UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RAJESH JAT, A226 103 853,
Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-cv-01162
v. (SAPORITO, J.)
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM On May 1, 2026, the petitioner, appearing through counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1. In this petition, Rajesh Jat, a native and citizen of India, challenges the legality of his pre-removal immigration detention without an individualized bond hearing. At the time of filing, Jat was being held in the custody of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at Pike County Correctional Facility, located in Pike County, Pennsylvania. I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Jat initially entered the United States without inspection at or near Mooers, New York, on or about June 25, 2024. Jat was apprehended by the United States Border Patrol shortly thereafter and detained briefly.
That same day, he was released on his own recognizance, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Resp. Ex. 1, at 3, Doc. 4-2. At the time of his release, Jat was served with a Notice to Appear, DHS Form I-862, dated June 25,
2024, which declared him to be subject to removal as an “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled,”1 and which directed him to appear for a hearing before an immigration judge in New
York, New York, on August 6, 2025. Resp. Ex. 2, Doc. 4-3. Jat has no criminal history, and he has complied with all legal obligations since his entry into the United States in June 2024.
On August 6, 2025, the date of his initial hearing before an immigration judge, Jat was re-arrested and detained by ICE officers. Jat was transported to Pike County Correctional Facility, where he remains
in civil immigration detention. He has been denied any opportunity to post bond or to be released on other conditions. On February 25, 2026, an immigration judge denied Jat’s
application for asylum and withholding of removal, including a claim for
1 Notably, a box on the Notice for declaring him to be an “arriving alien” was checked. Resp. Ex. 2, Doc. 4-3. withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture,2 and he
ordered Jat’s removal to India. Resp. Ex. 3, Doc. 4-4. Jat has timely filed an appeal of the immigration judge’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which remains pending. Resp. Ex. 4, Doc. 4-5.
II. DISCUSSION Since the United States began restricting immigration into this country in the late 19th century, it has distinguished between those noncitizens seeking entry into the country and those already residing within it. Noncitizens “stopped at the boundary line” who have “gained no foothold in the United States” do not enjoy the same constitutional protections afforded to persons inside the United States. But once a noncitizen enters the United States, “the legal circumstance changes,” for the constitutional right to due process applies to all “persons” within our nation’s borders, “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” This distinction between noncitizens who have entered and reside in
2 The immigration judge’s form order included a further, summary finding that Jat had knowingly filed a frivolous application for asylum after having been notified of the consequences, as set forth in INA § 208(d)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6). Resp. Ex. 3, at 1. At the time of his re-arrest on August 6, 2025—more than one year after his entry into the United States—Jat had not yet filed an application for asylum. Resp. Ex. 1, at 3. Thus, it would appear that Jat’s application for asylum was denied on the ground that it had been untimely filed, sometime after his re-arrest. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (requiring a timely application for asylum to be filed within 1 year after the alien’s arrival in the United States); , 26 I. & N. Dec. 872 (B.I.A. 2016) (holding that an untimely application for asylum may be found frivolous under INA § 208(d)(6)). the United States and those who have not yet entered “runs throughout immigration law.” , 809 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (D. Idaho 2025) (first quoting , 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925); and then quoting
, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)) (citations omitted). Consistent with this distinction, “[t]wo statutory sections govern the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal: 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225 and 1226.” , 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1111 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025), , No. 25-7429 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025). As
concisely summarized by the Supreme Court: “U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the
Government to detain certain aliens pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” , 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (emphasis added).
Under § 1225, “an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as an ‘applicant for admission.’” , 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(a)(1)). Applicants for admission may be detained pending removal under two separate provisions: § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2). Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens who ( ) are arriving in the
United States, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (the “arriving aliens provision”), or have been physically present in the United States for less than two years without being admitted or paroled, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (the
“designation provision”),3 ( ) are inadmissible either for misrepresenting a material fact while attempting to gain admission to the United States or for lacking proper immigration documentation.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A); § 1182(a)(6)(C) (inadmissibility based on misrepresentation); § 1182(a)(7) (inadmissibility for lack of documentation). For these aliens, § 1225(b)(1) provides for expedited
removal proceedings without further hearing or review, unless the alien
3 This so-called “designation provision” further limits this group of aliens subject to expedited removal proceedings to certain categories of aliens expressly designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, § 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii), but the current scope of that designation is “the full scope of statutory authority,” and thus all aliens who have not been admitted or paroled into the United States and who have not been physically present in the United States continuously for the two-year period prior to determination of inadmissibility are subject to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1). , 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025); , 962 F.3d 612, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (providing a historic overview of groups designated under § 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii)); , 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 62–64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same), , No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025). expresses a fear of persecution or an intent to apply for asylum, in which
case the alien is subject to mandatory detention pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removal. § 1225(b)(1)(B).
, 962 F.3d 612, 618–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (summarizing expedited removal provisions); , 811 F. Supp. 3d 274, 291–92 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (same);
, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 59–64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same), , No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025). Section 1225(b)(2) is a “broader . . . catchall provision” that applies
to other “applicants for admission” who are “seeking admission” to the United States.4 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); , 583 U.S. at 287. Under § 1225(b)(2), an applicant for admission is placed into ordinary
(not expedited) removal proceedings. § 1225(b)(2)(A); § 1229a (describing ordinary removal proceedings before an immigration judge). With limited exceptions, however, an alien is subject to mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2) while removal proceedings remain pending.
4 The statute expressly provides that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to those to whom § 1225(b)(1) applies, as well as other categories not relevant here. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B). § 1225(b)(2)(A); § 1182(d)(5) (authorizing the Secretary of
Homeland Security to grant humanitarian parole to aliens awaiting removal proceedings); § 1225(b)(2)(C) (providing that aliens arriving on land from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States may be
returned to that foreign territory pending removal proceedings, rather than be detained); , 809 F. Supp. 3d at 1113 (“Section 1225(b) mandates detention without bond hearings, except for narrow
humanitarian parole.”). Meanwhile, as noted above, § 1226 “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of
removal proceedings.” , 583 U.S. at 289. Such aliens who are already present in the United States may be detained pending removal under two separate provisions: § 1226(a) and § 1226(c).
Section 1226(a) prescribes a discretionary detention framework for these aliens when subject to removal proceedings, providing that: “On a warrant issued by the Attorney General,[5] an alien may be arrested and
5 This statutory authority to issue immigration arrest warrants has been delegated to a number of supervisory immigration officials listed in the applicable regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2); §§ 236.1(b), 1236.1(b). detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from
the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The statute further provides that such an alien may be released on bond while removal proceedings remain pending. § 1226(a)(2). The relevant implementing regulations provide
that a § 1226(a) detainee may be released on bond upon showing “that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8),
1236.1(c)(8). Immigration authorities6 are tasked with an initial bond or custody determination, §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8), after which the alien may request an individualized bond hearing before an immigration
judge, §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1); § 1003.19 (setting out procedures for the review of bond determinations by immigration judges). , 586 U.S. 392, 397 (2019) (“If the alien is
detained, he may seek review of his detention by an officer at the Department of Homeland Security and then by an immigration judge (both exercising power delegated by the Secretary); and the alien may
secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that
6 The same supervisory immigration officials authorized to issue arrest warrants. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8). he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.”) (citations
omitted). An adverse bond determination by the immigration judge can be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 U.S.C. §§ 236.1(d)(3), 1236.1(d)(3).
, 906 F.3d 274, 275 (3d Cir. 2018) (summarizing § 1226(a) bond procedures). Finally, “Section 1226(c) . . . carves out a statutory category of
aliens who may be released under § 1226(a).” , 583 U.S. at 289. This subsection specifies certain criminal histories that require mandatory detention of aliens who would otherwise be eligible for a bond
hearing under § 1226(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Such criminal aliens may only be released under very narrow circumstances involving a determination by the Attorney General that the alien’s release is
necessary for witness-protection purposes and the alien does not pose a flight risk or a danger to the community. § 1226(c)(4); , 583 U.S. at 289.
The petitioner in this case, Rajesh Jat, has been detained by immigration authorities without a bond determination pending disposition of his ordinary, § 1229a removal proceedings.7 In his petition,
Jat argues that, because he was detained within the interior of the United States, he is not properly subject to mandatory pre-removal-order detention under § 1225(b)(2). Rather, he contends that he may only be
properly detained under § 1226(a), which requires that he be given an opportunity for an individualized bond hearing. Jat further asserts a claim under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), arguing that his
detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2) is arbitrary and contrary to law.8 In addition to these statutory arguments, Jat argues that his pre-removal detention without an opportunity to be considered for release on bond
violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights.9
7 The parties appear to agree that the petitioner has been putatively detained without an opportunity for a bond determination pursuant to § 1225(b)(2). The respondent has identified no other basis for his detention. Moreover, the petitioner has not been placed in expedited removal proceedings, as would be expected for a § 1225(b)(1) detainee, he has no criminal record to qualify him for mandatory detention under § 1226(c), and immigration officials have refused to give him a bond hearing, as required under § 1226(a). 8 Having granted relief on the basis of the petitioner’s primary statutory claim—that his detention is pursuant to § 1226(a) rather than § 1225(b)(2)—we decline to reach the petitioner’s alternative argument that his detention violates the APA. 9 Having found a statutory basis for relief, we do not reach the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner as alternative grounds for The respondent raises multiple arguments in opposition to the
petition. First, the respondent argues that a jurisdiction-stripping provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) prevents this court from considering one particular form of injunctive relief
requested by the petitioner—an order enjoining the Government from removing Jat from the United States while his removal proceedings remain pending. Second, the respondent argues that § 1225(b)(2) does
properly apply to the petitioner, and that it prescribes mandatory detention.10 Finally, the respondent argues that applying § 1225(b)(2) here comports with due process.11
A. Jurisdiction We necessarily turn first to the question of this courts’ jurisdiction. The respondent argues that, to the extent that he seeks an order
enjoining the Government from removing him from the United States, the petitioner’s habeas claims are jurisdictionally barred under 8 U.S.C.
relief. , 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of defending them.”). 10 We note that the respondent’s answer does not engage with the petitioner’s APA claim at all. In any event, see note 8. 11 note 9. § 1252(b)(9), a statutory provision that strips federal district courts of
jurisdiction to consider certain immigration-related habeas claims. Section 1252(b)(9) is commonly described as a “zipper clause” because it channels judicial review of all decisions and actions arising
from removal proceedings into a single petition for review (“PFR”) from a final order of removal. , 164 F.4th 259, 275 (3d Cir. 2026) (“Section 1252(b)(9) works as a ‘zipper’ clause, channeling ‘most
claims that even relate to removal’ into PFRs. It ensures that petitioners get only one bite at the apple.”) (citations omitted). Section 1252(b)(9) provides that “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact . . . arising
from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final order [of removal],” and that “no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus
under section 2241 of Title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision . . . to review such an order or such questions of law or fact.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). “Because judicial review of a final order of removal is
available only in the court of appeals, district courts cannot review these ‘arising from’ claims either.” , 950 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2020). In , the Third Circuit
read the “arising from” phrase to require courts to “ask: If not now, when? If the answer would otherwise be never, then § 1252(b)(9) poses no jurisdictional bar.” The “point” of that subsection, [the court] explained, “is to channel claims into a single PFR, not to bar claims that do not fit within that process.” So when aliens can get review later—by litigating before an immigration judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and then by way of a PFR to a court of appeals—they must do so. District courts play little if any role in that sequence. But when aliens raise claims that courts cannot “meaningfully” review through the PFR process, those claims do not “arise from” the “actions taken” or “proceedings brought” to remove them. , 164 F.4th at 273–74 (citations and brackets omitted). In , the Third Circuit further clarified that such “[a] now-or-never claim must raise legal or factual that a court of appeals will not later be able to review meaningfully on a PFR. It is not enough to assert an injury that cannot be remedied later.” at 274–75; at 275 (“[T]o avoid getting channeled to a PFR, a claim must raise now-or-never , not just now-or-never harms.”). Although this court may properly exercise jurisdiction over the legal questions of whether § 1225(b) or § 1226(a) applies with respect to Jat’s pre-removal detention, and whether Jat is entitled to a bond hearing, the § 1252(b)(9) zipper clause precludes this court from
exercising jurisdiction over the petitioner’s request that we enjoin his removal, an issue that can—and must—be reviewed through the ordinary PFR process. , No. 3:26-CV-
00559, 2026 WL 788646, at *3 & n.2 (M.D. Pa. Mar 20, 2026) (“Requests for relief related to removal generally do not involve now or never questions of law that are reviewable with a writ of habeas corpus because
most issues with an order of removal or notice of removal can be reviewed later on a PFR.”). B. Merits
We turn then to the merits of the petition. The respondent purports to have detained Jat pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which provides for mandatory detention without the opportunity for release on bond. The
petitioner, however, contends that he could only be properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and under that statute, he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing.
“[F]or section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, several conditions must be met—in particular, an ‘examining immigration officer’ must determine that the individual is: (1) an ‘applicant for admission’; (2) ‘seeking admission’; and (3) ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted.’” , 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)), , No. 25-1902 (1st Cir. Dec. 23, 2025); , 2025 WL 3188399, at *6 (citing
); , No. 3:25-CV-02411, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2025) (citing and ); , No. 4:26-CV-00009, 2026 WL 296215, at *4
(M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2026) (citing ). Significantly, “Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to an alien who is an applicant for admission and ‘seeking admission.’” , 2025 WL 3188399, at *6
(emphasis in original); , 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (citing and , 807 F. Supp. 3d 397, 406 (D.N.J. 2025)); , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting
). Section 1225 defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives
in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Meanwhile, the phrase “seeking admission” is not defined in § 1225, and the courts of this circuit have construed the plain language of “seeking admission” to describe “active and ongoing conduct—physically attempting to come into the
United States, typically at a border or a port of entry.” , 2025 WL 3188399, at *6; , 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (citing ); , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (citing
). “This reading preserves the distinction between ‘seeking admission’ and the separate term ‘applicant for admission,’ ensuring that each phrase carries independent meaning.” ,
2025 WL 3188399, at *6; , 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (quoting ); , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting ). It also comports with the Supreme Court’s
finding in that “§ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United States.” , 583 U.S. at 297; , 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (quoting ); ,
2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting and ). “In sum, a plain reading of § 1225(b) demonstrates that it applies to individuals who are attempting to enter the United States, not those
already within the country.” , 2026 WL 296215, at *4; , 2025 WL 3188399, at *7 (considering the statutory context of § 1225(b)(2) and concluding that this provision “contemplates inspection and detention at or immediately following border crossing”).
By contrast, as the Supreme Court has previously recognized, “§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States.” , 583 U.S. at 303; , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting
). “Section 1226(a) creates a default rule for those aliens by permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney General to issue warrants for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings,” and it
“permits the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond.” , 583 U.S. at 303; , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting ); , 2025 WL 3709045, at *5 (“Unlike
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), § 1226(a) provides for bond or conditional parole.”) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)). “[U]nder Section 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, [an alien discretionarily detained pending removal
proceedings] is entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge at which the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he poses a danger to the community[] or . . . that he is a flight risk,
if it seeks to continue detaining him.” , 804 F. Supp. 3d 265, 277 (D. Mass. 2025);12 , 812 F. Supp. 3d 459, 462–
63 (D.N.J. 2025) (“Noncitizens who are arrested after having lived in the United States for a while do not generally have to be detained. They are instead entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration court.” (citing
) (citations and footnote omitted)). , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (“[I]f an individual is detained attempting to enter the country illegally or while otherwise presenting themselves for
inspection and entry, they are subject to mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225. If they are arrested after having already entered the country, they are subject to detention under § 1226 and are entitled to a bond
12 We note that, applying First Circuit precedent, the court stated that the government may prove that an alien is a danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence, or that he is a flight risk by the lesser preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. , 804 F. Supp. 3d at 277 (citing , 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021)). The Third Circuit, however, has held that the government must prove either dangerousness flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. , 965 F.3d 203, 213–14 (3d Cir. 2020) (“When the Government seeks to take more than just money from a party, we typically hold the Government to a standard of proof higher than a preponderance of the evidence.”); , 12 F.4th 321, 333 n.9 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[I]t is a ‘settled rule that when a party stands to lose his liberty, even temporarily, we hold the Government’ to a ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard in the context of civil detention . . . .”) (quoting ); , 547 F. Supp. 3d 462, 465 (M.D. Pa. 2021) (quoting ). hearing.”).
Here, § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to the detention of Jat. We find that Jat is no longer seeking admission into the United States— at the time of his arrest and detention, he was not actively attempting to
come into the United States at a border or port of entry. Rather, he is already here, having resided within the United States for an extended period of time. , 2025 WL 3188399, at *1 (finding that
petitioner who lived in the United States for almost two years was not “seeking admission” but “already here”); , 2025 WL 3709045, at *5 (citing ). Thus, Jat may only be properly
detained pursuant to § 1226(a), and therefore he is entitled to a bond hearing. , 2026 WL 296215, at *5. , No. 3:25-cv-2185, 2025 WL 3516865, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8,
2025) (“The overwhelming majority of federal district courts that have addressed this issue have interpreted the INA to find that persons similarly situated to Petitioner—noncitizens who previously entered the
United States and are currently residing in the United States—are not subject to the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) but instead are subject to the discretionary detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and accordingly are entitled to a bond hearing.”); at
*4 & n.7 (collecting Third Circuit district court cases).13 III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the petitioner is currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2), and thus he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing. Accordingly, the petition will be granted in part and denied in part. The
13 , ___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL 1146044, at *5, 6 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026) (“Section 1226(a) plainly applies to noncitizens, like Petitioner, who are present in the United States, but charged as inadmissible for entering the country without inspection and admission. . . . Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to those noncitizens who present themselves at a port of entry for admission, or who cross the physical border into the United States but are apprehended at the ‘threshold of initial entry.’”); , ___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL 1223250, at *21 (7th Cir. May 5, 2026) (“[T]he text, statutory context, legislative history, and long-standing Executive practice all confirm that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to ‘applicants for admission’ who are seeking lawful entry at the border or ports of entry and not to noncitizens unlawfully living in the country’s interior.”); , ___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL 1243395, at *1 (11th Cir. May, 6, 2026) (“The text and statutory structure of the INA, bolstered by the long history of detention across our immigration laws and the congressional purpose in passing IIRIRA, yield the conclusion that no-bond detention generally applies to arriving aliens seeking lawful entry to the country, and not to aliens who are simply present here.”); , ___ F.4th ____, at *11, 2026 WL 1283891 (6th Cir. May 11, 2026) (holding that noncitizens without lawful status who had lived in the United States for years were not “seeking admission” and thus were not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention scheme). petition will be granted to the extent that the government will be ordered
to provide the petitioner with an individualized bond hearing within twenty-one days or to release him from custody. The petition, however, will be denied with respect the petitioner’s request for an order enjoining
his removal from the United States while removal proceedings remain pending, as this court lacks proper jurisdiction to grant such relief. An appropriate order follows.
Dated: May 26, 2026 JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR. United States District Judge