Appellate Case: 24-1326 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2026 FILED Page: 1 United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 14, 2026 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Christopher M. Wolpert _________________________________ Clerk of Court
CYRUS RAJABI,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 24-1326 (D.C. No. 1:21-CV-00422-GPG-JPO) SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT (D. Colo.) SERVICES, INC.; TRISTAR GROUP, d/b/a Tristar Managed Care, d/b/a Tristar Risk Management,
Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before MATHESON, EBEL, and EID, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Cyrus Rajabi sued Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. and Tristar
Group (collectively, the “Claims Administrators”) for breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing under Colorado law. The district court entered summary
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-1326 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2026 Page: 2
judgment against Mr. Rajabi, concluding he lacked sufficient evidence to prove his
claim.
On appeal, Mr. Rajabi argues the court (1) erred in granting summary
judgment and (2) abused its discretion in denying him a stay of the litigation and an
extension of discovery deadlines. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History 1
On April 23, 2017, Mr. Rajabi—a volunteer firefighter—was injured during a
training exercise with the Arvada Fire Protection District. “He dislocated three
fingers, tore ligaments and a tendon, and sustained an avulsion fracture and nerve
damage.” Rajabi v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 21-cv-422, 2024 WL
3835697, at *1 (D. Colo. July 12, 2024). Mr. Rajabi reported the incident to his
employer, Arvada Fire, which “filed a claim with its Workers’ Compensation
Carrier.” App., Vol. I at 71. “Tristar—a third-party claims administrator—handled
[Mr. Rajabi’s] claim from the date initially submitted to July 2020,” when Sedgwick
took over claims-handling duties. Rajabi, 2024 WL 3835697, at *1.
“Because this case arises from an appeal of summary judgment, we present the 1
following factual background in the light most favorable to [Mr. Rajabi] as the non-moving party, unless contradicted by the record.” Litzsinger v. Adams Cnty. Coroner’s Off., 25 F.4th 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 2022).
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Following the incident, Mr. Rajabi was diagnosed with Complex Regional
Pain Syndrome (“CPRS”)—chronic pain that develops after an injury or other
traumatic event. Id. From 2017 to 2022, he received extensive medical treatment.
His treating physicians sought authorization from the Claims Administrators for
coverage of Mr. Rajabi’s medical treatments. Relying on reports from their
consulting physicians, the Claims Administrators denied authorization when the
reports concluded that treatment was not medically reasonable and necessary or
causally related to the April 23, 2017 injury.
B. Legal Background
Colorado law requires an insurer “to treat an insured with good faith.”
Sandoval v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 952 F.3d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 2020); see
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 102 P.3d 333, 342 (Colo. 2004) (en banc). An
insured may sue for breach of this duty. See Peden v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins.
Co., 841 F.3d 887, 890 (10th Cir. 2016). To prevail, “the insured must prove that the
insurer (1) acted ‘unreasonably under the circumstances’ and (2) ‘knowingly or
recklessly disregarded the validity of the insured’s claim.’” Id. (quoting Goodson v.
Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 89 P.3d 409, 415 (Colo. 2004) (en banc)). “The
reasonableness of the insurer’s conduct must be determined objectively, based on
proof of industry standards,” which “often require[s]” the “aid of expert witnesses.”
Goodson, 89 P.3d at 415.
In making a reasonableness determination, courts may consider a
fairly-debatable standard. It provides that “[i]f a reasonable person would find that
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the insurer’s justification for denying or delaying payment of a claim was ‘fairly
debatable’ (i.e., if reasonable minds could disagree as to the coverage-determining
facts or law), then this weighs against a finding that the insurer acted unreasonably.”
Sanderson v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 251 P.3d 1213, 1217 (Colo. App. 2010). But
even though “fair debatability” may help the insurer, it is not “outcome
determinative.” Id. at 1218. The insurer still “must exercise reasonable care and
good faith” in handling the claim. Id. (quotations omitted). “[A]n insurer will be
found to have acted in bad faith only if it has intentionally denied, failed to process,
or failed to pay a claim without a reasonable basis.” Zolman v. Pinnacol Assur.,
261 P.3d 490, 497 (Colo. App. 2011). 2
C. Procedural History
On October 23, 2020, Mr. Rajabi filed his complaint in state court. The
Claims Administrators removed the case to federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction. Rajabi, 2024 WL 3835697, at *1.
The Complaint
Mr. Rajabi’s complaint alleged that the Claims Administrators “wrongfully
delayed and/or failed to pay for Mr. Rajabi’s medical treatment . . . and/or denied
medical treatment for Mr. Rajabi.” App., Vol. I at 23. He alleged that, “[i]nstead of
relying on [Mr. Rajabi’s] treating physicians,” the Claims Administrators “would
2 Because the district court concluded that Mr. Rajabi failed to put forth “any competent summary judgment evidence” supporting his claim, it did not analyze the fairly-debatable standard. Rajabi, 2024 WL 3835697, at *4.
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default to . . . ‘independent’ medical exams or record reviews performed by
physicians known by [the Claims Administrators] to provide reports favorable to
[their] position in contested workers’ compensation claims.” Id. at 21. The
complaint asserted his “workers’ compensation benefits were improperly delayed
and/or denied,” id. at 23, but it did not provide specifics.
Pre-Summary Judgment Litigation
On September 22, 2022, the district court entered a scheduling order, including
discovery deadlines. The Claims Administrators served requests for admissions.
In March 2023, Mr. Rajabi’s counsel moved to withdraw and for an extension
of the deadlines. The district court extended the deadlines by three months and
granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. The Claims Administrators sought to
schedule Mr. Rajabi’s deposition and rejected his request to stay the deadlines due to
his medical treatments. After his original counsel withdrew, Mr. Rajabi did not
request a stay or a discovery extension that complied with the local rules.
In November 2023, Sedgwick moved for summary judgment. The district
court scheduled a status conference, but Mr. Rajabi failed to appear. He later
explained that his poor health limited his participation. In January 2024, Tristar
moved for summary judgment.
In February 2024, a new counsel entered a limited appearance for Mr. Rajabi
and moved for a six-month stay. The district court struck the motion for failure to
comply with the local rules. The court stated clear instructions on how to request a
60-day stay, but Mr. Rajabi failed to do so.
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In March 2024, after another counsel entered an appearance for Mr. Rajabi, the
court again afforded Mr. Rajabi an opportunity to request a stay or seek additional
discovery. It instructed counsel to file a motion “addressing all outstanding dates and
issues, e.g., discovery, summary judgment response, etc.” Id. at 14. Mr. Rajabi’s
new counsel requested an extension of time to respond to the summary judgment
motions. He did not ask for a stay and did not request additional discovery, stating
Mr. Rajabi “agree[s] with [the Claims Administrators’] counsel that discovery issues
should be addressed following the disposition of summary judgment motions.” App.,
Vol. III at 442. The court granted a 45-day extension for Mr. Rajabi to file his
opposition to summary judgment.
At no point did Mr. Rajabi serve any discovery requests or respond to the
Claims Administrators’ discovery requests. In particular, he did not answer the
requests for admissions, appear for a deposition, or disclose any experts. Because he
failed to respond to the Claims Administrators’ requests for admissions, the matters
were deemed admitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(3). 3
Summary Judgment
a. The Claims Administrators’ motions
In their summary judgment motions, the Claims Administrators argued
(1) Mr. Rajabi could not prove his claim because he lacked evidence that the Claims
3 “A matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or its attorney.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3).
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Administrators acted in bad faith, and (2) Mr. Rajabi’s deemed admissions showed
there were no genuine issues of material fact. Rajabi, 2024 WL 3835697, at *2 &
n.1.
Sedgwick attached an affidavit and expert report from Gregory R. Giometti, a
lawyer specializing in representing insurance companies and their insureds in
litigation. He explained the insurance industry standards for bad faith in Colorado,
provided a chronology of Mr. Rajabi’s medical treatments and Sedgwick’s claim
handling, and opined that Sedgwick complied fully with industry standards. 4
b. Mr. Rajabi’s opposition
Mr. Rajabi argued that (1) the Claims Administrators failed to “make an
affirmative showing of the absence of a genuine factual dispute,” App., Vol. III
at 461; (2) Mr. Giometti’s report is inadmissible; (3) the summary judgment motions
should have been brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 as motions for
discovery sanctions; and (4) he should be permitted to withdraw his “deemed
admissions,” id. at 471. He also attached an expert report from Dr. Ara
Deukmedjian, M.D., who had performed a spinal surgery on Mr. Rajabi that the
Claims Administrators had not authorized. Dr. Deukmedjian opined that the surgery
was causally related to and necessary to address Mr. Rajabi’s April 2017 injuries.
Although Sedgwick retained Mr. Giometti, Tristar also attached his report to its 4
summary judgment motion because Mr. Giometti said that he “saw no evidence that the Claim was improperly handled before Sedgwick became involved.” App., Vol. II at 246, 317.
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c. The district court’s order
The district court granted summary judgment to the Claims Administrators.
Rajabi, 2024 WL 3835697, at *6. It rejected Mr. Rajabi’s argument that they failed
to carry their burden as the movants, holding they “satisfied their initial summary
judgment burden by directing the Court to [Mr. Rajabi’s] apparent lack of admissible
evidence suggesting that [the Claims Administrators] both unreasonably denied or
delayed paying any benefits owed and knowingly or recklessly disregarded the
validity of Plaintiff’s claims.” Id. at *3. The court also said the Claims
Administrators “adequately supported their motion with affirmative evidence” by
providing Mr. Giometti’s affidavit and report opining that the Claims Administrators
complied with industry standards. Id.
The district court rejected Mr. Rajabi’s challenges to the admissibility and
contents of Mr. Giometti’s affidavit and report. Id. To the extent “[s]pecific portions
of Mr. Giometti’s materials” addressed issues exclusively reserved for the court and
jury, the court said it “would not have permitted” such testimony at trial, but that
“do[es] not warrant the wholesale exclusion of Mr. Giometti’s affidavit and report for
summary judgment purposes.” Id. at *4.
Having determined the Claims Administrators carried their burden, the district
court assessed whether Mr. Rajabi had presented “evidence creating a genuine triable
issue.” Id. It determined he had not provided “any competent summary judgment
evidence.” Id. The court said his affidavit “recites legal conclusions and offers
opinions as to [the Claims Administrators] behavior without explaining the factual
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basis for those opinions.” Id. And his “non-disclosed expert report” from
Dr. Deukmedjian failed to raise a fact issue precluding summary judgment. Id.
at *4-5. Although Dr. Deukmedjian opined on the causal relationship between
Mr. Rajabi’s spinal surgery and the April 2017 injury, he did not discuss whether the
Claims Administrators’ reliance on alternative physician opinions was unreasonable
or whether they followed industry standards in handling Mr. Rajabi’s claims. Id.
at *5.
Because Mr. Rajabi’s lack of evidence was dispositive, the district court
“decline[d] to resolve the parties’ dispute as to the status of [Mr. Rajabi’s] deemed
admissions.” Id. at *2 n.1. It concluded “that summary judgment [was] warranted
regardless of how the deemed admission issue resolves.” Id. The district court also
rejected his argument that the Claims Administrators’ motions were “improper,
backdoor motions for discovery sanctions,” stating that “simply because
[Mr. Rajabi’s] conduct in discovery might warrant some lesser sanction than
dismissal does not mean that [he] has adduced sufficient evidence that a reasonable
jury could find in his favor.” Id.
Finally, the district court said that because Mr. Rajabi had not (1) argued that
he was unable to conduct adequate affirmative discovery or (2) sought relief under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), it “presume[d] that [Mr. Rajabi] asserted his
most compelling case in response to the summary judgment motions.” Id. at *6
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II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mr. Rajabi challenges (A) the district court’s summary judgment
ruling and (B) its failure to grant a stay of the case and an extension of time for
discovery. We reject both.
A. Summary Judgment
Legal Standards
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, using the
same standard applied by the district court.” Walkingstick Dixon v. Oklahoma
ex. rel. Reg’l Univ. Sys. of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 125 F.4th 1321, 1333 (10th Cir.
2025) (quoting Cillo v. City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451, 461 (10th Cir. 2013)).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a “court shall grant summary judgment
if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” We view the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-movant, resolving all factual disputes and reasonable
inferences in their favor. Cillo, 739 F.3d at 461.
“The movant bears the initial burden of making a prima facie demonstration of
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a
matter of law.” Savant Homes, Inc. v. Collins, 809 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2016)
(quotations omitted); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “A
movant who does not bear the burden of persuasion at trial may satisfy this burden by
pointing out to the court a lack of evidence on an essential element of the
nonmovant’s claim.” Walkingstick Dixon, 125 F.4th at 1333 (quotations omitted);
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see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. “If the movant meets this initial burden, the burden
then shifts to the nonmovant to set forth specific facts from which a rational trier of
fact could find for the nonmovant.” Walkingstick Dixon, 125 F.4th at 1333
(quotations omitted); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
Analysis
Mr. Rajabi argues the district court erred by (1) failing to require the Claims
Administrators to “make an affirmative showing of the absence of genuine disputes
of material facts,” Aplt. Br. at 15; (2) considering Mr. Giometti’s report, id. at 20-23;
and (3) overlooking genuine disputes of material fact raised by Mr. Giometti’s report,
id. at 16.
a. The Claims Administrators’ initial burden
Mr. Rajabi’s first argument fails because, as the district court determined, the
Claims Administrators “direct[ed] the Court to [Mr. Rajabi’s] apparent lack of
admissible evidence” showing that they “both unreasonably denied or delayed paying
any benefits owed and knowingly or recklessly disregarded the validity of
[Mr. Rajabi’s] claim.” Rajabi, 2024 WL 3835697, at *3. Based on our review of the
summary judgment motions and the record, we see no error in this determination.
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b. Mr. Giometti’s report
Mr. Rajabi argues that the district court should not have considered
Mr. Giometti’s report because it included opinions on legal issues. Aplt. Br.
at 20-22. 5 The court did not err.
As noted above, in bad faith insurance claim cases, “[t]he aid of expert
witnesses is often required in order to establish objective evidence of industry
standards.” Goodson, 89 P.3d at 415; see also, e.g., Peden, 841 F.3d at 890 (Industry
standards “may be established through expert opinions or state law.”). “But an
expert may not state his or her opinions as to legal standards nor may he or she state
legal conclusions drawn by applying the law to the facts,” Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co.
Emp. Stock Ownership Plan & Tr. v. Alerus Fin., N.A., 858 F.3d 1324, 1342
(10th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). To the extent Mr. Giometti did so, those parts
of his report should not be considered in resolving the summary judgment motions.
See Christiansen v. City of Tulsa, 332 F.3d 1270, 1283 (10th Cir. 2003). But they
were not. The district court said it would not allow such evidence at trial and did not
consider it when ruling on the Claims Administrators’ motions. See Rajabi,
2024 WL 3835697, at *3-4, *4 n.3. So it did not err.
5 Mr. Rajabi failed to raise this issue below, but the district court “passed upon” it, see Tesone v. Empire Mktg. Strategies, 942 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted), preserving his challenge for appellate review. The court said “Mr. Rajabi should have challenged Mr. Giometti’s testimony in a freestanding motion [under Federal Rule of Evidence 702] rather than a summary judgment response,” but it addressed the challenge on the merits anyway. Rajabi, 2024 WL 3835697, at *3 n.2.
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c. Material factual dispute
Despite arguing that the district court should not have considered
Mr. Giometti’s report at all, Mr. Rajabi also contends the report showed material
factual issues that should have precluded summary judgment because it described
“conflicting conclusions between Mr. Rajabi’s treating physicians and the Claims
Administrators’ retained physicians” about the need for treatment. Aplt. Br. at 16.
This argument misunderstands the summary judgment standard, the law governing
bad faith insurance claims, or both.
To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show a fact is not
only disputed but also is material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986); Walkingstick Dixon, 125 F.4th at 1333. “A fact is ‘material’ if it
‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’” Alcala v. Ortega,
128 F.4th 1298, 1306 (10th Cir. 2025) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
Here, the issue under the governing law is whether the Claims Administrators
acted reasonably under industry standards. Goodson, 89 P.3d at 414-15. So the
material question is not whether Mr. Rajabi’s treating doctors and the Claims
Administrators’ consulting doctors disagreed about whether treatment was necessary
or related to the covered injury. If it were, any insurer’s refusal to authorize payment
for treatment in this circumstance would defeat summary judgment. The pertinent
question instead is whether the Claims Administrators (1) acted unreasonably and
(2) knowingly or recklessly disregarded the validity of the insured’s claim. See
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Peden, 841 F.3d at 890; Zolman, 261 P.3d at 496. As the district court determined,
Mr. Rajabi presented no evidence that the Claims Administrators did so.
Mr. Giometti’s report explains that the Claims Administrators denied
authorization to pay for treatments and surgeries that their consulting physicians
determined were “not medically reasonable and necessary” or “were unrelated to the
April 23, 2017 injury.” App., Vol. I at 201. Mr. Rajabi has offered no evidence to
question the reasonableness of the Claims Administrators’ decisions. See Sandoval,
952 F.3d at 1237 (noting the insurer’s “disagreement with Ms. Sandoval’s surgeon
does not suggest that the investigation was unreasonable”). Nor has he controverted
Mr. Giometti’s conclusion that the Claims Administrators complied with industry
standards. See Aplt. Br. at 16-19. Mr. Rajabi has presented no evidence that they
failed to (1) reasonably investigate, Peden, 841 F.3d at 891, (2) “promptly and
effectively communicate” claim handling information, id. (quotations omitted), or
(3) pay undisputed benefits, Fear v. GEICO Casualty Co., 560 P.3d 974, 976 (Colo.
2024).
In sum, as the district court found, Mr. Rajabi “lacks any competent summary
judgment evidence that would allow a jury to conclude that [the Claims
Administrators] acted unreasonably, let alone evidence showing that [the Claims
Administrators] knowingly or recklessly disregarded the validity of [Mr. Rajabi’s]
claims.” Rajabi, 2024 WL 3835697, at *4.
* * * *
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Mr. Rajabi’s challenges to the district court’s summary judgment ruling lack
merit. We affirm. 6
B. Denial of Stay and Discovery Extension
Mr. Rajabi argues the district court “abused its discretion in denying [him] a
stay of litigation and additional time to pursue discovery.” Aplt. Br. at 29. As
Mr. Rajabi appears to agree, we review for abuse of discretion. 7 Based on the
procedural history set forth above, we discern no error.
The district court afforded Mr. Rajabi multiple opportunities to seek a stay and
more time for discovery. And, as the court noted, Mr. Rajabi did not request
additional discovery under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 56(d), Rajabi, 2024 WL
3835697, at *6, which states, “If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that,
for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the
court may . . . allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery.”
“Because [Mr. Rajabi] ‘failed to invoke Rule 56(d),’ the district court ‘did not err in
6 Mr. Rajabi argues the district court erred because it relied on (1) the “fairly debatable” standard as “outcome determinative” and (2) his deemed admissions. Aplt. Br. at 23-29. It relied on neither. It instead granted summary judgment because Mr. Rajabi failed to present competent evidence that the Claims Administrators acted unreasonably. Rajabi, 2024 WL 3835697, at *2 n.1. 7 See, e.g., Price ex rel. Price v. W. Res., Inc., 232 F.3d. 779, 783-84 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying abuse of discretion standard to review a denial of a stay to take more discovery); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 987 (10th Cir. 2000) (same); Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006) (applying abuse of discretion standard to review a denial of a request to extend the discovery deadline).
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granting summary judgment based on the evidence and arguments presented to it by
both parties.’” Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Baca, 122 F.4th 1224, 1240 (10th Cir.
2024) (quoting Rocky Mountain Prestress, LLC v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
960 F.3d 1255, 1264 (10th Cir. 2020)).
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s judgment.
Entered for the Court
Scott M. Matheson, Jr. Circuit Judge