R.A.J. v. Miller

590 F. Supp. 1319, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15651
District Court, N.D. Texas·Decided June 22, 1984·No. Civ. A. 3-74-0394-H·Published·Cited by 8 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SANDERS, District Judge.

This case is before the Court on the Review Panel’s (“Panel”) Recommendation Number 24, which concerns the adoption of a proposed Commissioner’s Rule governing the manner in which patient consent must be sought prior to the administration of psychotropic medications. The Panel filed its original Recommendation on January 16, 1984. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants objected.

After further Court-ordered negotiations, the parties concluded that they fundamentally disagreed over the right of an involuntarily committed patient to withhold consent to the administration of psychotropic medication. In the absence of an emergency, Plaintiffs would allow administration over the patient’s objections only if it is deemed necessary after review and the patient lacks the present ability to appreciate the nature and consequences of his decision to object to the medication; a competent involuntarily committed patient would have the right to refuse treatment. Defendants would afford the involuntarily committed patient the right to have the treatment decision reviewed, and would provide an extra step in the review process if the patient is able to appreciate the nature and consequences of his decision; they would not, however, allow any involuntarily committed patient to refuse treatment.

Defendants filed their own Proposed Rule on March 21, 1984, which incorporates their position on the disputed issue. See Appendix. Plaintiffs’ Proposed Rule, filed March 28, 1984, has been adopted by the Panel in its Statement filed May 31, 1984. Pursuant to this Court’s Order of March 26, 1984, the parties have filed briefs in support of their respective positions. The United States filed its Recommendation and Memorandum on May 31, 1984; Plaintiffs and Defendants both filed their Briefs on June 1, 1984. In addition, the Court on June 1, 1984, granted leave to the Texas Medical Association to file an amicus curiae brief on this issue, which was received by the Court on June 11th.

After consideration of the aforementioned briefs, the authorities cited therein, and the Settlement Agreement, the Court is of the opinion, for the reasons discussed below, that Defendants’ Proposed Rule should be accepted.

The portion of the Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) that governs this controversy provides that the proposed rule on patient consent “shall set forth standards to be used with respect to voluntary admissions, emergency admissions, temporary hospitalizations and indefinite commitments. The proposed regulation shall take into account, procedures and practices developed and mandated in the cases of Rennie v. Klein, 476 F.Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), and Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (C.A. 1, 1980).” Agreement, VI(B)(3).

Since the entry of the Agreement in April of 1981, there has been significant activity in both the Rennie and Rogers eases. Rennie, after an en banc decision by the Third Circuit, was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3rd Cir.1981) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119, 102 S.Ct. 3506, 73 L.Ed.2d 1381 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3rd Cir.1983) (en banc). Assuming that the Youngberg analysis also applied to the facts of Rogers, the Supreme Court vacated that decision as well, calling on the lower court to decide whether an intervening state court decision may have obviated the need to reach the federal question. See Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir.1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 102 S.Ct. 2442, 73 L.Ed.2d 16 (1982).

*1321 In Youngberg, the Supreme Court held that an involuntarily committed mentally retarded person has a fourteenth amendment liberty interest in safe conditions of confinement and freedom from bodily restraint. Youngberg, supra, 457 U.S. at 315-16, 102 S.Ct. at 2458. The Court found, however, that, under certain circumstances, legitimate state interests can override these individual rights. Id. at 320,102 S.Ct. at 2460. The proper balance between individual rights and relevant state interests is achieved, and due process satisfied, as long as the restrictions on liberty are imposed by the exercise of professional judgment. Id. at 321, 102 S.Ct. at 2461. “It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of the several professionally acceptable choices should have been made.” Id. (quoting Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 178 (3rd Cir.1980) (Seitz, J., concurring)). The decision of a professional will be invalid only when it “is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2462, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). Any more stringent standard, the Court felt, “would place an undue burden on the administration of institutions ... and also would restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional judgment as to the needs of residents.” Id. at 322, 102 S.Ct. at 2461.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

R.A.J. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp. 1319, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15651 (N.D. Tex. 1984).

590 F. Supp. 1319 (R.A.J. v. Miller) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Steinkruger v. Miller
2000 SD 83 (South Dakota Supreme Court, 2000)
In re C.E.
641 N.E.2d 345 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1994)
Woodland v. Angus
820 F. Supp. 1497 (D. Utah, 1993)
Williams v. Wilzack
573 A.2d 809 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1990)
Riese v. St. Mary's Hospital & Medical Center
209 Cal. App. 3d 1303 (California Court of Appeal, 1987)
Jarvis v. Levine
403 N.W.2d 298 (Court of Appeals of Minnesota, 1987)