Rainey v. Commissioner

1988 T.C. Memo. 314, 55 T.C.M. 1315, 1988 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 342
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedJuly 25, 1988
DocketDocket No. 15782-86.
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1988 T.C. Memo. 314 (Rainey v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rainey v. Commissioner, 1988 T.C. Memo. 314, 55 T.C.M. 1315, 1988 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 342 (tax 1988).

Opinion

J. ROGERS RAINEY, JR., AND KATHLEEN L. RAINEY, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Rainey v. Commissioner
Docket No. 15782-86.
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 1988-314; 1988 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 342; 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1315; T.C.M. (RIA) 88314;
July 25, 1988.
V. Camp Cuthrell, III, for the petitioners.
Ramon Estrada, for the respondent.

COHEN

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

COHEN, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency of $ 1,973 in petitioners' Federal income taxes for 1982. The issue for determination is whether petitioners are entitled to depreciation deductions for structures located on their ranch property.

FINDINGS OF FACT

*343 Some of the facts have been stipulated, and the stipulated facts are incorporated in our findings by this reference. Petitioners were residents of Corpus Christi, Texas, at the time their petition was filed.

At all material times, J. Rogers Rainey, Jr. (petitioner) was a practicing certified public accountant with offices in Corpus Christi, Texas. He also performed management services for ranches and farms and arranged oil drilling ventures for his clients. Petitioner had a background in agricultural management.

In about 1977, petitioners acquired approximately 3,214 acres of ranch property in McMullen County, Texas. Petitioners leased the property for grazing in 1977. The property also produced income from mineral units, sale of water, sale of gravel, and a small lease to the Navy in relation to a target site installation.

After acquisition of the property, petitioners installed a prefabricated house, a water well, a water line, and a septic tank on the premises. They also renovated a house on the premises used for storage and purchased furniture for the prefabricated house. The prefabricated house was approximately 100 miles, and a 2-hour drive, from petitioners' *344 residence.

Petitioners, a consultant, and a game warden occasionally used the prefabricated house. In years other than 1982, petitioner hunted on the property. Petitioners reported net income and losses from the ranch operation as follows:

1981Loss$  7,995
1982Loss13,790
1983Loss3,053
1984Net Income20,405
1985Net Income10,247

OPINION

Petitioner testified that the ranch property was held for the production of income and that structures on the property were used in that activity. Petitioners' position is "that the management of the property for profit is the property as a whole, whether it is the gravel, or the oil and gas, or the increasing the value of the property by increasing the value of the wildlife on the property, or whether it is increasing the value of the property by increasing the grazing and the general condition of the property."

Without any evidence supporting his position, respondent asserts that the structures in question related to a "hunting operation" on the ranch. Respondent argues that petitioners' "hunting operation" was not a trade or a business operation in 1982, nor an activity eligible for deductions under*345 section 212. 1 Respondent asserts: 2

Petitioner's own testimony was to the effect that (1) the property is not leased for hunting (Tr. p. 27), (2) the property has never been leased for hunting (Tr. p. 32), and (3) that it was not petitioner's intention to develop the land into a very "high-class hunting preserve." (Tr. p. 34) Thus, there is no sec. 212 deduction because petitioner did not intend to realize any income from the hunting operations. * * *

*346

Respondent distorts petitioner's testimony to fit respondent's theory.

Petitioner identified David Wolf as a consultant and the only person employed at the ranch. Wolf apparently used the prefabricated house. Cross-examination proceeded as follows:

Q Okay. When you hired Mr. Wolf, was it in your mind to develop the land into a very high-class hunting preserve?

A I think it would be better worded to say that I was -- to add value to the property to some extent, and make it a good piece of property for whatever purpose it was used.

MR. ESTRADA: Your Honor, the response was not responsive. I would like a yes or a no.

THE COURT: All right. Yes. He is entitled to an answer to his question, not to an explanation of you --

THE WITNESS: No.

BY MR ESTRADA:

Q To the best of your knowledge, in the area surrounding your property, are hunting rights and hunting leases a valuable portion of the total value of the land?

A Yes.

* * *

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY CR. CUTHRELL:

Q You testified that -- on cross that you did not intend to create a high-class, I think, hunting preserve on this property as a result of your hiring Mr. Wolf. Is that correct?

A That*347 is affirmative.

Q What were your intentions, if you had any, with regard to the game management of that property?

A To protect the deer that we had, and to increase the size of them, and increase the overall character of the entire herd.

Q For what reason?

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Related

Steen v. Commissioner
61 T.C. No. 31 (U.S. Tax Court, 1973)

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Bluebook (online)
1988 T.C. Memo. 314, 55 T.C.M. 1315, 1988 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 342, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rainey-v-commissioner-tax-1988.