Raines v. State

317 So. 2d 559, 294 Ala. 360

Opinions

COLQUITT, Circuit Judge.

This case presents the narrow but precise issue whether the statutory waiver of a jury trial required by the Youthful Offender Act (Act No. 335, approved Feb. 10, 1972, Tit. 15 § 266(l)-(6), Code of Alabama, is violative of the constitutional guarantees of the right to trial by jury and due process of law.

Don Raines was indicted for unlawfully selling marijuana. At arraignment the trial court appointed counsel to represent Raines and advised him of his “youthful offender” rights in substance as follows:

(1) If he applied for and was granted youthful offender status, he would be tried before the court without a jury; and, if found guilty as charged, he would be adjudged a youthful offender.

(2) The sentence could be suspended.

(3) He could be placed on probation for a period not to exceed three years.

(4) He could be fined with or without commitment or he could be committed to the custody of the Director of the Department of Corrections for a term of not more than three years.

(5) Any adjudication of being a youthful offender would not disqualify him from public office or public employment or operate as a forfeiture of any right or privilege or make him ineligible to receive any license granted by a public authority.

(6) Such conviction could not be deemed to be a conviction of a crime except that, if such person were subsequently convicted of a crime, a prior adjudication of his being a youthful offender could be considered.

(7) Fingerprints, photographs, and other records of him, if he were adjudged a youthful offender, would be barred from public inspection.¹

The trial court also informed Raines that as a prerequisite to his becoming eligible for these post-adjudication “benefits,” he would have to consent to (1) an examination by the court to determine whether he should be tried as a youthful offender and (2) trial without a jury; and that, if the court so determined, the issue of the defendant’s guilt or innocence would be tried by the court in the event he entered a plea of not guilty.

Thereupon, Raines’ counsel informed the court that Raines claimed his benefits under the Act, but that he refused to waive his right to trial by jury. The court then ordered that he be arraigned and tried as an adult. Following a plea of “not guilty,” and a trial of the case, the jury found Raines guilty as indicted and he was sentenced to three years in the penitentiary. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and we granted certiorari. We affirm and hold that the provision of the Youthful Offender Act requiring waiver of trial by jury is constitutional.

The Youthful Offender Act is intended to extricate persons below twenty-one years of age from the harshness of criminal prosecution and conviction. It is designed to provide them with the benefits of an informal, confidential, rehabilitative system. A determination that one is a youthful offender (1) does not disqualify the youth from public office or public employment, (2) does not operate as a forfeiture of any right or privilege, (3) does not make him ineligible to receive any license granted by public authority, and (4) shall not be deemed a conviction of crime; and (S) the record shall not be open to public inspection except upon permission of the court. Title IS, § 266(6), Code of Alabama.

The Act also affords several alternative sentencing provisions should the accused be adjudged a youthful offender and the underlying charge be a felony. The Act provides in part:

“[T]he court shall (a) suspend the imposition or execution of sentence with or without probation, or (b) place the defendant on probation for a period not to exceed three years, or (c) impose a fine as provided by law for the offense with or without probation or commitment, or (d) commit the defendant to the custody of the director of the department of correction for a term of three years or a lesser term.”

Tit. 15 § 266(4), Code of Alabama.

The adjudication and disposition of a case under the Youthful Offender Act requires that the accused consent to an examination by the court and a trial without a jury. It is this provision of the Act which is in question here.

We intend to show that the requirement that a defendant consent to a trial without a jury in order to bring himself within the purview of the Youthful Offender Act is not unconstitutional; that the denial of a trial by jury does not violate other constitutional guarantees of due process, particularly the right of confrontation and cross-examination and the privilege against self-incrimination; that the investigation and examination of the defendant by the court incident to determining whether he should be afforded youthful offender status is not a denial of due process; that the application of jury trials to youthful offender cases cannot benefit the youthful offender system, but can only create tension and overlap between that system and the system of criminal adjudication'; and that the application of jury trials in such cases would only serve to vitiate the purpose for which the youthful offender system was conceived and the interests which it was designed to protect.

It has been held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971), that trial by jury in juvenile proceedings is not constitutionally, required. Relying on McKeiver, our Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the youthful offender statute in Flippo v. State, 49 Ala.App. 138, 269 So.2d 155, cert. denied, 289 Ala. 743, 269 So.2d 164 (1972).

It is of first importance that the Alabama Youthful Offender Act does not categorically deny an accused the right to trial by jury. If the accused so desires, he may have a jury trial, along with the full complement of rights and privileges accorded him under the criminal adjudicatory process. It is at his option that he brings himself within the Youthful Offender Act and it is with his consent that his case is heard without a jury.

In the instant case, appellant relies on the rationale in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968), that where an accused must waive a jury trial in order to be eligible for certain benefits, such requirement penalizes the assertion of a constitutional right and is a denial of due process.

In a Second Circuit case, United States v. Torres, 500 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1974), an attempt was made to apply this rationale to proceedings under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, which at that time contained a jury-waiver provision quite similar to the jury-waiver provision in our Youthful Offender Act. The Torres court found that the requirement of a non-jury trial did not violate the Sixth Amendment or due process of law, and that no constitutional right to trial by jury existed in federal juvenile proceedings. 500 F.2d, at 948.

In addressing the Jackson rationale, the Torres court distinguished between cases where the defendant possesses a constitutional right to trial,by jury in a criminal prosecution (such as Jackson), and those cases in which there is no constitutional right to a jury trial due to the nature of the proceeding and the power of Congress to circumscribe that right in certain instances. The Torres court stated:

“[Congress] permitted the juvenile to choose between the relatively beneficent and rehabilitative juvenile delinquency proceeding in which he was not entitled to a jury and prosecution as an adult with trial by jury. * * * [W]e hold that the provisions of the Act requiring that the consent of a juvenile to delinquency proceedings ‘be deemed a waiver of a trial by jury’ are constitutionally valid. The choice afforded the appellant under these provisions did not deprive him of any constitutional right to a jury trial or impermissibly burden the exercise of any such right.”

500 F.2d, at 949.

Similarly, we find that the proceedings under Title 15, § 266, Code of Alabama, are not criminal in nature and therefore are not subject to the constitutional mandate of trial by jury. Youthful offender adjudications are special proceedings designed to protect persons in a certain age group, heretofore tried as adults, from the stigma and often harmful consequences of the criminal adjudicatory process. It is a manifestation of the legislature’s judgment that while persons are still young they may more readily and appropriately respond to methods of treatment which are more rehabilitative, more correctional and less severe than penalties to which adults are exposed. It is an extension, so to speak, of the protective juvenile process. The institution of special procedures is a right vested in the state, and their application lies within the discretion of the state.

The question arises as to whether denial of a jury trial violates the accused’s rights of due process, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination. The right to such procedures goes to the fact-finding process and the need for accuracy in determining what the true facts are in each case. The McKeiver court found the jury not to be a “necessary component of accurate factfinding.” 403 U.S. at 543, 91 S.Ct. 1976. The court also stated:

“The imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court system would not strengthen greatly, if at all, the factfinding function, and would, contrarily, provide an attrition of the juvenile court’s assumed ability to function in a unique manner. It would not remedy the defects of the system. * * * [It] would tend once again to place the juvenile squarely in the routine of the criminal process.” 403 U.S., at 547, 91 S.Ct., at 1987.

Furthermore, the investigation undertaken by the court under the Youthful Offender Act does not amount to a denial of the accused’s due process guarantees. The procedure whereby the court determines whether the accused should be afforded youthful offender status is not a “summary trial” where the guilty are relegated to different treatment than the innocent. Guilt or innocence is not at issue during this stage of the proceeding. Trial judges have for years considered preliminary issues before hearing a case non-jury. See, e. g., Title 13 §§ 326, 327, Code of Alabama, which provide that county court judges shall “examine the affiant under oath, and other witnesses, if he so desires, touching the offense charged in the affidavit [before issuing a warrant],” and then, after issuing the warrant, try the case non-jury; or consider Title 13, §§ 363, 364, Code of Alabama, providing for transfer of juveniles between courts, where it is entirely possible for the same judge to sit, e. g., transfer from juvenile court to county court or vice-versa. And, of course, after such transfer, the same judge would try the case non-jury.

In the recent United States Supreme Court case of Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975), the Court in a unanimous decision upheld a state statute empowering an administrative board with both investigative and adjudicative functions. The statute was attacked on grounds of due process. In analogizing the statutory power of such a board to that of the judicial system, the Court stated:

“Judges repeatedly issue arrest warrants on the basis that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person named in the warrant has committed it. Judges also preside at preliminary hearings where they must decide whether the evidence is sufficient to hold a defendant for trial. Neither of these pretrial involvements has been thought to raise any constitutional barrier against the judge presiding ■ over the criminal trial and, if the trial is without a jury, against making the necessary determination of guilt or innocence.”

at p. 56, 95 S.Ct. at p. 1469. The Court further stated at pp. 56-57, 95 S.Ct. at p. 1469:

“We should also remember that it is not contrary to due process to allow judges * * * who have had their initial decisions reversed on appeal to confront and decide the same questions a second time around.”

Thus, the Withrow case is the most recent example of the Court’s recognition of that which we hold — pretrial involvement or knowledge on the part of the trial judge does not necessarily create an unconstitutional risk of bias.

We cannot say that the discretion exercised by the court in an investigation of the accused to determine his eligibility for youthful offender status is violative of due process.

We note that sentences under the Youthful Offender Act have the potential for exceeding the six-month maximum established in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970), which held that any sentences beyond that limit automatically entitled criminal defendants to a jury trial. The possibility of a sentence longer than six months was understood to have existed in both McKeiver and Torres, supra, and yet did not preclude a finding that denial of jury trial in such cases was constitutional.

Last, we must consider the potential harm to the operation of the youthful offender court that would be imposed by the application of jury trials. The McKeiver Court feared the possibility of delay, formality, and the clamor of a public trial inherent in a trial by jury. See 403 U.S., at 550, 91 S.Ct. 1988, 29 L.Ed.2d 663. The McKeiver Court also stated:

“There is a possibility, at least, that the jury trial, if required as a matter of constitutional precept, will remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding.”

403 U.S., at 545, 91 S.Ct., at 1986.

The Alabama Youthful Offender Act was conceived for the purpose of protecting those who fall within its ambit from the stigma and practical consequences of a conviction for a crime. Accordingly, the Act provides for confidentiality in the proceedings and in the availability of the offender’s records with regard to the adjudication. The introduction of a jury into such proceedings would destroy any confidentiality with which the Act attempts to clothe the proceedings and the youthful offender’s record. As a practical matter, the provision that youthful offenders be tried “at court sessions separate from those for adults charged with crime” (Title 15 § 266(2), Code of Alabama), would become virtually impossible to carry out.

We find that the jury-waiver provision of the Youthful Offender Act does not render that Act unconstitutional; that the adjudicatory procedures defined by the Youthful Offender Act do not violate due process of law; and that any benefits which might result from the infusion of a jury trial into youthful offender proceedings are greatly outweighed by the detrimental effects it would have to the orderly functioning of the youthful offender system and to the interests of those persons the Act was designed to protect.

For the reasons set out above the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is due to be affirmed.

The foregoing opinion was prepared by COLQUITT, Circuit Judge, temporarily on duty on the Supreme Court by order of the Chief Justice pursuant to Ala.Const. Art. 6 § 149 (1973).

Affirmed.

HEFLIN, C. J., and MERRILL, BLOOD-WORTH, MADDOX and FAULKNER, JJ., concur. JONES, SHORES and EMBRY, JJ., dissent. ALMON, J., not sitting.

Footnotes

1

. The trial court’s explanation of the defendant’s rights under the Act is set out in order that we might commend this procedure for use by trial courts in appropriate situations.