Raines v. Richter

338 S.W.2d 331, 232 Ark. 449, 1960 Ark. LEXIS 429
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedSeptember 26, 1960
Docket5-2185
StatusPublished

This text of 338 S.W.2d 331 (Raines v. Richter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Raines v. Richter, 338 S.W.2d 331, 232 Ark. 449, 1960 Ark. LEXIS 429 (Ark. 1960).

Opinion

Carleton Harris, Chief Justice.

This is a will contest. Mary Gavet, a resident of Little Rock, died on July 19, 1959, at the age of 82. Mrs. Gavet had executed a will on April 14,1953, wherein certain bequests were made to various institutions and individuals, the bulk of the estate, including real estate located at 806 Center Street in Little Rock, being bequeathed and devised to Theresa Korte Raines, appellant herein. Mrs. Raines was not related to Mrs. Gavet, but had been a good friend for a long number of years. This will was turned over to Mrs. Raines, named co-executrix in the instrument, by Mrs. Gavet, together with a codicil, executed in 1955, and remained in possession of appellant until after the death of Mary Gavet. On October 23,1956, Mrs. Gavet executed a second will, wherein all former wills were revoked, and some twenty-eight bequests were made to institutions and individuals, including a bequest to appellant in the amount of $4,000. C. H. Richter and Warren Baldwin of Little Rock were named executors. Item 12 of this will, which occasions the present litigation, provides:

“12. At the present time I own and reside in my home place, which contains rental units, located at 806 Center Street, Little Rock, Arkansas. If I am the owner of this property at the time of my death, I direct that the Roman Catholic Bishop of the Diocese of Little Rock be given the first opportunity to buy the property at its fair market value. If the Bishop elects to make an offer for the purchase of the property, the court having jurisdiction of my estate shall pass upon the reasonableness of the offer and shall direct the sale of the property to the Bishop if the court determines that the offer represents fair market value of the property at the time.”

Following the death of Mrs. Gavet, Mrs. Raines offered the 1953 will and the 1955 codicil for probate; subsequently, the 1956 will was offered for probate. Following a hearing, at which numerous witnesses testified, the Probate Court found that the testamentary dispositions executed by Mrs. Gavet on April 14, 1953, and December 14, 1955, “are not the last will and testament of the decedent”; and admitted to probate the will dated October 23, 1956. From the order refusing to admit to probate the earlier instruments, and admitting the latter will, Mrs. Raines brings this appeal. For reversal, appellant relies upon two points:

“I.
‘ ‘ The execution of the 1956 will was procured through undue influence at a time when deceased did not possess testamentary capacity.
“II.
‘ ‘ Deceased was mentally incompetent to execute a will on October 23, 1956.”

I.

The proof reflected that the title to property on either side of 806 Center Street was held by the Catholic Bishop of Little Rock, and the evidence reflected that the Bishop, through Richter, had endeavored on several occasions over the years, to purchase Mrs. Gavet’s property. Mrs. Gavet did not consent to sell the property. Mrs. Raines contends that undue influence was exercised over Mrs. Gavet by Harry Richter, as agent of the Bishop; next, by the attorney who prepared the 1956 will, as an agent of the Catholic Church ; and finally, by “somebody” — “I’m saying she was influenced to make this will by somebody, because she would not have done it.” When interrogated as to her reason for stating that the attorney who prepared the will exercised undue influence, and that such attorney represented Bishop Fletcher, appellant answered: “Just because I believe that is what it is. * * * I know that somebody influenced her.” She then mentioned several priests that she thought exercised undue influence over deceased, but when asked her basis for making this statement, said: “Well, those are the people it would be since she did it. Somebody influenced her, and those are the people it would be since she did it. Those are the people that are closest connected to it that I could put a finger on.”

Appellant admitted on cross-examination that she did not know whether Richter ever mentioned anything to Mrs. Gavet about the provisions of her will. The only other person testifying on behalf of appellant, whose testimony even remotely touched the issue of undue influence, was Beatrice Anthamatten. Mrs. Anthamatten testified that Mrs. Gavet did not want the Bishop to have her property, and told her (Mrs. Anthamatten) that she was leaving her place to “the one that has done the most for me. The Bishop has never raised his hand for me. ’ ’ The witness testified that Mrs. Gavet stated that her deceased husband would not have wanted the property sold to the Bishop. “They felt that they had done enough for the church.” She stated that Richter had tried to purchase the property several times from Mrs. Gavet, and that these conversations would always upset the latter. This is the sum total of the evidence offered by appellant on this point, and obviously falls far short of establishing undue influence. In fact, appellant was unable to point to any specific person who suggested the disposition of the property as made in the 1956 will — or any specific act of undue influence. Mrs. Raines simply feels that undue influence must have been exercised, because, in appellant’s view, Mrs. Gavet would not have otherwise thusly disposed of the property. In Dunklin v. Black, 224 Ark. 528, 275 S. W. 2d 447, this Court quoted with approval from the case of McCulloch v. Campbell, 49 Ark. 367, 5 S. W. 590, as follows:

“As we understand the rule, the fraud or undue influence, which is required to avoid a will, must be directly connected with its execution. The influence which the law condemns is not the legitimate influence which springs from natural affection, but the malign influence which results from fear, coercion or any other cause that deprives the testator of his free agency in the disposition of his property. And the influence must be specially directed toward the object of procuring a will in favor of particular parties.”

We find no merit in this contention.

II.

The record reflects that Mrs. Gavet was declared incompetent on July 3,1957, some eight months after the 1956 will had been executed. Evidence on behalf of appellant discloses that she underwent an operation in the latter part of 1954, and another in the summer of 1955. She suffered a broken hip in December of 1955, and was hospitalized until the middle of the following January. From January 13th through May, Mrs. Gavet lived with Mrs. Raines. Six witnesses, in addition to the latter, testified at the hearing in behalf of appellant, namely, Beatrice Anthamatten, heretofore referred to, and her daughter, Margaret Rose Anthamatten, a registered nurse, both of whom were long time friends of Mrs. Gavet; Josephine Branscum, who took care of Mrs. Gavet from October, 1957, until May, 1958; Addie Thomason, a tenant of Mrs. Gavet’s; Fred Perry, an acquaintance of Mrs. Gavet for the last fifteen years of her life; and Dr. Elizabeth D. Fletcher, a physician of Little Rock specializing in psychiatry. Testimony from the lay witnesses was to the effect that during the year 1955, Mrs.

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Related

Dunklin v. Black
275 S.W.2d 447 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1955)
McCulloch v. Campbell
49 Ark. 367 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1887)

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Bluebook (online)
338 S.W.2d 331, 232 Ark. 449, 1960 Ark. LEXIS 429, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/raines-v-richter-ark-1960.