Dunklin v. Black

275 S.W.2d 447, 224 Ark. 528, 1955 Ark. LEXIS 433
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedJanuary 31, 1955
Docket5-546
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 275 S.W.2d 447 (Dunklin v. Black) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dunklin v. Black, 275 S.W.2d 447, 224 Ark. 528, 1955 Ark. LEXIS 433 (Ark. 1955).

Opinion

Minor W. Millwee, Justice.

L. A. Black of DeWitt, Arkansas died testate December 31, 1945, leaving a large estate consisting of farm lands, gins, a rice mill, mercantile businesses and related enterprises which he operated from his offices in DeWitt. Prior to his death he made substantial gifts to his three daughters, Hattie Boone Black, Georgea Oliver McKinley and Elizabeth Black. By his will- Mr. Black devised one-third of his estate to his wife, Mary B. Black, and the remaining two-thirds to his daughters in equal shares. At the time b'f Mr. Black’s death the oldest daughter, Hattie Boone, who is the appellee here, and the youngest daughter, Elizabeth, who is the appellant here, were living with their parents in DeWitt. Georgea McKinley and her family lived across the street and her husband, Ed I. McKinley, Jr., was working for Mr. Black.

• . • A few days after Mr. Black’s death sharp differences arose between the- McKinleys on one side and Mrs. Black, Hattie Boone and Elizabeth on the other resulting in the McKinleys moving to Little Kock and an unfortunate social and business estrangement which continued for several. years. A partition suit was immediately instituted by Mrs. McKinley to. separate her two-ninths interest in her father’s estate from that of h;er: mother and sisters. A consent decree to this effect was, rendered January .29, 1947.

. . On February 2, 1948 Mrs. Black executed a will which in effect disinherited Mrs. McKinley and devised her estate equally to Hattie Boone and Elizabeth. She had executed a similar will in 1946 during the partition litigation with Mrs. McKinley. Hattie Boone and Elizabeth continued to reside in DeWitt with their mother until May 28, 1949 when Elizabeth married and moved to Pine Bluff with her husband, George Dunklin. On- March 16, 1951 Mrs. Black added a codicil to the 1948 will so as to devise three specific farms to Elizabeth and the remainder of her property to Hattie Boone. According to certain estate tax returns the value of the three farms amounted to only 1.61 per cent of the total value of Mrs. Black’s estate.

Mrs. Black died May 16, 1951. Upon a petition filed by appellee, Hattie Boone Black, an order was entered in probate court July 17, 1952 admitting the will and codicil to probate. Appellant, Elizabeth Black Dunklin, filed a contest of the codicil July 27, 1952 on the ground that it was procured by the undue influence of appellee over Mrs. Black while she was in ill health and a highly nervous condition; and the further ground that probation of said codicil was in violation of an agreement between the two sisters that the will would be probated without the codicil. This appeal is from the judgment of the Arkansas Probate Court dismissing the Contest.

The evidence discloses that after the death of Mr. Black and the removal of the McKinleys to Little Rock, Mrs. Black, Hattie Boone and Elizabeth each took some part in the running of the estate left by Mr. Black which is still intact with the exception of the two-ninths interest allotted to Mrs. McKinley. The undistributed portion of said estate is valued at nearly $700,000.00 and appellant’s two-ninths interest therein will amount to values in excess of $150,000.00. She also has an annual income of more than $50,000.00 from the properties given her by Mr. Black during his lifetime. After appellant’s marriage in 1949 her relations with her mother and appellee continued to be cordial and pleasant. They visited each other frequently and made many business and social trips together. A daughter was born to appellant in September 1950.

A few days prior to execution of the codicil in question Mrs. Black and appellee visited in Memphis, Tennessee, returning to DeWitt on March 15,1951. They planned to leave the next day on a three-weeks trip to Florida. Appellant had visitors at the time and declined to make the Florida trip. On the morning of March 16, 1951 Mrs. Black and appellee drove to Pine Bluff on their way to Florida and appellee remained in the car while Mrs. Black went to the office of her attorney, N. J. Gantt, Jr., who drafted the codicil which Mrs. Black executed and left there with the will for safe keeping.

Appellee left DeWitt May 6, 1951 on a business trip to Chicago where she still remained until her mother’s sudden death on May 16th. During this 10-day period appellant and Mrs. Black visited in each others homes and made a trip to Little Rock together. Following the death of Mrs. Black appellant stayed with appellee in DeWitt for a month. Upon the reading of the will appellant became very upset and, at Mr. Gantt’s suggestion, there were considerable negotiations over an extended period between appellant and appellee relative to some arrangement whereby a division of property could he made without probating the codicil, but no final agreement was ever concluded.

After an extended hearing involving over 600 pages of testimony the chancellor rendered an exhaustive opinion setting forth his findings and conclusions bearing on the issue of whether appellee exercised undue influence over her mother in the execution of the codicil. In urging a reversal appellant points, to certain discrepancies in the testimony of appellee and others, some of which were noted by the trial court. Appellant also insists that the court erred in at least two factual findings which caused him to reach an erroneous conclusion. At the same time appellee also argues that the court made erroneous conclusions on certain factual matters.

On the whole case we have concluded that the findings of the chancellor are fully supported by a preponderance of the evidence. We are also of the opinion that the court correctly applied the legal principles that have been repeatedly stated by this court in such cases as McCulloch v. Campbell, 49 Ark. 367, 5 S. W. 590; Sanger v. McDonald, 87 Ark. 148, 112 S. W. 365; Miller v. Carr, 94 Ark. 176, 126 S. W. 1068; Phillips v. Jones, 179 Ark. 877, 18 S. W. 2d 352; Brown v. Emerson, 205 Ark. 735, 170 S. W. 2d 1019; Shippen v. Shippen, 213 Ark. 517, 211 S. W. 2d 433; Toombs v. Blankenship, 215 Ark. 551, 221 S. W. 2d 417.

The following statement from McCulloch v. Campbell, supra, has been cited with approval in most of our subsequent cases involving the question of undue influence : “As we understand the rule, the fraud or undue influence, which is required to avoid a will, must be directly' connected with its execution. The influence which' the law condemns is not the legitimate influence which springs from natural affection, but the malign influence which results from fear, coercion or any other cause that deprives the testator of his free agency in the disposition of his property. And the influence must be specially directed towhrd the object of procuring a will in favor of particular parties. It is not sufficient that the testator was influenced by the beneficiaries in the ordinary affairs of life, or that he was surrounded by them and in confidential relations with them at- the time of its execution.” The facts constituting the- undue influence are required to be far stronger in the case of a testator whose mind is strong and alert than in the case of one whose mind is defective or impaired by disease or advancing age. Phillips v. Jones, supra. On the other hand less evidence is required to establish undue influence where the disposition of the testator’s effects is unaccountably unnatural. Brown v. Emerson, supra.

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Bluebook (online)
275 S.W.2d 447, 224 Ark. 528, 1955 Ark. LEXIS 433, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dunklin-v-black-ark-1955.