Railroad Commission of Texas v. DeBardeleben

305 S.W.2d 141, 157 Tex. 518, 8 Oil & Gas Rep. 466, 1957 Tex. LEXIS 585
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 24, 1957
DocketA-6222
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 305 S.W.2d 141 (Railroad Commission of Texas v. DeBardeleben) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Railroad Commission of Texas v. DeBardeleben, 305 S.W.2d 141, 157 Tex. 518, 8 Oil & Gas Rep. 466, 1957 Tex. LEXIS 585 (Tex. 1957).

Opinions

Mr. Justice Culver

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This suit brought by respondent, DeBardeleben, attacked an order of the Railroad Commission that denied him exceptions to the Statewide Density Rule for four gas wells in the Bethany Field in Harrison and Panola Counties. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed a judgment in favor of respondent. 297 S.W. 2d 203. In that affirmance we concur.

Substantially the only question for decision here is whether or not the evidence shows as a matter of law that respondent’s gas producing properties are being confiscated, or in other words, was the order of the Railroad Commission reasonably supported by substantial evidence.

Originally the area now composing the Bethany Gas Field was treated by the Commission as two separate and distinct fields, Bethany to the south and lying principally in Panola County and Elysian Fields to the north in Harrison County. As development progressed, the distance between these two fields was gradually narrowed to the point of mergence. On September 15, 1955 the Commission found that the two fields were pro[520]*520ducing from a common reservoir and ordered them combined under the designation of Bethany Field and under Bethany Field Rules. Prior to this combination the spacing and density rules in the two fields differed substantially. In the Bethany Field it had been determined that one well would effectively drain 640 acres and proration units were so set up with one well to the unit. In the Elysian Field the per well unit was 320 acres.

Petitioner admits that respondent’s leases were located in what might be called the “twilight zone” between the two fields and could possibly have been considered in either at the time of the original designation by respondent. Considerable latitude was permitted to the operator in determining in which field his properties should be placed.

Respondent owned four units of approximately 640 acres each and designated by him and the Commission as being in the original Bethany Field. On each of these four tracts one well had been drilled according to the Bethany Rules. The applications to drill these wells were made in the latter part of 1954 and early in 1955. Permits were issued, the wells were drilled and production obtained.

In July 1955 respondent made application to drill four more wells on four additional units of 320 acres each, carved out of four 640 acre units. This was done without permission of or notice to the Comimssion. He falsely represented these tracts as lying within Elysian Field. His applications were examined, appeared to be in order and in compliance with the Elysian Field Rules of one well to 320 acres. Permits were accordingly granted and the wells drilled.

The Commission thereafter having discovered the misrepresentation refused to grant production allowables for these four wells and ordered them sealed. It then denied respondent’s application for exception to the Density Rule on the ground that the evidence did not justify an exception either for the prevention of waste or for the protection of correlative rights. Although there are some extenuating circumstances, there can be no question but that respondent did obtain the permits in question through misrepresentation of fact and this conduct is not in the least to be condoned, as said by the Court of Civil Appeals. Even so, if respondent would have been entitled to drill the four wells to protect against confiscation of and drain[521]*521age from his property by offsetting wells to the north and east, that were drilled according to the Elysian Field and as close as 330 feet to respondent’s property line, while under the Bethany Rules respondent could drill no nearer his neighbor’s line than 1320 feet, we think production from these wells should not be denied.

Respondent’s claim of confiscation is based upon these points: (1) the reservoir under the Bethany and Elysian Fields is common, continuous and in free communication; (2) the pressure of the four original wells drilled on the 640-acre units is uniformly higher than that of the surrounding offset wells and it is an admitted physical fact that gas will flow from a high pressure area to a low pressure area if the reservoir is continuous and in communication; (3) the area that one well will drain had been determined by the Railroad Commission to be 640-acre units; (4) respondent’s original wells are on 640-acre units, but the offsets to the north and east are on 320-acre units, are closer to the northern and eastern limits of respondent’s units, and the offsets are producing more cubic feet per acre than respondent’s wells; (5) if respondent was allowed to produce from the four additional wells he would approximate the cubic feet per acre production of the offsets in the adjoining 320-acre units; (6) the Railroad Commission itself recognized the situation by reciting in its order, combining the two fields, that different rules for the two fields were causing “ineouitable conditions to exist;” (7) the drainage from respondent’s 640-acre units is uncompensated by any drainage to his properties from the south, east and west.

Confiscation, as that term is used here, means the denial to an owner or lessee of a fair chance to recover the oil or gas in or under his land or the equivalent in kind. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Gulf Production Co., 134 Texas 122, 132 S.W. 2d 254; Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 134 Texas 59, 131 S.W. 2d 73.

A valid contention that a tract of land is being drained and the property being confiscated must be based upon a finding that the reservoirs underlying the tracts are actually one reservoir with free communication between the tracts.

The Railroad Commission’s order of September 13, 1955 provides in part as follows:

[522]*522“Whereas, fro mevidence adduced at said hearing and from information contained in Commission records and reports, it appears to the Commission that, among other things, The Elysian Fields and Bethany Fields area, each of which had developed separately for several years, had, through such continuing development operation joined and become a common field with the reservoirs underlying such area recognized as common and continuous throughout the two-field area * * (Emphasis supplied.)

Only two witnesses testified on the trial of this case. Jack K. Baumel, a consultant petroleum and natural gas engineer, was a witness for respondent. Mr. Baumel was in the employ of the Railroad Commission for some fifteen years and was Director of Production and Chief Engineer in charge of the Oil & Gas Division for ten years ending in 1952. John S. Cameron, engineer in charge of the Commission’s gas department, testified in behalf of the Railroad Commission.

The testimony of the witness, Baumel, substantiates the respondent’s contentions. That testimony is set forth in considerable detail in the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion and will not be reinstated here. Mr. Cameron stated that his idea of a common reservoir is one that is continuous and in reasonable communication throughout its length and breadth through a semi-permeable formation of some sort. Mr. Cameron refused to testify regarding the drainage in this case, giving as his reason that he was not sufficiently acquainted with the formation of the reservoir. On the other hand Mr.

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Railroad Commission of Texas v. DeBardeleben
305 S.W.2d 141 (Texas Supreme Court, 1957)

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Bluebook (online)
305 S.W.2d 141, 157 Tex. 518, 8 Oil & Gas Rep. 466, 1957 Tex. LEXIS 585, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/railroad-commission-of-texas-v-debardeleben-tex-1957.