Rahman v. Garland

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: January 7, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-02132
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3

4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 ANISUR R., CASE NO. 2:24-cv-02132-JHC-TLF 8

ORDER DENYING EMERGENCY 9 Petitioner, MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 10 v. 11 MERRICK GARLAND, et al.,

12 Respondents. 13

14 I 15 INTRODUCTION 16 This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner’s Emergency Motion for Temporary 17 Restraining Order, Dkt. # 2, filed with his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Dkt. # 1. 18 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Bangladesh who is detained at Northwest Immigration and 19 Customs Enforcement (ICE) Processing Center in Tacoma, Washington. Dkt. # 1 at 1, ¶ 1. He 20 has been detained for about six months. Id. at 5, ¶ 21. Petitioner asks the Court to order his 21 immediate release and to enjoin Respondents from transferring him to a different facility during 22 the pendency of these proceedings or, in the alternative, to require ICE to conduct a custody 23 review. Dkt. # 2 at 5. The Court has reviewed the materials filed in support of and in opposition 24 1 to the motion, the rest of the case file, and the governing law. Being fully advised, the Court 2 DENIES Petitioner’s motion. 3 II BACKGROUND 4 On June 21, 2024, Petitioner entered the United States in Arizona, where he was 5 apprehended by immigration authorities. That day, Customs and Border Patrol issued an 6 expedited removal order for Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), which requires an 7 immigration officer to order an inadmissible noncitizen removed from the United States without 8 further review unless the noncitizen expresses an intent to apply for asylum or a fear of 9 persecution. Dkt. # 1-1 at 15–16. In July 2024, Petitioner was transferred to Northwest ICE 10 Processing Center. Dkt. # 7 at 2, ¶ 5. Petitioner later expressed fear of returning to Bangladesh, 11 postponing his removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (requiring detention “pending a 12 final determination of credible fear of persecution”). 13 On August 21 and 27, 2024, an asylum officer conducted a credible fear interview, in 14 which Petitioner said that he joined the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 2018 and led political 15 activities opposing the Awami League, the governing party in Bangladesh. Dkt. # 1-1 at 2–5. 16 Petitioner explained that members of the Awami League sent him death threats and stabbed him, 17 causing him to be hospitalized for two days. Id. On August 28, 2024, the asylum officer 18 concluded that Petitioner’s testimony was credible. Id. at 12–13. But the asylum officer also 19 concluded that Petitioner did not have a credible fear of future persecution because the Prime 20 Minister of the Awami League resigned on August 5, 2024, allowing a new administration to 21 take over. Id. at 13, 29. Petitioner requested review of the negative credible fear determination 22 by an Immigration Judge (IJ). 23 24 1 On September 11, 2024, an IJ affirmed the negative credible fear determination. Id. at 2 54–55. What happened next is disputed. Petitioner says that the next day, he submitted a request 3 for further review of the negative credible fear determination to the “Asylum Office” and that

4 this “request for re-determination remains pending.” Dkt. # 1 at 5, ¶ 19; see 8 C.F.R. 5 § 208.30(g)(1)(i) (allowing discretionary reconsideration of a negative credible fear finding 6 affirmed by an IJ). And without specifying when, Petitioner says that he submitted “a Request 7 for Reinterview” with the “Asylum Office” because the asylum officer did not know that 8 Petitioner qualified for an exception to an interim rule limiting asylum relief. See Dkt. # 1 at 3– 9 4, ¶¶ 14, 17 (citing Dkt. # 1-1 at 10–11). Petitioner asserts that the “Request for Reinterview [] 10 remains pending.” Id. at 4, ¶ 17. Petitioner also says that, at some point after being detained for 11 over 90 days, he submitted a “request for release pending his removal” and that “[t]here is no 12 indication that ICE reviewed [his] request for release pending his removal.” Id. at 6, ¶ 23.

13 Respondents do not directly mention the “request for re-determination” of the negative 14 credible fear determination. They say that on October 16, 2024, ICE spoke with Petitioner to get 15 information necessary to obtain a travel document. Dkt. # 6 at 4 (citing Dkt. # 7 at 2–3, ¶ 10). 16 Because Petitioner said that he would appeal the IJ’s decision, ICE decided to wait to submit a 17 travel document application. Id. But Respondents decided to proceed with obtaining travel 18 documents once they learned that Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the Ninth 19 Circuit. Id. (citing Dkt. # 7 at 2–3, ¶¶ 10–13). Respondents do not mention at all the “Request 20 for Reinterview” or the interim final rule limiting asylum relief. Nor do Respondents mention 21 Petitioner’s “request for release pending his removal.” 22 Respondents say that on December 27, 2024, ICE headquarters confirmed with its Seattle

23 officers that removals to Bangladesh will continue. Id. (citing Dkt. # 7 at 3, ¶ 12). They say that 24 on December 30, 2024, Petitioner refused to cooperate with ICE by declining to fill out travel 1 document forms and preventing ICE from taking his passport photo by looking away from the 2 camera. Id. at 4–5 (citing Dkt. # 7 at 3, ¶ 13). Deportation Officer George Chavez declares, 3 “ICE expects that a travel document for Petitioner will be issued once Petitioner begins

4 cooperating with ICE to secure a travel document and ICE will be able to effect Petitioner’s 5 removal to Bangladesh.” Id. at 5 (citing Dkt. # 7 at 3, ¶ 16). 6 III DISCUSSION 7 A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus must establish that “[h]e is in custody in 8 violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 9 Petitioner mainly brings a Fifth Amendment due process challenge to indefinite detention under 10 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) by relying on Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Dkt. # 2 at 3, ¶ 7. 11 Petitioner also brings claims under: (1) the Suspension Clause, U.S. Const. art. I § 9, cl.2; (2) the 12 Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures; and (3) the Eighth 13 Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Dkt. # 1 at 7, ¶¶ 26, 28. 14 A. TRO Standards 15 A temporary restraining order (TRO) is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be 16 awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. 17 Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008); Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 18 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (the standard for issuing a TRO is “substantially identical” to 19 the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction). A petitioner seeking a TRO must establish: 20 (1) “that he is likely to succeed on the merits”; (2) “that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in 21 the absence of preliminary relief”; (3) “that the balance of equities tips in his favor”; and (4) 22 “that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Alternatively, a petitioner 23 who shows only that there are “serious questions going to the merits” can satisfy the Winter 24 1 requirements by establishing that the “balance of hardships [] tips sharply towards [the 2 petitioner]” and that the remaining two Winter factors are met. All. for the Wild Rockies v. 3 Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131–35 (9th Cir. 2011).

4 B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits and Irreparable Harm 5 Based on the briefing and the unresolved factual questions at this stage, Petitioner does 6 not show that he is likely to succeed on the merits. Because Petitioner does not show that he is 7 likely to succeed on his constitutional claims, he has not shown that he will likely suffer 8 irreparable harm.1 See Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2012) (“It is well established 9 that the deprivation of constitutional rights unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”) 10 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 11 1. Fifth Amendment claim 12 Petitioner does not show that he is likely to succeed on his Fifth Amendment claim under 13 Zadvydas. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court addressed the legality of indefinitely detaining 14 noncitizens who are ordered removed under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 533 U.S. at 682. The 15 Supreme Court held that detaining a noncitizen for six months is presumptively reasonable. Id. 16 at 701. After six months, a noncitizen does not necessarily have to be released. Id. But a 17 noncitizen has an opportunity to make a showing that there “is no significant likelihood of 18 removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” which the government must then rebut. Id. 19 Petitioner does not address whether Zadvydas applies to detention pending removal 20 orders under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) or cite authority for when the six-month period 21 for Zadvydas begins. It is unclear whether Zadvydas applies to § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) because 22

1 Petitioner contends that he would also face irreparable harm if he were transferred to another 23 facility because he would be unable to speak with his counsel and a family friend. Dkt. # 9 at 5–6. The Court declines to consider this contention because it is raised for the first time in Petitioner’s reply brief. 24 See United States v. Vidican, 2010 WL 889960, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2010). 1 unlike § 1231(a)(6), it provides for mandatory, rather than discretionary, detention.2 It is also 2 unclear whether the six-month period under Zadvydas begins before or after proceedings 3 regarding Petitioner’s negative credible fear determination have concluded. Relying on Jennings 4 v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), Respondents suggest that Zadvydas does not apply to 5 § 1225(b)(1) but also say that Petitioner’s claim fails even if Zadvydas applied to the statute. 6 Dkt. # 6 at 8, 10. Respondents also contend that the six-month period for Zadvydas would not 7 begin until after review of Petitioner’s negative credible fear determination is complete but cites 8 no clear authority for this proposition. Id. 9 Even assuming that Zadvydas applies to § 1225(b)(1) and that the six-month period has 10 elapsed, Petitioner does not show that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the 11 reasonably foreseeable future. When Petitioner filed his emergency motion for TRO, he had 12 been detained for about six months. Thus, “what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’”

13 is most generously construed before it begins “to shrink.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. The 14 parties disagree as to the cause of Petitioner’s continued detention. Petitioner says that 15 Respondents are processing his various requests (for review of his negative credible fear 16 determination, for another asylum interview, or for release pending removal); Respondents 17 suggest that there are no such pending requests, and that Petitioner is refusing to cooperate with 18 immigration officials’ attempts to obtain travel documents. 19 20

21 2 A court in this district has held that “unreasonably prolonged detention under § 1225(b) without a bond hearing violates due process.” Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1106 (W.D. Wash. 22 2019) (quoting adopted report and recommendation). In his habeas petition, Petitioner alternatively seeks release “on a reasonable bond.” Dkt. # 1 at 8, ¶ 32. But Petitioner makes no legal argument for why such relief is warranted. Petitioner’s reliance on Zadvydas is insufficient because although the court in Banda 23 discusses Zadvydas, it adopts a “multi-factor test” to “determine whether § 1225(b) detention has become unreasonable.” 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1117–18. Petitioner also does not expressly request a bond hearing in 24 his TRO motion. See Dkt. # 2 at 5. 1 At this stage, unresolved factual questions as to the cause of Petitioner’s continued 2 detention are not enough for the Court to conclude that Petitioner is “likely to succeed on the 3 merits.” Petitioner has not specifically shown when and where he filed his various requests for

4 relief, much less shown a likelihood that they will not be adjudicated in a reasonable time. That 5 the resolution of Petitioner’s requests have “no clear end date does not mean that there is no 6 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”3 Aden v. Nielsen, 409 F. 7 Supp. 3d 998, 1022 (W.D. Wash. 2019); see also Del Toro-Chacon v. Chertoff, 2008 WL 8 687445, at *7–8 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2008) (detention is not indefinite where removal is 9 delayed by a petitioner’s challenges to agency decisions and “there is no showing that the 10 government has caused any unreasonable delay”). 11 2. Remaining claims 12 Nor does Petitioner show that he is likely to succeed on the merits of any of his 13 remaining claims. Petitioner claims that his alleged indefinite detention violates the Suspension 14 Clause but cites only Zadvydas to support this contention. Dkt. # 1 at 7, ¶ 26. The Court 15 concludes that Petitioner has not shown that he is likely to succeed on this claim for the same 16 reasons discussed supra, Section III.B.1. The Court also concludes that Petitioner has not shown 17 that he is likely to succeed on his Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims because they are 18 conclusory. Dkt. # 1 at 7, ¶ 28. 19 C. Balance of the Equities and Public Interest 20 The balance of the equities and the public interest favors Petitioner. When the 21 government is a party, the balance of equities and public interest factors merge. Nken v. Holder, 22

23 3 Petitioner also asserts that he is entitled to a custody review because “[g]enerally, Immigration and Customs Enforcement will conduct a 90 day custody review when an order of removal becomes 24 final.” Dkt. # 1 at 6, ¶ 23. But Petitioner cites no authority to support this assertion. 1 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). While there is a public interest in the enforcement of immigration 2 laws, Respondents do not show that Petitioner cannot be released in a manner that ensures that 3 he will comply with law enforcement. Dkt. #6 at 13. Thus, the government’s public interest in 4 enforcing immigration laws does not outweigh the public interest in “prevent[ing] the violation 5 of a party’s constitutional rights.” Doe v. Horne, 115 F.4th 1083, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2024) 6 (citation omitted). 7 But the balance of equities does not tip sharply in favor of Petitioner. The cause of 8 Petitioner’s continued detention is unclear, and the period of presumptively unconstitutional 9 detention—if any—has, at most, just begun following the six-month mark set forth in Zadvydas. 10 || Because the balance of equities does not strongly favor Petitioner, the Court does not consider 11 whether Petitioner has satisfied the Winter factors by showing that there are “serious questions 12 || going to the merits” rather than a likelihood of success on the merits. A//. for the Wild Rockies, 13. || 632 F.3d at 1135. 14 IV CONCLUSION 15 For these reasons, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s emergency motion for temporary 16 restraining order. 17 Dated this 7th day of January, 2025. 18 19 20 John H. Chun 21 United States District Judge 22 23 24 ORDER DENYING EMERGENCY MOTION FOR