Rahman v. Allstate Insurance Company

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedMarch 7, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-02052
StatusUnknown

This text of Rahman v. Allstate Insurance Company (Rahman v. Allstate Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rahman v. Allstate Insurance Company, (E.D. La. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

IRSHAD DANIEL RAHMAN, D/B/A CIVIL ACTION RAHMAN INSURANCE, D/B/A INSURE FOR LESS, AND D/B/A BUDGET INSURANCE

VERSUS No. 22-2052

ALLSTATE INSURANCE SECTION: “J”(2) COMPANY, ET AL.

ORDER & REASONS Before the Court is a Motion for Entry of Final Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b) (Rec. Doc. 54) filed by Plaintiff, Irshad Daniel Rahman, (d/b/a/ Rahman Insurance, d/b/a Insure for Less, and d/b/a Budget Insurance). Defendant, Allstate Insurance Company has opposed this motion (Rec. Doc. 56), and Plaintiff has filed a reply (Rec. Doc. 59). Having considered the motion and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the motion should be DENIED. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This case arises from an alleged breach of contract. Plaintiff alleges that Allstate breached its Exclusive Agent Agreement (“EA Agreement”) with Plaintiff when notified him that it was terminating the EA Agreement effective June 30, 2021. Plaintiff alleges that his contract was terminated without just cause, and Allstate improperly transferred Plaintiff’s economic interest in his Allstate book of business to local Allstate agent, Tim Buckley. Allstate refused to even consider in good faith, Plaintiff claims, two objectively qualified potential buyers of Plaintiff’s book of business. Plaintiff claims that he also had a non-Allstate book of business which

consisted of FAIR and flood policies that he owned. Plaintiff alleges that he was unable to retain his flood book and was forced to sell it for far below market value due to Allstate’s actions and misrepresentations. The EA Agreement, Plaintiff claims, permits him to continue to manage and collect commissions on flood policies, even after termination, until the policies come up for renewal. Despite these provisions, Plaintiff alleges that Allstate told him he would not be able to continue to manage his

flood policies after termination, and he was forced to sell his flood book for far below market value. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans against Allstate, Brad Heggem, Doug Caminita, and Tim Buckley. Plaintiff, Doug Caminita, and Tim Buckley are all citizens of Louisiana. However, Allstate timely removed the suit to this Court arguing that Caminita and Buckley were improperly joined. Plaintiff sought to remand the suit back to state court contending

that Caminita and Buckley were properly joined. However, this Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. (Rec. Doc. 19). This Court found that Plaintiff’s claims against Caminita and Buckley for conversion, unfair trade practices, fraud, tortious interference with a contract, and detrimental reliance were all improperly pleaded because he “[made] no attempt to allege that either Caminita or Buckley acted as anything but agents or employees of Allstate.” (Rec. Doc. 19, at 10). Further, this Court also held that Louisiana law bars Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claims as to both Caminita and Buckley. Id. at 11. After this Court’s denial of the Motion to Remand (Rec. Doc. 19), Plaintiff filed

an Amended Complaint (Rec. Doc. 21) which this Court construed as a Motion for Leave to File an Amended and Supplemental Complaint. This proposed Amended Complaint contained additional claims against the non-diverse defendants Doug Caminita and Tim Buckley. Plaintiff also attempted to add an additional non-diverse party: Tim Buckley, Inc., a Louisiana corporation. (Rec. Doc. 21). In response to this Amended Complaint, Allstate filed a Motion to Strike (Rec. Doc. 33) which Tim

Buckley and Tim Buckley Inc. adopted as their own. (Rec. Doc. 35). This Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended and Supplemental complaint and granted the Motion to Strike and a Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 26) filed by Caminita and Heggem. The Court dismissed Caminita, Heggem, Buckley, and Tim Buckley, Inc. from this litigation. (Rec. Doc. 52). Finally, this Court granted in part and denied in part Allstate’s Motion to Dismiss. (Rec. Doc. 53). The only remaining claims in this action are Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim relating to his termination payments

and alleged LUTPA violations and fraud relating to Plaintiff’s FAIR plan and flood book of business. LEGAL STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that: When an action presents more than one claim for relief—whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim—or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54. Rule 54(b) balances two policies: avoiding “piecemeal appeals” and the “danger of hardship or injustice through delay.” PYCA Indus., Inc. v. Harrison Cnty. Waste Water Mgmt. Dist., 81 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir. 1996). Thus, the court should consider “whether the claims under review were separable from others remaining to be adjudicated and whether the nature of the claims to be determined was such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once even if there were subsequent appeals.” H & W Indus., Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, 860 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Curtiss–Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980)). A district court should grant certification only when there exists some danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by immediate appeal; it should not be entered routinely as a courtesy to counsel. PYCA Indus. Inc., 91 F.3d at 1421. DISCUSSION There are two prerequisites to certification of a Rule 54(b) judgment. First, the Court must have entirely dealt with one or more claims or parties, and second, there must be no just reason for delay. Plaintiff has requested entry of final judgment as to Allstate, Doug Caminita, Brad Heggem, Tim Buckley, and Tim Buckley, Inc. as to all claims dismissed pursuant to this Court’s orders of October 20, 2022 and October 25, 2022. (Rec. Docs. 52, 53). Plaintiff also seeks entry of a final judgment as to the Court’s order denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Rec.

Doc. 19). As to the first prerequisite to Rule 54(b), Plaintiff is correct that all claims against Doug Caminita, Brad Heggem, Tim Buckley, and Tim Buckley, Inc. had been dismissed. Therefore, the first requirement is met as to them. However, Plaintiff admits that there are still “some claims remaining against Allstate.” (Rec. Doc. 54, at 4.). Plaintiff does not attempt to argue that the claims which have been

dismissed as to Allstate are separable from the remaining claims, nor in fact does Plaintiff argue that these claims should be separated for the purpose of final judgment. Therefore, the first prerequisite fails as to Allstate. As to the second requirement, the Court must now address whether there would be some hardship or injustice which necessitates immediate appeal. Courts should only grant certification of Rule 54(b) final judgments rarely, when an immediate appeal is necessary and there is no reason for delay. They are not meant

to be routine.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Rahman v. Allstate Insurance Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rahman-v-allstate-insurance-company-laed-2023.