Raheemah Whitmore v. Raheem Whitmore

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: April 1, 2026
• Docket: 25-3392
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 25-3392 __________

RAHEEMAH DONYE SHADIRE WHITMORE, Appellant

v.

RAHEEM RYAN WHITMORE; RAHIYA WILLIAMS AND FAMILY; JANAE WILLIAMS; A STRANGE GUY NAMED MACK; FRIENDS/FAMILY OF MALDONADO; TERICKA MARTIN AND RELATIVES; ROBERT WILLIAMS, AKA Meek Mill ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-02602) District Judge: Honorable Kai N. Scott ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 26, 2026 Before: BIBAS, CHUNG, and BOVE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 1, 2026) ___________

OPINION* ___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Raheemah Whitmore appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing her

complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). For the reasons that follow, we will affirm

the District Court’s judgment.

Whitmore filed a complaint claiming a violation of her civil rights. The allegations

stem from Whitmore’s belief that there is an overall conspiracy that defendant Raheem

Whitmore—is directing others to cause her harm by, inter alia, hacking into her devices

“secretly” to delay important emails, text messages, and phone calls “to prevent [her]

from trying to make a living for [herself].” She further alleges that “multiple members of

his family and entourage” work at hospitals in Philadelphia and are mistreating her “due

to him telling them to ‘make [her] suffer.’” The District Court permitted Whitmore to

proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed the entire complaint under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because all the claims were factually frivolous and legally meritless.

The District Court dismissed the federal claims with prejudice and declined to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Whitmore timely appealed.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to consider this appeal. We exercise

plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint as frivolous under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), see Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373-74 (3d Cir. 2020), and we

review an order denying a recusal motion for abuse of discretion. See Jones v. Pittsburgh

Nat’l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1356 (3d Cir. 1990). Because Whitmore is proceeding pro

se, we liberally construe her filings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per

2 curiam). But pro se litigants still must “abide by the same rules that apply to all other

litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).

For substantially the reasons given by the District Court in its memorandum

opinion, dismissal of the complaint was proper. See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530

(3d Cir. 2003) (“To be frivolous, a claim must rely on an ‘indisputably meritless legal

theory’ or a ‘clearly baseless’ or ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual scenario.” (quoting

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989))); ECF 17 at 5 (explaining “Whitmore’s

allegations rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible” and “lack a basis in

fact”). Moreover, Whitmore has failed to present any clear challenge to the District

Court’s order dismissing the complaint. See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir.

2016) (stating that litigants forfeit claims that they fail to develop in an opening brief).

Instead, Whitmore argues that the District Court illegally “dropped the case” after

she requested that Judge Scott recuse herself. The request was included in a document

titled “motion that requests go unsolved,” which the District Court did not address in

either its memorandum opinion or order dismissing the complaint. We construe the

District Court’s decision to dismiss Whitmore’s claims as an implicit denial of the

request for recusal. See DLJ Mortg. Cap., Inc. v. Sheridan, 975 F.3d 358, 369 (3d Cir.

2020) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Depew, 210 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir.

2000) (“We treat the district court’s failure to rule on [the defendant’s] motion as a denial

of it.”).

3 To the extent that Whitmore contends that the District Court’s dismissal of her

complaint was inappropriate because the district judge should have recused herself, we

disagree. In her recusal motion, Whitmore alleged only that police had ignored her

complaints. She did not develop any argument how such contentions supported a

conclusion that the District Court was biased. Denial of her motion was thus not in error

as recusal is only warranted when a judge’s impartiality might be questioned; a party’s

displeasure with legal rulings is not a basis for recusal. See Securacomm Consulting, Inc.

v. Securacomm Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Arrowpoint Cap. Corp. v.

Arrowpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC, 793 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2015) (explaining that

“adverse rulings . . . are not in themselves proof of prejudice or bias”). To the extent that

Whitmore argues the District Court dismissed her case in retaliation for Whitmore’s

filing of the recusal motion, that assertion is without merit. As set forth more fully

above, the District Court properly dismissed Whitmore’s Complaint for failing to state a

claim. Finally, Whitmore speculates—without supporting facts—that Judge Scott is

biased in this case because “[g]roups of people in law who made errors are covering for

each other.” Moreover, she claims that “[a]liens dropped down and dismissed [her] case

due to” requests from individuals not named in this case. These allegations would not

cause a reasonable person to believe that Judge Scott is biased. See United States v.

Martorano, 866 F.2d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that a recusal motion must be based

4 on “objective facts,” not mere “possibilities” and “unsubstantiated allegations”). We

discern no abuse of discretion.

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.