Rago v. Nationwide Insurance

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Rago v. Nationwide Insurance

120 A.D.2d 579, 502 N.Y.S.2d 66, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 56662

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 12, 1986

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 120 A.D.2d 579 (Rago v. Nationwide Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rago v. Nationwide Insurance, 120 A.D.2d 579, 502 N.Y.S.2d 66, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 56662 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986).

Pincite

Opinion

— In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Ingrassia, J.), entered July 1, 1985, which denied their motion pursuant to CPLR 3403 (a) (3) for a special trial preference in the interest of justice.

Order affirmed, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

Special Term properly denied the motion for a special trial preference, as the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate "that the anticipated lag in reaching trial is likely to cause unusual hardship” (Ocera v Solomon, 110 AD2d 628, 629). The plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts, such as imminent financial destitution, or a probability of death before trial, which would justify the granting of this extraordinary privilege (see, Marks v Freidus, 32 AD2d 964). As such, Special Term properly denied the requested relief (see, Morris Elecs. v Stereo E. Devs., 71 AD2d 1061). Eiber, J. P., Kunzeman, Kooper and Spatt, JJ., concur.

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— In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Ingrassia, J.), entered July 1, 1985, which denied their motion pursuant to CPLR 3403 (a) (3) for a special trial preference in the interest of justice.

Order affirmed, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

Special Term properly denied the motion for a special trial preference, as the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate "that the anticipated lag in reaching trial is likely to cause unusual hardship” (Ocera v Solomon, 110 AD2d 628, 629). The plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts, such as imminent financial destitution, or a probability of death before trial, which would justify the granting of this extraordinary privilege (see, Marks v Freidus, 32 AD2d 964). As such, Special Term properly denied the requested relief (see, Morris Elecs. v Stereo E. Devs., 71 AD2d 1061). Eiber, J. P., Kunzeman, Kooper and Spatt, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

120 A.D.2d 579, 502 N.Y.S.2d 66, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 56662, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rago-v-nationwide-insurance-nyappdiv-1986.

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