Ragan v. Forbes

2 F.2d 785, 1924 U.S. App. LEXIS 2162
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedDecember 22, 1924
DocketNo. 1752-1756
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 2 F.2d 785 (Ragan v. Forbes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ragan v. Forbes, 2 F.2d 785, 1924 U.S. App. LEXIS 2162 (1st Cir. 1924).

Opinions

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge.

Benjamin P. Cheney was adjudicated a bankrupt on January 14, 1918.

In the schedules filed by Mm the American Ammonia Company appeared as a creditor in the amount of $136,000, holding as security 14,800 shares of its capital stock.

Upon September 17, 1918, the trustee filed a petition for leave to sell at public or private sale all of the assets of the estate of the bankrupt. On September 26, 1918, the American Ammonia Company filed objections to the sale, “for the reason that, certain shares of its capital stock are among said assets, and that it has a lien on said shares amounting to upwards of $130,000.”

The referee, who has since died, ordered that the trustee should have leave to sell at public or private sale any and all assets of the bankrupt estate, except “the interests of the bankrupt in any stock of the American Ammoiiia Company, any interests he may have in the estate of his late father, Benjamin P. Cheney, Sr., and any interests he may have in the stock or bonds of the Gila Copper Sulphide Company.”

On December 4, 1923, the petitioner, as trustee of the American Ammonia Company, which had been adjudicated a bankrupt, filed a petition with the referee in bankruptcy appointed after the decease of the referee to whom the Cheney bankruptcy case was first referred, asking leave to amend the written objection to the sale of assets filed by the attorney for the American Ammonia Company on September 26, 1918, by substituting therefor a formal proof of its claim, and also praying that the value of the stock held by the American Ammonia Company as security be appraised, and that it be allowed to participate in any dividends declared or to be declared in said bankruptcy estate as a creditor to the extent of the excess of the claim of the American Ammonia Company above the value of the said securities. This petition was denied, and' upon review the District Court has approved the order of the referee.

The District Court has found that, in the course of proceedings before the referee upon the petition to sell the assets of the Cheney estate, Mr. Anderson, counsel for the American Ammonia Company, stated orally that his client had a claim of upwards of $130,000 for which it held collateral and that it objected to its collateral being sold by the trustee.

The District Court further found that the only written document presented to the trustee or filed in court relating to the claim of the American Ammonia Company was [786]*786the objection to the sale filed by Mr. Anderson; that the Ammonia Company became bankrupt in 1922 without having realized on its collateral and applying the proceeds on its claim, and that its stock is worthless; that “there is nothing indicating any intention on the part of the Ammonia Company seasonably to assert its rights as a creditor; that it never instructed its counsel to prove its claim; it resisted any effort on the part of the trustees to sell the securities belonging to the bankrupt; it never pursued any of the courses open to it with reference to liquidation of that security, an essential step to any proof; that there is no evidence that the Ammonia Company omitted to file the proof through oversight, misunderstanding, or mistake; that the learned referee was not unwarranted in inferring that the Ammonia Company knew what it Was about and intentionally failed to prove.”

Section 57n of the Bankruptcy Act (Comp. St. § 9641) contains the following limitation on the proof of claims: “Claims shall not be proved against a bankrupt estate subsequent to one year after the adjudication; or if they are liquidated by litigation and the final judgment therein is rendered within thirty days before or after * * * such time, then within sixty days after the rendition of such judgment: Provided, That the right of infants and insane persons without guardians, without notice of the proceedings, may continue six months longer.”

Both the referee and the District Court have ruled that because of this section'the petitioner has lost the right to prove this claim 'of the American Ammonia Company after more than five years had elapsed since the adjudication in bankruptcy.

The requisites of a proof of claim are pointed out in section 57a of the act:

“Proof of claim shall consist of a statement under oath, in writing, signed by a creditor setting forth the claim, ;the consideration therefor, and whether any, and if so what, securities are held therefor, and whether any, and if so what, payments have been made thereon, and that the sum claimed is justly owing from the bankrupt to the creditor.”

Nothing approaching any compliance with these requirements was filed by the American Ammonia Company in the Cheney bankruptcy’ proceedings. While the claim of that company was included in the schedule of creditors, this would not relieve it from a proof of its claim. In the objection filed by its counsel to the sale of its stock it did not make any claim against the estate of Benjamin Cheney, but objected to the sale because it had a lien upon these shares of stock in the amount of $130,000. The oral statement made by its counsel before the referee that it had a claim against the Cheney estate of upwards of $136,000 was evidently made to show its right to file its objections to the sale of its stock. While the courts have been liberal in the allowance of amendments of the proofs of claims, yet in all the eases cited by the counsel for petitioner there was some written document, however informal, which could be recognized as a claim made against the estate of the bankrupt and which could be the subject of amendment. '

In this case no claim was made by the creditor against the estate. The statement of its counsel that it objected to the sale of its stock because it had a lien upon the same' of upwards of $130,000 could not be distorted into the assertion of a claim against the estate. As a secured creditor it could rely upon its security, believing it to be sufficient to pay its claim in full. The notes of the bankrupt which it held were all given for this stock and partial payments had been made upon the same, as appears from the record. It is evident that it did not wish, for reasons. of its own, to have its stock sold as such sale might show it to be of little value. It might have proved its claim as a secured creditor for the amount which the court should determine the face of its notes exceeded the value of the collateral which it held. Until there was an offer to prove its claim there was no necessity under section 57h to ascertain the value of the securities held by it so that the excess of its claim above the value of such securities might be determined. As no proof of claim was filed by it within a year after adjudication and nothing done by it which could be distorted into añ informal claim, there was nothing which could be the subject of amendment.

The third edition of Remington on Bankruptcy, § 889, states the law as follows:

“Of course there must have been an original process duly signed within the year; otherwise there would be nothing by which to amend; and the power of amendment is not to be distorted to let in dilatory creditors who have filed no proofs within the limited year.”

A large number of eases are cited in sup- ‘ port of this statement.

The learned district judge in his opinion pointed out the extreme difficulty in now ascertaining the value of the stock at the time of the adjudication of bankruptcy, as it has now become worthless and never listed [787]

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Oyoma Asinor v. DC
111 F.4th 1249 (D.C. Circuit, 2024)
Belser v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (In re Belser)
534 B.R. 228 (First Circuit, 2015)
In Re Fink
366 B.R. 870 (N.D. Indiana, 2007)
In re P. Derby Co.
18 F. Supp. 995 (D. Massachusetts, 1937)
In re Wilson & Tomlinson
18 F. Supp. 999 (D. Massachusetts, 1937)
In Re Rothbell
6 F. Supp. 244 (S.D. New York, 1933)
In Re Hotel St. James Co.
65 F.2d 82 (Ninth Circuit, 1933)
Lacoe v. De Long
65 F.2d 82 (Ninth Circuit, 1933)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2 F.2d 785, 1924 U.S. App. LEXIS 2162, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ragan-v-forbes-ca1-1924.