Rafael Soto v. Jack Johnson and Twin Falls County Adult Detention Center

• Court: District Court, D. Idaho
• Decided: December 5, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00493
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

RAFAEL SOTO, Case No. 1:25-cv-00493-BLW Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE

JACK JOHNSON and TWIN FALLS COUNTY ADULT DETENTION CENTER,

Defendants.

The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Rafael Soto’s Complaint because of Plaintiff’s status as an inmate. A “conditional filing” means that a plaintiff must obtain authorization from the Court to proceed. Upon screening, the Court must dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if Plaintiff intends to proceed. 1. Standards of Law for Screening Complaints A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). To state an actionable claim, a plaintiff must provide “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” that the defendant committed the unlawful act, meaning that sufficient facts are pled “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [activity].” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). “A

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 US. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case should be dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory or for

the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, even if a complaint meets the pleading

requirements, dismissal under §§ 1915 and 1915A is still appropriate if an affirmative defense is an “obvious bar to securing relief on the face of the complaint.” Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is an inmate currently held in the Twin Falls County Jail. Plaintiff appears to allege that his religion requires him to refrain from eating pork. Compl., Dkt. 3, at 2.

On July 4, 2025, Defendant Sheriff Johnson served Plaintiff a “polish sausage” and stated that the sausage was beef. If is unknown whether the sausage actually was beef-based. Plaintiff was told that the jail serves pork and pork by-products, something which unidentified individuals had previously denied. Id. Plaintiff then went on a “self-made” non-pork diet, but he is concerned that he previously might have consumed pork products

at the jail without his knowledge. Id. Plaintiff sues Sheriff Johnson and the Twin Falls County Jail, alleging that Defendants’ actions violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment religious rights. Id. 3. Discussion Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will, however, grant Plaintiff 28 days to amend the Complaint. Any amended complaint should

take into consideration the following. A. Legal Standards Applicable to Plaintiff’s Claims Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. Compl. at 1. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct

of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). A defendant causes a constitutional deprivation within the meaning of § 1983 “if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). To bring a § 1983 claim against a local governmental entity such as the Twin Falls

County Jail, a plaintiff must allege that the execution of an official policy or unofficial custom inflicted the injury of which the plaintiff complains, as required by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Under Monell, the requisite elements of a § 1983 claim against such an entity are the following: (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the entity had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or

custom amounted to deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2001). An entity also “may be held liable under § 1983 when the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority” or when “such an official ratified a

subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled in part on other grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). An unwritten policy or custom must be so “persistent and widespread” that it constitutes a “permanent and well settled” practice. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (quoting

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1970)). “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment absolutely protects the right to

believe in a religion—it does not absolutely protect all conduct associated with a religion. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940). Inmates retain their free exercise of religion rights in prison. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). An inmate who is an adherent of a minority religion must be afforded a “reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners

who adhere to conventional religious precepts.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam). A prison need not, however, provide “identical facilities or personnel” for “every religious sect or group within a prison,” and a “special chapel or place of worship need not be provided for every faith regardless of size; nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without regard to the extent of the demand.” Id. at 322 n.2.

To serve as a basis for a viable claim challenging a prison restriction under the Free Exercise Clause, an inmate’s belief must be both sincerely held and rooted in religious belief. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2008); Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994). Further, the burden placed on the inmate’s religious exercise by the defendants’ actions must be substantial. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S.

680, 699 (1989). De minimis—or minor—burdens on the free exercise of religion are not of a constitutional dimension, even if the belief upon which the exercise is based is sincerely held and rooted in religious belief. See, e.g., Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1006 n.4 (7th Cir. 1999) (the unavailability of a non-pork tray for inmate at 3 meals out of 810 does not constitute more than a de minimis burden on inmate’s free exercise of religion). Challenges to prison restrictions that are alleged “to inhibit First Amendment

interests must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the corrections system, to whose custody and care the prisoner has been committed in accordance with due process of law.” Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977) (citation omitted). What constitutes a reasonable opportunity for religious exercise, therefore, must be evaluated within the context of a prison’s need for security, among other legitimate

goals. O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 350-53 (1987) (holding that a prison’s policy of not allowing Muslim inmates on work detail to return to the prison to attend Jumu’ah, a group worship service, did not violate the Constitution). So long as a restriction on an inmate’s religious practice “is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,” that restriction is valid. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,

89 (1987). Factors to be considered in this reasonableness inquiry include (1) whether there is a logical connection between the governmental interest and the particular policy or decision at issue; (2) whether “alternative means of exercising the right remain open to prison inmates”; (3) the impact that accommodating a prisoner’s religious practice would have on “other inmates, on prison personnel, and on allocation of prison resources

generally”; and (4) whether there is an absence of “obvious, easy alternatives to the policy adopted by” prison officials. O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 350–53 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Courts must take care to avoid “substitut[ing] [their] judgment on difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration.” Id. at 353 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Prisoners “have the right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in

good health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion.” McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987). However, this right must be balanced with the prison’s “legitimate interest in running a simplified food service, rather than one that gives rise to many administrative difficulties.” Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993). A prison is not required under the First Amendment to provide a specific religious

meal for an inmate, but may require him to choose from a range of diets, provided that one of these diets allows the inmate to comply with his religious dietary restrictions: Because Plaintiffs can choose a diet plan that does not include any food that would violate their religious dietary laws, they have not established that they are substantially burdened by the failure of IDOC to offer a specific, separately-prepared Catholic or Halal meal. Plaintiffs are not entitled to demand meat in a religious diet—they are perfectly able to choose a vegan diet (or a non-pork or lacto-ovo diet) that complies with their religious dietary restrictions. IDOC’s decision to offer the selective diets instead of specific religious meals prepared according to each inmate’s religious beliefs is reasonably related to the legitimate penological purpose of meeting and maintaining each prisoner’s nutritional needs, while still running an efficient institution. The First Amendment does not require prison officials to offer each prisoner his own religious meal option, tailored to that particular prisoner’s expressed religious belief.

Wintrode v. Ada Cnty. Jail Emps., No. 1:24-CV-00015-DCN, 2025 WL 2374328, at *4 (D. Idaho Aug. 13, 2025) (unpublished) (quoting Hogan et al. v. IDOC, Case No. 1:15- cv-00308-BLW, Dkt. 11 at 11 (D. Idaho Dec. 15, 2015). A jail or prison’s occasional failure to accommodate a religious practice does not violate the Free Exercise Clause where the failures were not caused by “anything other than institutional shortage.” Id. at *3. Similarly, a temporary delay in accommodating

religious practice does not violate the First Amendment when caused by ordinary administrative or institutional delay. Tapp v. Stanley, 2008 WL 4934592, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008) (unpublished) (holding that a 3-month delay in providing a prisoner with a religious meal did not substantially burden the prisoner’s sincerely held religious beliefs where the problem was “caused by ordinary administrative delay”).

Further, an isolated act of negligence does not violate an inmate’s First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff cannot simply restate these standards of law in a complaint. Instead, a plaintiff must provide specific facts supporting the elements of each claim and must allege facts showing a causal link between each defendant and Plaintiff’s injury or

damage. Alleging “the mere possibility of misconduct” is not enough. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. B. The Complaint Fails to State a Plausible First Amendment Claim For several reasons, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under the Free Exercise Clause. Plaintiff offers no allegations about his religion

or its dietary requirements, nor does he allege that he ever actually had to eat pork in violation of those requirements. Plaintiff also does not disclose how long he was required to go without eating pork—if he was indeed required to do so. Plaintiff is merely concerned that he might have eaten pork on an unknown number of occasions. This is insufficient to plausibly suggest that the events of which Plaintiff complains constituted a substantial burden on his exercise of religious belief. See Rapier, 172 F.3d at 1006 n.4. Second, even if Plaintiff’s religious exercise had been substantially burdened, the

Complaint does not plausibly allege that Defendants acted more than negligently in failing to ensure that Plaintiff’s meals complied with his religious dietary restrictions. See Gallagher, 587 F.3d at 1070. Finally, the allegations in the Complaint do not plausibly imply that anything other than ordinary administrative shortage or delay caused the alleged burden on Plaintiff’s

religious exercise. See Tapp, 2008 WL 4934592, at *7; Wintrode, 2025 WL 2374328, at *4. Plaintiff may attempt to remedy these deficiencies in an amended complaint. 4. Standards for Amended Complaint If Plaintiff chooses to amend the Complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the

actions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). Plaintiff must also allege a sufficient causal connection between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “Vague and

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss” or to survive screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Rather, for each cause of action against each defendant, Plaintiff must state the

following: (1) the name of the person or entity that caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) facts showing the defendant is a state actor (such as state employment or a state contract) or a private entity performing a state function; (3) the dates on which the conduct of the defendant allegedly took place; (4) the specific conduct or action Plaintiff alleges is unconstitutional; (5) the particular constitutional or

statutory provision Plaintiff alleges has been violated; (6) facts alleging the elements of the violation are met—for example, Plaintiff must allege facts satisfying the elements of an free exercise claim; (7) the injury or damages Plaintiff personally suffered; and (8) the particular type of relief Plaintiff is seeking from each defendant. In addition, Plaintiff must include facts showing Plaintiff can meet the Monell requirements, if applicable

(explained above). Further, any amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff’s allegations in a single pleading and cannot rely upon, attach, or incorporate by reference other pleadings or documents. See Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[An] amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-

existent.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court erred by entering judgment against a party named in the initial complaint, but not in the amended complaint). Plaintiff must set forth each different factual allegation in a separate, numbered

paragraph. The amended complaint must be legibly written or typed in its entirety, and it should be clearly designated as the “Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff’s name and address should be clearly printed at the top left corner of the first page of each document filed with the Court. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must also file a “Motion to

Review the Amended Complaint.” If Plaintiff does not amend within 28 days, or if the amendment does not comply with Rule 8, this case may be dismissed without further notice. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (“When a litigant knowingly and repeatedly refuses to conform his pleadings to the requirements of the Federal Rules, it is reasonable to conclude that the litigant simply cannot state a claim.”).

ORDER IT IS ORDERED: 1. The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff has 28 days within which to file an amended complaint as described above. If Plaintiff does so, Plaintiff must file (along with the

amended complaint) a Motion to Review the Amended Complaint. Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal if Plaintiff no longer intends to pursue this case.! 2. If Plaintiff does not file a timely amended complaint, this case may be dismissed with prejudice and without further notice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, failure to prosecute, or failure to comply with a Court order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). 3. Because an amended complaint is required for Plaintiff to proceed, Plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel (contained in the Complaint) is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may renew the request for counsel in an amended complaint.

oo DATED: December 5, 2025

i A» B. Lynn Winmill uO US. District Court Judge

' A voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) is not a dismissal for frivolity, for maliciousness, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, does not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Spencer v. Barajas, 140 F.4th 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2025).

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 12