Rader's Administrator v. Maddox

Supreme Court

Rader's Administrator v. Maddox

150 U.S. 128, 14 S. Ct. 46, 37 L. Ed. 1025, 1893 U.S. LEXIS 2363

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedNovember 6, 1893

Docket54

StatusPublished

Cited by10 cases

This text of 150 U.S. 128 (Rader's Administrator v. Maddox) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rader's Administrator v. Maddox, 150 U.S. 128, 14 S. Ct. 46, 37 L. Ed. 1025, 1893 U.S. LEXIS 2363 (1893).

Pincite

Opinion

Mr. Justice Brewer

delivered the opinion of the court.

On the trial of this case, all the testimony offered by the defendants to show the circumstances of the .sale was on motion óf the plaintiffs stricken out by the court. For the purpose of this hearing, therefore, it must be assumed that the facts were as this testimony tended to show that they were. The owners of these notes and mortgage were not present at the sale, but were represented by their agent and attorney, and by his direction the sheriff received the bids of Kier up to eight thousand dollars and upwards, and, as security for the completion of those purchases, retained all the property bid for, and in addition received $1752. The contention of the mortgagees is, that an attorney has, in the absence of special authority, no s power to. make a sale on credit, or to receive anything other than money on a claim placed in his hands for collection. Without questioning the truth of that proposition, it seems to us that it is inapplicable. No completed sale was made, no title passed; and while these horses were struck off to Kier, the transaction was evidently- merely a conditional sale, to be perfected if, and only if, within five days the balance of the purchase money was paid.

But it is unnecessary to pursue any inquiry in this direction, for upon a very clear rule of law the mortgagees are estopped from maintaining this action. The arrangement, whether within or without the power of the attorney, was made and carried into effect by his directions, and it was an arrangement by which *131 the proposed buyer deposited $1152 with, the sheriff, as well as left with him the horses which he had attempted to purchase. If that transaction was beyond the power of the attorney, and the mortgagees were intending to repudiate it, they were bound to repudiate it in toto. They could not accept that which was beneficial, and avoid that which was burdensome. 1 Parsons on Contracts, (1th ed.,) 19 to: 52, and cases cited in notes. It is urged, however, that it was the sheriff’s duty to pay over the entire amount of the notes, and that the mere receiving from him of a part of that which it was his duty'to pay did not work a ratification of any unauthorized proceedings by which he obtained that sum. This argument rests upon the assumption that a different rule obtains where the deposit by the proposed 'buyer is money, from that which would obtain if it were some other personal property. But can the question of ratification depend on the character of the deposits?- If ICier had deposited a gold watch as security for the completion, of his purchase, and the plaintiffs had received that from the sheriff, there would be no doubt that they had ratified the act of their attorne}7. Suppose that .the deposit was a package whose contents were unknown, and that deposit was accepted by the plaintiffs; would it prove a ratification if, when .opened, the contents turned out to be watches, and not a ratification if only money ? It may be that this case turns somewhat on whether the sheriff and plaintiffs understood and intended that the payment of this money was in fact a transfer by him to them of the deposit, or merely a payment on account; but even if this be so, the question was one of fact to be settled by the jury, and should not have been disposed of by striking out all the testimony, and withdrawing tire case from the jury. Kier parted with his property on the faith of this agreement between Smith and himself; and if it was unauthorized, and gave him no rights, he was entitled to a return of his deposit, whether that was a watch or money ; and if the plaintiffs have taken from the sheriff this deposit, they have deprived him of the power tó return it. It is unnecessary to hold that the horses became the property of plaintiffs. It is enough that they, by receiv *132 ing this deposit, have ratified the arrangement- made by their attorney as to the sale which the sheriff was making, and if they desired a resale of the property they should have directed it.' They cannot repudiate the action of their agent and attorney and treat the sheriff as having made a complete sale, When in fact he had not. When the money and horses were tendered to their attorney, lje declined both. But they took the money, while declining to receive the horses, and failed to give any instructions to the sheriff as to further sale or otherwise: They assume to ..treat this as a completed sale to Kier, whfen in. fact it was not, and when they have ratified w'hat the sheriff did in respect thereto in obedience to the instructions of their agent and attorney by taking the deposit made by Kier.

The judgment must be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial. As since it was brought to this court the Territory of Montana has been admitted as a State, and as no question of a Federal nature is presented, the case will be remanded to the Supreme Court of the State.'

Reversed.

The Chief. Justice did not hear the argument or take part in the decision of this case.

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Mr. Justice Brewer

delivered the opinion of the court.

On the trial of this case, all the testimony offered by the defendants to show the circumstances of the .sale was on motion óf the plaintiffs stricken out by the court. For the purpose of this hearing, therefore, it must be assumed that the facts were as this testimony tended to show that they were. The owners of these notes and mortgage were not present at the sale, but were represented by their agent and attorney, and by his direction the sheriff received the bids of Kier up to eight thousand dollars and upwards, and, as security for the completion of those purchases, retained all the property bid for, and in addition received $1752. The contention of the mortgagees is, that an attorney has, in the absence of special authority, no s power to. make a sale on credit, or to receive anything other than money on a claim placed in his hands for collection. Without questioning the truth of that proposition, it seems to us that it is inapplicable. No completed sale was made, no title passed; and while these horses were struck off to Kier, the transaction was evidently- merely a conditional sale, to be perfected if, and only if, within five days the balance of the purchase money was paid.

But it is unnecessary to pursue any inquiry in this direction, for upon a very clear rule of law the mortgagees are estopped from maintaining this action. The arrangement, whether within or without the power of the attorney, was made and carried into effect by his directions, and it was an arrangement by which *131 the proposed buyer deposited $1152 with, the sheriff, as well as left with him the horses which he had attempted to purchase. If that transaction was beyond the power of the attorney, and the mortgagees were intending to repudiate it, they were bound to repudiate it in toto. They could not accept that which was beneficial, and avoid that which was burdensome. 1 Parsons on Contracts, (1th ed.,) 19 to: 52, and cases cited in notes. It is urged, however, that it was the sheriff’s duty to pay over the entire amount of the notes, and that the mere receiving from him of a part of that which it was his duty'to pay did not work a ratification of any unauthorized proceedings by which he obtained that sum. This argument rests upon the assumption that a different rule obtains where the deposit by the proposed 'buyer is money, from that which would obtain if it were some other personal property. But can the question of ratification depend on the character of the deposits?- If ICier had deposited a gold watch as security for the completion, of his purchase, and the plaintiffs had received that from the sheriff, there would be no doubt that they had ratified the act of their attorne}7. Suppose that .the deposit was a package whose contents were unknown, and that deposit was accepted by the plaintiffs; would it prove a ratification if, when .opened, the contents turned out to be watches, and not a ratification if only money ? It may be that this case turns somewhat on whether the sheriff and plaintiffs understood and intended that the payment of this money was in fact a transfer by him to them of the deposit, or merely a payment on account; but even if this be so, the question was one of fact to be settled by the jury, and should not have been disposed of by striking out all the testimony, and withdrawing tire case from the jury. Kier parted with his property on the faith of this agreement between Smith and himself; and if it was unauthorized, and gave him no rights, he was entitled to a return of his deposit, whether that was a watch or money ; and if the plaintiffs have taken from the sheriff this deposit, they have deprived him of the power tó return it. It is unnecessary to hold that the horses became the property of plaintiffs. It is enough that they, by receiv *132 ing this deposit, have ratified the arrangement- made by their attorney as to the sale which the sheriff was making, and if they desired a resale of the property they should have directed it.' They cannot repudiate the action of their agent and attorney and treat the sheriff as having made a complete sale, When in fact he had not. When the money and horses were tendered to their attorney, lje declined both. But they took the money, while declining to receive the horses, and failed to give any instructions to the sheriff as to further sale or otherwise: They assume to ..treat this as a completed sale to Kier, whfen in. fact it was not, and when they have ratified w'hat the sheriff did in respect thereto in obedience to the instructions of their agent and attorney by taking the deposit made by Kier.

The judgment must be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial. As since it was brought to this court the Territory of Montana has been admitted as a State, and as no question of a Federal nature is presented, the case will be remanded to the Supreme Court of the State.'

Reversed.

The Chief. Justice did not hear the argument or take part in the decision of this case.

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150 U.S. 128, 14 S. Ct. 46, 37 L. Ed. 1025, 1893 U.S. LEXIS 2363, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/raders-administrator-v-maddox-scotus-1893.

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