RACHEL BREAUX * NO. 2024-C-0126
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL LOUISIANA STADIUM & * EXPOSITION DISTRICT, SMG, FOURTH CIRCUIT LANDMARK EVENT * STAFFING SERVICES, INC., STATE OF LOUISIANA AND JANE DOE *******
APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 2016-00689, DIVISION “C” Honorable Sidney H. Cates, Judge ****** Judge Rosemary Ledet ****** (Court composed of Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Judge Dale N. Atkins)
Dennis J. Phayer BURGLASS, TANKERSLEY, GAUDIN, AND PHAYER, LLC 5213 Airline Drive Metairie, LA 70001
Phyllis E. Glazer Taylor M. Simon Angelo O’Brien LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1885 N Third Street, 3rd Floor Baton Rouge, LA 70802
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/RELATORS
D. Russell Holwadel Heather A. England Reznik ADAMS RUSSELL HOLWADEL, LLC 400 Poydras Street, Suite 2450 New Orleans, LA 70130
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT
WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED AND RENDERED APRIL 4, 2024 RML SCJ DNA Relators — SMG and Jameika Gleason — seek supervisory review of the
trial court’s January 30, 2024 judgment, denying their exception of no right of
action. We grant Relators’ writ. Based on our review of the record, the Respondent
– Rachel Breaux – is judicially estopped from recovering damages through the
instant litigation. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s judgment on Relators’
exception of no right of action.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 20, 2012, Rachael Breaux (“Ms. Breaux”) filed a voluntary petition
for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana. As with most Chapter 13 bankruptcy plans, Ms. Breaux
agreed to certain terms and conditions to satisfy her creditors. As a part of these
terms, Ms. Breaux signed a Certification of Notice to Consumer Debtors under 11
U.S.C. § 342(b). The notice stated the following:
WARNING: Section 521(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that you promptly file detailed information regarding your creditors, assets, liabilities, income, expenses and general financial condition. Your bankruptcy case may be dismissed if this information is not filed with the court within the time deadlines set by the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules, and the local rules of the court.
1 The above excerpt was confirmed as a condition of Ms. Breaux’s bankruptcy plan
by court order (the “Court Order”). The Court Order also mandated that Ms.
Breaux abide by the following:
IT IS ORDERED:
[…]
That all…proceeds from lawsuits or settlements…shall be turned over to the trustee for administration.
That the debtor shall provide to the trustee, at least once every six months until the case is closed, a report on the status of any pending or potential lawsuit in which the debtor is or may be a plaintiff.
In essence, the totality of Ms. Breaux’s responsibilities required her to disclose
information regarding contingent and potential claims during the effective period
of the bankruptcy plan. The bankruptcy was not closed until 2017.
While her bankruptcy was open, Ms. Breaux was allegedly injured by
Jameika Gleason (“Ms. Gleason”), an employee of SMG, during a New Orleans
Saints preseason game at the Superdome. Ms. Breaux later filed a petition for
damages against the Relators in connection with this incident.1 She failed to report
both the accident and the filing of a lawsuit to the bankruptcy trustee. Ms. Breaux
also did not disclose a separate lawsuit arising from an automobile accident in
2015.
In response, Relators filed a peremptory exception of no right of action.
Relators asserted that Ms. Breaux is judicially estopped from pursuing damages
because she failed to notify the bankruptcy court that she had an interest in this
1 Ms. Breaux also named Louisiana Stadium & Exposition District and Landmark Event Staffing
Services, Inc. as defendants, but they were not party to the Relators’ Exception of No Right of Action.
2 litigation in accordance with her Chapter 13 plan. After a hearing, the trial court
denied Relators’ exception of no right of action. This writ followed.
DISCUSSION
Relators argue that Ms. Breaux did not comply with her duty under the
Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan to disclose any pending or potential lawsuits. As a
consequence of this failure to disclose, Ms. Breaux is judicially estopped from
seeking damages from Relators through this action. We agree.
“[I]n determining whether the trial court was legally correct in sustaining the
exception, an appellate court is required to conduct a de novo review.” DLN
Holdings, L.L.C. v. Guglielmo, 2021-0640, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/29/22), 366 So.
3d 461, 466-467. Here, Relators seek review of the trial court’s denial of their
exception of no right of action. The denial was based on the finding that Ms.
Breaux was not judicially estopped from bringing forth this lawsuit. Because
judicial estoppel was raised by the Relators in the context of a bankruptcy case,
federal law applies here. See Tates v. Integrated Prod. Servs., Inc., 51,574, p. 6
(La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So. 3d 716, 720 (citing Thomas v. Economy Premier
Assur. Co., 50,638, p. 6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/18/16), 196 So.3d 7, 12).
“Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine designed to protect the integrity
of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions
according to the exigencies of the moment.” Webb v. Webb, 2018-0320, p. 9 (La.
12/5/18), 263 So. 3d 321, 328 (quoting Miller v. Conagra, Inc., 2008-0021, p. 9
(La. 9/8/08), 991 So. 2d 445, 452). “Federal courts review judicial estoppel
determinations for abuse of discretion.” Id.
A court may apply judicial estoppel if the following circumstances are
present: 1) the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought has asserted a legal
3 position that is plainly inconsistent with a prior position, 2) a court accepted the
prior position, and 3) the party did not act inadvertently. See Reed v. City of
Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “With bankruptcy
cases, this inconsistent position requirement is generally met when a debtor does
not disclose an asset to the bankruptcy court, but then pursues a claim in a separate
tribunal based on the undisclosed asset.” Tates v. Integrated Prod. Servs., Inc.,
51,574, p. 6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So.3d 716, 720 (citing Allen v. C&H
Distributors, 813 F.3d 566, 572 (5th Cir. 2016)).
A non-disclosure is “inadvertent” when the estopped party was unaware of
the facts giving rise to his claim or no motive for concealment existed. See Miller
v. Conagra, Inc., 2008-0021, pp. 9–10 (La. 9/8/08), 991 So.2d 445, 452 (citing
Jethroe v. Omnova Solutions, Inc., 412 F.3d 598, 601 (5th Cir. 2005)). To show a
lack of knowledge, it is not enough for a party to show that he did not know he had
a duty to disclose his claim. See United States ex rel. Bias v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch.
Bd., 766 Fed.Appx.
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RACHEL BREAUX * NO. 2024-C-0126
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL LOUISIANA STADIUM & * EXPOSITION DISTRICT, SMG, FOURTH CIRCUIT LANDMARK EVENT * STAFFING SERVICES, INC., STATE OF LOUISIANA AND JANE DOE *******
APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 2016-00689, DIVISION “C” Honorable Sidney H. Cates, Judge ****** Judge Rosemary Ledet ****** (Court composed of Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Judge Dale N. Atkins)
Dennis J. Phayer BURGLASS, TANKERSLEY, GAUDIN, AND PHAYER, LLC 5213 Airline Drive Metairie, LA 70001
Phyllis E. Glazer Taylor M. Simon Angelo O’Brien LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1885 N Third Street, 3rd Floor Baton Rouge, LA 70802
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/RELATORS
D. Russell Holwadel Heather A. England Reznik ADAMS RUSSELL HOLWADEL, LLC 400 Poydras Street, Suite 2450 New Orleans, LA 70130
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT
WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED AND RENDERED APRIL 4, 2024 RML SCJ DNA Relators — SMG and Jameika Gleason — seek supervisory review of the
trial court’s January 30, 2024 judgment, denying their exception of no right of
action. We grant Relators’ writ. Based on our review of the record, the Respondent
– Rachel Breaux – is judicially estopped from recovering damages through the
instant litigation. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s judgment on Relators’
exception of no right of action.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 20, 2012, Rachael Breaux (“Ms. Breaux”) filed a voluntary petition
for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana. As with most Chapter 13 bankruptcy plans, Ms. Breaux
agreed to certain terms and conditions to satisfy her creditors. As a part of these
terms, Ms. Breaux signed a Certification of Notice to Consumer Debtors under 11
U.S.C. § 342(b). The notice stated the following:
WARNING: Section 521(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that you promptly file detailed information regarding your creditors, assets, liabilities, income, expenses and general financial condition. Your bankruptcy case may be dismissed if this information is not filed with the court within the time deadlines set by the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules, and the local rules of the court.
1 The above excerpt was confirmed as a condition of Ms. Breaux’s bankruptcy plan
by court order (the “Court Order”). The Court Order also mandated that Ms.
Breaux abide by the following:
IT IS ORDERED:
[…]
That all…proceeds from lawsuits or settlements…shall be turned over to the trustee for administration.
That the debtor shall provide to the trustee, at least once every six months until the case is closed, a report on the status of any pending or potential lawsuit in which the debtor is or may be a plaintiff.
In essence, the totality of Ms. Breaux’s responsibilities required her to disclose
information regarding contingent and potential claims during the effective period
of the bankruptcy plan. The bankruptcy was not closed until 2017.
While her bankruptcy was open, Ms. Breaux was allegedly injured by
Jameika Gleason (“Ms. Gleason”), an employee of SMG, during a New Orleans
Saints preseason game at the Superdome. Ms. Breaux later filed a petition for
damages against the Relators in connection with this incident.1 She failed to report
both the accident and the filing of a lawsuit to the bankruptcy trustee. Ms. Breaux
also did not disclose a separate lawsuit arising from an automobile accident in
2015.
In response, Relators filed a peremptory exception of no right of action.
Relators asserted that Ms. Breaux is judicially estopped from pursuing damages
because she failed to notify the bankruptcy court that she had an interest in this
1 Ms. Breaux also named Louisiana Stadium & Exposition District and Landmark Event Staffing
Services, Inc. as defendants, but they were not party to the Relators’ Exception of No Right of Action.
2 litigation in accordance with her Chapter 13 plan. After a hearing, the trial court
denied Relators’ exception of no right of action. This writ followed.
DISCUSSION
Relators argue that Ms. Breaux did not comply with her duty under the
Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan to disclose any pending or potential lawsuits. As a
consequence of this failure to disclose, Ms. Breaux is judicially estopped from
seeking damages from Relators through this action. We agree.
“[I]n determining whether the trial court was legally correct in sustaining the
exception, an appellate court is required to conduct a de novo review.” DLN
Holdings, L.L.C. v. Guglielmo, 2021-0640, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/29/22), 366 So.
3d 461, 466-467. Here, Relators seek review of the trial court’s denial of their
exception of no right of action. The denial was based on the finding that Ms.
Breaux was not judicially estopped from bringing forth this lawsuit. Because
judicial estoppel was raised by the Relators in the context of a bankruptcy case,
federal law applies here. See Tates v. Integrated Prod. Servs., Inc., 51,574, p. 6
(La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So. 3d 716, 720 (citing Thomas v. Economy Premier
Assur. Co., 50,638, p. 6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/18/16), 196 So.3d 7, 12).
“Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine designed to protect the integrity
of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions
according to the exigencies of the moment.” Webb v. Webb, 2018-0320, p. 9 (La.
12/5/18), 263 So. 3d 321, 328 (quoting Miller v. Conagra, Inc., 2008-0021, p. 9
(La. 9/8/08), 991 So. 2d 445, 452). “Federal courts review judicial estoppel
determinations for abuse of discretion.” Id.
A court may apply judicial estoppel if the following circumstances are
present: 1) the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought has asserted a legal
3 position that is plainly inconsistent with a prior position, 2) a court accepted the
prior position, and 3) the party did not act inadvertently. See Reed v. City of
Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “With bankruptcy
cases, this inconsistent position requirement is generally met when a debtor does
not disclose an asset to the bankruptcy court, but then pursues a claim in a separate
tribunal based on the undisclosed asset.” Tates v. Integrated Prod. Servs., Inc.,
51,574, p. 6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So.3d 716, 720 (citing Allen v. C&H
Distributors, 813 F.3d 566, 572 (5th Cir. 2016)).
A non-disclosure is “inadvertent” when the estopped party was unaware of
the facts giving rise to his claim or no motive for concealment existed. See Miller
v. Conagra, Inc., 2008-0021, pp. 9–10 (La. 9/8/08), 991 So.2d 445, 452 (citing
Jethroe v. Omnova Solutions, Inc., 412 F.3d 598, 601 (5th Cir. 2005)). To show a
lack of knowledge, it is not enough for a party to show that he did not know he had
a duty to disclose his claim. See United States ex rel. Bias v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch.
Bd., 766 Fed.Appx. 38 (5th Cir.2019).
Here, the first element for judicial estoppel is met because Ms. Breaux
represented to the bankruptcy court that she did not have any potential or pending
claims; but she filed three lawsuits while her Chapter 13 plan was in effect.
The second element is met because the bankruptcy court discharged Ms.
Breaux after five years of payments under the belief that she did not have any state
claims.
Finally, the third requirement is met because the non-disclosure of the
lawsuits was not inadvertent. The court order mandated that Ms. Breaux “provide
to the trustee, at least once every six months until the case is closed, a report on the
4 status of any pending or potential lawsuit in which the debtor is or may be a
plaintiff.”
At the hearing on Relators’ exception of no right of action, Ms. Breaux
testified that although the Court Order directed her to notify the trustee about “any
pending or potential lawsuits”, she did not remember or know that she had to
report any of the accidents resulting in litigation. The Fifth Circuit held in In Re
Bias that a lack of knowledge is not sufficient to show inadvertence. Her testimony
does not meet this threshold. Ms. Breaux had to prove that she was unaware of the
facts giving rise to her claims – the specific facts of the three accidents. Her
knowledge of these facts is evident from the filing of the lawsuits in which she
sought to recover for the injuries allegedly sustained in the same three accidents.
The third element of judicial estoppel is met.
Thus, the three elements of judicial estoppel are met and the trial court erred
in failing to grant Relators’ exception of no right of action.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we grant Relators’ writ, reverse the trial court’s
judgment denying the Relators’ exception of no right of action, and render
judgment sustaining the exception of no right of action and dismissing this suit.
WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED AND RENDERED