R.A. Poplawski v. N. Marlier, Esq. & Michelle L.N.U., Employee

CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 6, 2022
Docket135 M.D. 2021
StatusUnpublished

This text of R.A. Poplawski v. N. Marlier, Esq. & Michelle L.N.U., Employee (R.A. Poplawski v. N. Marlier, Esq. & Michelle L.N.U., Employee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
R.A. Poplawski v. N. Marlier, Esq. & Michelle L.N.U., Employee, (Pa. Ct. App. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Richard A. Poplawski, : Petitioner : : v. : No. 135 M.D. 2021 : Submitted: March 4, 2022 Noah Marlier, Esquire, : & : Michelle L.N.U., Employee, : Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: May 6, 2022

Noah Marlier, Esquire (Marlier)1 and Michelle Jackson (Jackson),2 (collectively, Prothonotary) filed Preliminary Objections (Prothonotary’s POs) in response to inmate Richard A. Poplawski’s (Poplawski) petition for review (Petition) seeking this Court to order Prothonotary to accept for filing a cross-

1 Marlier is the Montgomery County Prothonotary. Petition ¶ 2; Prothonotary’s POs ¶ 2. 2 The case caption identifies Jackson as “Michelle L.N.U.” as Petitioner Richard A. Poplawski references her in his Petition as “Michelle (last name unknown)[,]” indicating that he was unable to ascertain her last name, but identifies her as an employee of the Montgomery County Prothonotary’s Office. See Petition ¶¶ 3-4; Prothonotary’s POs ¶ 3. complaint in his wife’s divorce action.3 Poplawski then filed preliminary objections (Poplawski’s POs) to Prothonotary’s POs. After review, we dismiss Poplawski’s Petition, as the issues he raised are now moot. Poplawski is an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Phoenix. In January 2021, Poplawski’s wife filed a divorce complaint in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. Petition ¶ 6. Poplawski claims that by mid-March, when he still had not been served with the original divorce complaint, he sought to file a cross-complaint in the matter. Petition ¶¶ 7-8. However, Prothonotary returned the cross-complaint to him unfiled with a note remarking that there was already an active divorce action. Petition ¶ 9. Poplawski returned the cross- complaint to Prothonotary and requested that it be docketed. Petition ¶ 10. Poplawski notes that as of the date of filing his Petition, the cross-complaint had not been filed. Petition ¶ 11. Poplawski filed this Petition requesting that this court enter an order “COMMANDING [Prothonotary] to file his divorce action[.]”4 See Petition. In response to Poplawski’s Petition, Prothonotary filed Prothonotary’s POs. In Prothonotary’s POs, Prothonotary acknowledges that it rejected Poplawski’s cross-complaint for filing in his wife’s divorce action and returned it to him unfiled. Prothonotary’s POs ¶ 7. Prothonotary asserts that it rejected Poplawski’s cross- complaint because Poplawski failed to comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Specifically, Prothonotary asserts that pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1920.5, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1920.5, Poplawski, as a defendant in a

3 Poplawski initially filed a “Complaint in Mandamus[,]” which this Court treated as a petition for review by Order dated October 5, 2021. In his Petition, Poplawski requests that this Court to order Prothonotary to accept a cross-complaint for filing in his wife’s divorce action. 4 Additionally, Poplawski requests the Court order Prothonotary to pay damages, costs, fees, and expenses. See Petition.

2 divorce action, was required to counterclaim in his answer to the complaint if he wished to assert a cause of action for divorce. Id. ¶ 8. Notably, Prothonotary asserts that after filing this Petition, Poplawski filed his own action for divorce against his wife, and his wife’s pending divorce action was closed by agreement of the parties. Id. ¶ 17. Thus, Prothonotary asserts that the Petition should be dismissed due to its failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted and this Court’s lack of personal5 and subject matter jurisdiction. In Poplawski’s POs, he requests that Prothonotary’s POs be dismissed for two reasons. See generally Poplawski’s POs. First, Poplawski alleges that Prothonotary failed to properly serve Prothonotary’s POs and misrepresented the date of service. Id. ¶¶ 11-13. Second, Poplawski asserts that the Prothonotary’s attachment of the criminal docket in Poplawski’s underlying case to Prothonotary’s POs constitutes a “scandalous and impertinent matter[,]” and was done for the improper purpose of “harass[ing] and prejudic[ing] [Poplawski] before this Court.” Id. ¶¶ 14-18. In addition to considering the pleadings, we take judicial notice of Poplawski’s divorce action at the docket referenced by Prothonotary and attached to Prothonotary’s POs, which can be found under Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County docket number 2021-06650.6 Per the docket, a divorce decree has been entered in Poplawski’s divorce action.7

5 This issue was addressed by the October 5, 2021 Order of this Court upon consideration of Prothonotary’s PO alleging lack of personal jurisdiction and ordering Poplawski to serve his Petition in compliance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. It appears Poplawski complied with such Order. 6 We are permitted to take judicial notice of court dockets and find it appropriate to do so in this instance. See Pa.R.E. 201(b)(2); see also Krenzel v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 840 A.2d 450, 454 n. 6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (“Judicial notice can be taken of pleadings and judgments in other proceedings where appropriate.” (citation omitted)). 7 Per the docket, the divorce decree was entered on March 1, 2022.

3 Poplawski’s Petition seeks mandamus relief against Prothonotary. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy used to compel a government agency to act where a petitioner can show (1) a clear right to relief, (2) a corresponding duty on the part of the respondent to act, and (3) that no alternative legal remedy exists. Humphrey v. Dep’t of Corr., 939 A.2d 987, 991 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (citing McCray v. Dep’t of Corr., 872 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa. 2005)). This Court has jurisdiction over this filing pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 761, which provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings . . . [a]gainst the Commonwealth government[.]” Despite Prothonotary’s argument to the contrary, our Supreme Court determined that a prothonotary is a clerk of the court of common pleas. In re Admin. Order No. 1– MD–2003, 936 A.2d 1 (Pa. 2007). Because a county clerk of court is a Commonwealth officer, it logically follows that a prothonotary is also a Commonwealth officer. See Richardson v. Peters, 19 A.3d 1047 (Pa. 2011). Before turning to the merits of the parties’ POs, we must first address whether Poplawski’s Petition is moot. While neither party specifically raised the issue of mootness in their pleadings, both parties reference mootness in their briefs. See Reply Brief of Respondents, dated 1/10/21, p. 4; Petitioner’s Brief, dated 1/3/21, p. 6. We address the issue sua sponte, as we cannot “decide moot or abstract questions, nor can we enter a judgment or decree to which effect cannot be given.” Battiste v. Borough of East McKeesport, 94 A.3d 418, 424 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (quoting Orfield v. Weindel, 52 A.3d 275, 277 (Pa. Super. 2012)). The mootness doctrine requires that “an actual case or controversy” exist at all stages of review, not merely at the time an action is filed. Pap’s A.M. v.

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R.A. Poplawski v. N. Marlier, Esq. & Michelle L.N.U., Employee, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ra-poplawski-v-n-marlier-esq-michelle-lnu-employee-pacommwct-2022.