R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Rollins

315 S.W.2d 1, 203 Tenn. 565, 7 McCanless 565, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 332
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedJune 6, 1958
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 315 S.W.2d 1 (R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Rollins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Rollins, 315 S.W.2d 1, 203 Tenn. 565, 7 McCanless 565, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. 1958).

Opinion

Me. Justice Swepston

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an action filed under T.C.A. sec. 50-1025 by Roy Rollins to increase the amount of a previous compensation award made to him and approved by the same trial judge. In the previous case the court made an award of 75% of the loss of a leg at the rate of $28 per week for 131.25 weeks from March 10, 1955. The present petition was filed on July 24, 1957, a few weeks before the prior award would have expired.

Proof was heard, after which the court awarded petitioner permanent-partial disability to the extent of 75% to his body as a whole at the rate of $28 for 168.75 additional weekly installments.

The court made the following finding:

“At the time I tried or heard this case before I seriously considered giving this man 75% partial, permanent disability to his body as a whole, but out of the abundance of caution I confined it to 75% disability to his leg. I was at that time hoping that it would be retained on the docket, or if not on the docket if I was mistaken in finding what I did, the case would be reopened so I could correct a mistake and I think this has happened. I think I made a mistake the first time. I think I should have allowed him 75% disability to work to his body as a whole, and now this has given me the opportunity of hearing evidence to determine whether or not I was mistaken in the first place, and from the proof introduced by the plaintiff it now appears and I so find that he has done his best to work and has been unable to work. He has tried to work at the jobs he is [567]*567able to work at, and when be does be falls down and can’t continue working; and he has tried this all the way from here to New Orleans. I now find from the proof introduced on this particular reopening of the case that this man has a partial, permanent disability to bis body as a whole which renders him unable to do 75% of the work he was able to do before he had this injury, and that he now has only a 25% ability to earn any wages at all, or to engage in any work that would bring him more than 25% to what he was formerly able to earn in this condition before he had his injury. ’ ’

The assignments of error raise two questions: first, that the trial judge had no right under said Section 50-1025 to correct any mistake that he had made in his former judgment, and second, that there is no material evidence to support the finding of any increase in disability.

The only testimony in behalf of the petitioner on this second hearing was his own testimony the substance of which is as follows:

“XQ. The situation is exactly what it was before? A. I wouldn’t say it was. At that time I didn’t know whether I could hold down a job or not, and now I know I can’t.
“XQ. The situation at that time was, you thought you would get better, and now you know you are going to stay the same? A. Well, the doctor says my leg is perfectly normal, but I can’t see that it is getting any better.
[568]*568‘ ‘XQ. What the situation is now is just exactly what it was at the time the Court awarded your disability? A. Not in my mind.
“XQ. I say, the way you feel now is the same as the way you felt then? A. No, sir.
“XQ. What is the difference? A. At that time I figured I would be able to go back to work, and now I know I won’t.
“XQ. At that time you felt like you were going to make improvement, and now you know you are not? A. That is right.
“XQ. That is the only difference? A. Let us go back just a minute.
“XQ. Tell me whether there are other differences between then and now, and we will go back. A. Well, I will tell you the difference in it now and at that time. It stays dead continuously now, and it would go to sleep occasionally then.
“XQ. You have always had difficulty with it going to sleep? A. Yes, but there is a difference in its going to sleep and being numb like it is now.
“XQ. It is not numb enough that you don’t walk? A. Sure, I can move it.
“XQ. Sometimes it gets number? A. That is right.
“XQ. Sometimes it is a little bit numb, and the rest of the time it is all numb? A. That is right.
“XQ. When it is a little bit numb where is it numb? A. Right in there. (Indicating.)
[569]*569“XQ. And then it gets numb tbe rest of the way? A. Yes, sir, to the end of my toe.
“XQ. And at times it gets better and is not numb? A. No, sir, it is numb all the time.
“XQ. That is the way it was then? A. It stays asleep continually now for hours. I will go to sleep and wake up and have to rub my leg to get any feeling in it.
“XQ. You say you fell down four times? A. Yes, sir, I have got scars to show where I feel down between two bars of steel.” Second Tr. pp. 26-28.
“XQ. The only difference back when the Court heard you before and now, you state that your leg gets numb some of the time? A. Yes, sir, and I am not able to hold down a job.
“XQ. Did you tell the Court at that time you were not able to hold down a job? A. I have worked, I tried since that time, and I wasn’t able to hold it down.
“XQ. You tried one time and fell several times? A. Yes, sir.” Second Tr. p. 31.

The difficulty about accepting this evidence as proof of an increase of disability, however, is that he testified, as we see it, exactly the same in substance on the previous hearing and we will quote certain extracts therefrom in order to demonstrate what we mean.

His regular occupation was that of a structural steel worker foreman and particularly his job was to bolt up structural steel as it was fitted into place in the construction of buildings. On page 21 of the previous record [570]*570where he was testifying that he conld no longer work at that job, he had this to say:

“Ton climb up the steel work? A. Yes, sir, that is right.
‘ ‘ Q. And that is very high aboye streets and things ? A. Very high and you have the other man’s life at stake when you are up there, and I had to quit this year due to my leg going to sleep on me.”

On page 22 he was asked and answered as follows :

“Q. Do you have any feeling' in that leg? A. Its numb, it has a numb feeling all the time.
“Q. Now, have you been able, have you been able to follow your usual occupation since that time? A. I can’t stay on my feet that long. If I stay in one position my foot goes to sleep and if I move around it gets tired. ’ ’

Then at the bottom of that page and the top of the next, he testified that in his own opinion of the loss of the use of his leg amounted to 75 to 80%.

He then testified that he had tried to work at his old job and that he did work a short time in Detroit as a foreman, which was his regular job.

Now on page 27, further testimony was:

“Q.

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Bluebook (online)
315 S.W.2d 1, 203 Tenn. 565, 7 McCanless 565, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 332, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/r-j-reynolds-tobacco-co-v-rollins-tenn-1958.