UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 22-1307
QUINTEZ TALLEY, Appellant
v.
KERI MOORE; PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; JOHN E. WETZEL; RHONDA HOUSE; SCOTT NICKELSON; TRAVIS NAPP; PETER SAAVEDRA; SGT. LOUIS DOBISH; C/O ANDREW HIGINBOTHAM; MHM; ROBERT MCSURDY; PA DEPT. OF GENERAL SERVICES _____________________________
On Appeal from the U.S. District Court, W.D. Pa. Judge Cynthia R. Eddy, No. 2:21-cv-00298
Before: HARDIMAN, BOVE, AND FISHER, Circuit Judges Argued: June 9, 2026; Filed: July 30, 2026 _____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION*
BOVE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Quintez Talley is an inmate at a Pennsylvania prison
and a prolific litigator. This case relates to a fire that Plaintiff lit in his cell as part of an
alleged suicide attempt. Plaintiff sued 10 Defendants associated with the Commonwealth,
as well as a psychologist and the psychologist’s employer. Aided by capable pro bono
amicus counsel,1 Plaintiff appeals the District Court’s orders denying his motion to proceed
* This is not an opinion of the full Court and, under 3d Cir. IOP 5.7, is not binding precedent. 1 This Court thanks David Roth, Esq. and Tadhg Dooley, Esq. for their service in this appeal as Court-appointed amicus curiae on behalf of the Plaintiff. We also thank Elizabeth in forma pauperis based on the three-strikes rule, and dismissing certain claims for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
The Commonwealth Defendants correctly concede that the District Court must
revisit the three-strikes analysis in light of intervening precedent. Plaintiff’s exhaustion
issue presents a very close call, but we hold that his grievance was sufficient to properly
exhaust administrative remedies with respect to his claims based on the absence of a fire
sprinkler in his cell. Exercising our gatekeeping function under the PLRA and our
authority to affirm on any basis in the record, we also hold that Plaintiff failed to exhaust
in other important respects relating to certain of the Defendants and certain of his non-
sprinkler claims. Finally, applying statutory limitations, sovereign immunity, and
applicable pleading standards to the properly exhausted claims, we hold that Plaintiff’s
Complaint does not pass muster against the remaining Commonwealth Defendants.
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s three-strikes order and affirm in part its
dismissal order. We will remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and
issues on appeal. Facts relevant to our disposition are described below. Unless otherwise
noted, references to “Defendants” are to the 10 Commonwealth Defendants named in
Beling and Kamran King, student advocates from the Yale Law School Advanced Appellate Litigation Project, for their fine oral advocacy.
2 Plaintiff’s Complaint.2
A.
Plaintiff’s claims relate to an alleged suicide attempt on July 2, 2019. Plaintiff
alleges that he informed a non-party correctional officer that he was contemplating suicide
and “needed to speak” with non-Commonwealth Defendant Saavedra, a psychologist.
JA75. The non-party correctional officer allegedly told Plaintiff that he would report the
issue to Defendant Dobish. According to Plaintiff, Defendants Dobish and Higinbotham
later approached his cell. Plaintiff alleges that he told Defendants Dobish and Higinbotham
that he needed to speak with the prison’s Psychiatric Review Team and that those
Defendants agreed to tell the non-party Unit Manager.
Plaintiff alleged further that he subsequently set fire to items in his cell, inhaled
smoke from the fire, and at some point vomited blood. According to the operative pleading,
Plaintiff’s cell lacked a fire sprinkler. Prison employees, including Defendants Dobish and
Higinbotham, used a fire extinguisher to put out the fire. Plaintiff alleged that he was
punished for the attempted suicide through, among other things, a misconduct citation that
was promptly dismissed.
2 Specifically, the 10 Commonwealth Defendants Plaintiff sued are: Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Pennsylvania Department of General Services, Louis Dobish, Andrew Higinbotham, Rhonda House, Robert McSurdy, Keri Moore, Travis Napp, Scott Nickelson, and John Wetzel. The non-Commonwealth Defendants Plaintiff sued are Peter Saavedra and Saavedra’s alleged employer, “MHM.” JA42-43.
3 B.
Plaintiff filed a grievance at the prison pursuant to Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections policy DC-ADM 804. The grievance described the alleged suicide attempt
and, as relevant here, complained of an alleged “ongoing refusal to equip” certain cells
“with fire sprinkler systems.” JA150. The prison rejected the sprinkler-related grievance
on the basis that DC-ADM 804 required that “[g]rievances based upon different events
must be presented separately.” JA151. Plaintiff’s administrative appeals were
unsuccessful.
Plaintiff then filed claims in the District Court pursuant to the Americans With
Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on alleged violations of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and Pennsylvania law based on alleged medical
malpractice and negligence. He sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as
injunctive relief relating to fire sprinklers.
The District Court denied most of Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis
pursuant to the three-strikes rule and Plaintiff’s lengthy history of unsuccessful prison
litigation. Based on the rule’s exception for “imminent danger of serious physical injury,”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the District Court permitted Plaintiff to proceed with claims “alleging
inadequate policies and practices regarding fire safety.” JA8. The District Court later
granted summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s sprinkler-related claims. The court
reasoned that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to those
claims. Plaintiff timely appealed.
4 II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a District Court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo. Massey v. Borough of Bergenfield, 169 F.4th 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2026).3
III.
Based on an intervening decision relating to Plaintiff’s litigation history, all agree
that he was not a three-strikes litigant when he filed his claims. See Talley v. Wetzel, 15
F.4th 275, 285 (3d Cir. 2021). Thus, we will vacate the District Court’s orders regarding
Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status.
The real question here is the scope of the remand. Although we hold that Plaintiff
exhausted administrative remedies for his sprinkler-related claims, we identify several
other exhaustion deficiencies. Each of Plaintiff’s properly exhausted claims against the
remaining Defendants suffer from additional fatal flaws described below.
With respect to the § 1997e(a) exhaustion requirement, we hold as follows:
1) Plaintiff properly exhausted his sprinkler-related claims, i.e., claims based on an alleged failure “to place him in a cell protected with fire sprinklers.” Br. 3.
2) Plaintiff did not properly exhaust any claims with respect to five Defendants— House, McSurdy, Moore, Napp, Nickelson—because he failed to name them in his grievance.
3 Unless otherwise indicated, case quotations omit all internal citations, quotation marks, footnotes, alterations, and subsequent history.
5 3) Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust all of the claims based on allegations relating to the misconduct citation he received following his alleged suicide attempt.
1.
The parties’ exhaustion arguments regarding Plaintiff’s sprinkler-related claims
present exceedingly close questions. Prisoners must “complete the administrative review
process in accordance with the prison’s grievance policies.” Talley v. Clark, 111 F.4th
255, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2024). Precedent obligates us to “require strict compliance by prison
officials with their own policies.” Hardy v. Shaikh, 959 F.3d 578, 586-87 (3d Cir. 2020).
We conclude that Plaintiff did the bare minimum to open the courthouse door.
The policy at the heart of this appeal states that “[a]ny grievance based on separate
events must be presented separately, unless it is necessary to combine the issues to support
the claim.” DC-ADM 804 § 1 A.14. The better reading of that language, as applied to this
case, is that Plaintiff’s grievance described several concerns that were “based on” a single
“event,” id., which was his alleged suicide attempt on July 2, 2019. One of the concerns
Plaintiff described in the grievance related to the lack of a fire sprinkler in his cell. He
argued that his alleged injuries were a “direct result” of an “ongoing refusal” by Defendants
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Pennsylvania Department of General Services,
and Wetzel to “equip” cells in Plaintiff’s unit “with fire sprinkler systems.” JA150.
Despite the fact that the grievance was littered with many other concerns and allegations,
this language was sufficient—barely—to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.
Notably, however, Plaintiff’s victory is narrow. The grievance was adequate for
proper exhaustion because the “event” was Plaintiff’s alleged suicide attempt. We reject
6 Plaintiff’s arguments that the exhaustion process was unavailable to him. Also meritless
is Plaintiff’s alternative argument that a multi-event grievance was “necessary” under DC-
ADM 804 to “support the claim.” DC-ADM 804 § 1 A.14. The prison’s handling of
Plaintiff’s grievance does not reflect a misapplication of that separate language. As one
example among many, Plaintiff’s presentation of the sprinkler-related claims was not
necessary to grieve medical malpractice against Saavedra. The lack of necessity is further
illustrated by the fact that amicus had no trouble bifurcating the case between sprinkler and
non-sprinkler claims during briefing and at argument. Consequently, based on the record
here, Plaintiff did not properly exhaust with respect to any claims based in any way on
allegations of a broader “custom” or “practice,” other “fire incidents,” or “separate
incidents in which Plaintiff employed fire.” JA81-82.
2.
Plaintiff also failed to properly exhaust with respect to five Defendants. DC-ADM
804 includes a “mandatory” requirement that a grievance “identify specific persons”
involved in the event at issue. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 234 (3d Cir. 2004); see also
DC-ADM 804 § 1.A.11(b) (“The inmate shall identify individuals directly in the
event(s).”). Of the 10 Commonwealth Defendants that Plaintiff named in his Complaint,
he only described actions by five of them in the grievance: Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, Pennsylvania Department of General Services, Dobish, Higinbotham, and
Wetzel. Because the relevant part of the record—Plaintiff’s grievance—is before us and
not subject to change or further development, it would be inconsistent with our judicial
screening role under the Prison Litigation Reform Act to ignore this defect. Therefore, we
7 hold that Plaintiff did not properly exhaust administrative remedies with respect to any of
his claims against Defendants House, McSurdy, Moore, Napp, and Nickelson.
3.
As to the remaining Defendants, Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust administrative
remedies with respect to all claims based on his allegations relating to misuse of
misconducts.
When Plaintiff raised the misconduct citation in his grievance pursuant to DC-ADM
804, the Facility Grievance Coordinator indicated that he had to pursue that issue pursuant
to a different policy, DC-ADM 801. During Plaintiff’s ensuing challenge of that decision,
he informed the Facility Manager that “[a]nything regarding the misconduct issue” was not
part of his appeal. JA153. Plaintiff explained that he planned to present his concerns about
“the misconduct” and certain Defendants’ alleged “willful blindness to this practice” in a
manner “consistent with the DC-ADM 801 procedures.” JA153. There is no suggestion
in the record that he did so. Therefore, § 1997e(a) prevents Plaintiff from pursuing claims
based on the misconduct citation.
Perhaps recognizing the problem, Plaintiff argued on appeal that DC-ADM 801
does not provide for the type of “procedures” Plaintiff referenced. Amicus is right that
DC-ADM 801 does not provide for a direct appeal where, as here, the misconduct was
dismissed because Plaintiff was found “not guilty.” DC-ADM 801 § 5.A.2. But there is a
separate process outlined in DC-ADM 801 for reviewing the prison’s compliance with
applicable procedures and facility regulations relating to misconduct citations. See DC-
ADM 801 § 4.C.1. Therefore, Plaintiff did not properly exhaust administrative remedies
8 with respect to his claims regarding the misconduct citation.
B.
Like District Courts, we have an obligation to screen inmates’ frivolous or meritless
claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). It is also well-established that we may affirm on
any basis in the record. E.g., Talley, 111 F.4th at 266. Of course, we construe Plaintiff’s
filings liberally in light of his pro se status. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021).
But we also “apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name
it,” and “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a
claim.” Id. Therefore, we are duty-bound to point out additional defects in Plaintiff’s
pleading relating to (1) his choice of parties, and (2) the legal insufficiency of his
allegations.
The problems with Plaintiff’s selection of Defendants are rooted in statutory
requirements and sovereign immunity.
Under § 1983, Defendants Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and
Pennsylvania Department of General Services are not “persons.” See, e.g., Patterson v.
Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 915 F.3d 945, 956 n.2 (3d Cir. 2019). Thus, these agencies are
not proper parties to any of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.
Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
do not provide for claims against individuals. See Montanez v. Price, 154 F.4th 127, 144-
45 (3d Cir. 2025). So Plaintiff’s disability claims against Defendant Wetzel, as well as the
unexhausted claims against Defendants McSurdy and Napp, are not viable. Specifically,
9 any personal-capacity claims against these individuals have no statutory basis, and any
official-capacity claims are “treated as if they are against the public entity or recipient of
federal funds that employs the individual.” Id. at 145 n.6. That leaves only Defendants
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and Department of General Services for purposes
of Plaintiff’s claims under the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.
Sovereign immunity also bars all of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for damages against
the Commonwealth and Commonwealth employees acting in their official capacities. See
Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 227-29 (3d Cir. 2023). This immunity applies to
Defendants Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and Department of General Services
and official-capacity claims against the remaining individual Defendants. To the extent
Plaintiff sought to plead around sovereign immunity by seeking injunctive sprinkler-related
relief for his official-capacity claims, those claims are moot based on Defendants’
representation that Plaintiff has been transferred to a new facility. See Williams v. Sec’y
Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 553 n.6 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Preiser v. Newkirk, 422
U.S. 395, 402-04 (1975).
C.
After this legally mandated party pruning, the following federal claims remain based
on Plaintiff’s framing of the Complaint during this appeal: (1) sprinkler-related disability
claims under the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act against
Defendants Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and Pennsylvania Department of
General Services; (2) sprinkler-related § 1983 claims alleging violations of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments against Defendants Dobish, Higinbotham, and Wetzel in their
10 personal capacities; (3) suicide-related § 1983 claims alleging violations of the Eighth
Amendment against the same individual Defendants in their personal capacities. We take
each in turn. All of them are defective as pleaded.
Plaintiff did not plausibly allege causation for his sprinkler-related disability claims.
See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12132. His allegations fail to link the institutional
decision not to equip cells with fire sprinklers to his disability. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 680-81 (2009).
Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a reasonable-accommodation theory either.
See Montanez, 154 F.4th at 144. This would be a different case if the prison had elected
not to provide any fire-safety measures. It is clear from the Complaint, however, that prison
employees deployed a “fire extinguisher [to] put out the fire” that Plaintiff chose to light
in his cell using his personal effects. JA77. “[P]laintiffs are not entitled to their preferred
accommodation.” Finley v. Huss, 102 F.4th 789, 821 (6th Cir. 2024). Nothing in the
Complaint plausibly explains the distinction Plaintiff would have us draw between
sprinklers and fire extinguishers.
Finally, to pursue damages under these disability laws, Plaintiff had to plausibly
allege that any “discrimination was ‘intentional’ in the sense that it was more than mere
disparate impact.” Montanez, 154 F.4th at 149. The Complaint is deficient in that respect
too. As alleged, there was not a “failure to act despite . . . knowledge” on the part of any
remaining Defendant. Id. At most, there was an alleged failure to act as Plaintiff would
have preferred, which does not amount to disability discrimination under these statutes.
11 2.
The surviving sprinkler-related § 1983 claims against Defendants Dobish,
Higinbotham, and Wetzel, in their personal capacities, fare no better. There are no
allegations of personal involvement by Defendants Dobish or Higinbotham in the alleged
decision not to install sprinklers. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Wetzel was “personally
provided with knowledge of the risk” arising from the lack of sprinklers “by way of the
many grievances and lawsuits that Plaintiff has named [him] in.” JA81. Those allegations
are insufficient because “Wetzel’s lack of any response or action . . . . does not demonstrate
the personal direction or actual knowledge required” to state a claim. Dooley v. Wetzel,
957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020). Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not adequately
allege a constitutional violation relating to the absence of sprinklers by any remaining
Defendants.
The Complaint does not state a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to the
alleged risk of suicide, under the Eighth Amendment, against Defendants Dobish,
Higinbotham, and Wetzel in their personal capacities.
From a textual perspective, it is not obvious that the Eighth Amendment has any
relevance. According to the Constitution’s original public meaning, “the Eighth
Amendment was about choices at sentencing.” DiFraia v. Ransom, 171 F.4th 622, 627 (3d
Cir. 2026). It “did not encompass a prisoner’s injuries that bore no relation to his sentence,
such as those from prison deprivations.” Id. at 628. Binding precedent has “stretched” the
Amendment’s scope, but not without limits. Id. “[I]in the specific context of prison
12 medical care, it is not enough that a prisoner or another doctor would prefer a different
approach than the one corrections officials took.” Id. at 629.
Plaintiff made no allegations linking Defendant Wetzel to the medical treatment he
received on July 2, 2019—at least none that were distinct from the sprinkler allegations
that we have already addressed. As to Defendants Dobish and Higinbotham, Plaintiff
acknowledged in the Complaint that they acted “pursuant to” Department of Corrections
“policy” and agreed to notify the (non-party) Unit Manager that Plaintiff “was suicidal.”
JA78-77. Defendants Dobish and Higinbotham are also alleged to have been part of the
team that responded to Plaintiff’s fire “with a fire extinguisher and put out the fire.” JA77.
At most, Plaintiff suggested in the Complaint that these Defendants should not have left
him alone or should have responded to the fire more quickly. But “[n]egligence, even gross
negligence, is not enough” to plead an Eighth Amendment violation. DiFraia, 171 F.4th
at 628; see also Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations do not support
a § 1983 claim based on a theory of deliberate indifference to the alleged risk of suicide.
IV.
Based on the foregoing, the two non-Commonwealth Defendants (Saavedra and
MHM) are the only ones left in Complaint. Plaintiff has not served either of them. His
allegations are also lacking in key respects. As to Defendant Saavedra, Plaintiff did not
allege personal involvement in any of the sprinkler-related claims. That makes sense, as
Saavedra is a psychologist. Plaintiff’s remaining theories against Defendant Saavedra are
his § 1983 deliberate-indifference claim and state-law “medical malpractice / negligence.”
JA85. “[D]ifferences in judgment between [Plaintiff] and these medical personnel about
13 appropriate medical treatment,” and even “medical malpractice,” are not “cognizable under
the Eighth Amendment.” Montanez, 154 F.4th 142. Should Plaintiff complete service and
overcome all other potential procedural obstacles to proceeding against Defendant
Saavedra, we will leave it to the District Court to address the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s
allegations based on this theory.
Finally, Plaintiff also named MHM, as Defendant Saavedra’s “emplo[y]er,” “under
the doctrine of respondeat superior.” JA86. That is not a viable theory. “Rather, like
municipalities, private corporations under contract to provide prison health services are
liable only if their policies or customs caused the constitutional violation.” Montanez, 154
F.4th at 142. As noted above, Plaintiff did not properly exhaust administrative remedies
with policy- or custom-based claims. It is also far from clear that Plaintiff’s single
reference to MHM in the grievance was sufficient for purposes of proper exhaustion.
Similar to Defendant Saavedra, however, we will leave it to the District Court to address
the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations against MHM if and when the appropriate time
comes.
* * *
In sum, Plaintiff properly exhausted administrative remedies with respect to his
sprinkler-related claims, but he did not exhaust in several other key respects. While some
of Plaintiff’s claims against the Commonwealth Defendants survive the exhaustion
requirement, Plaintiff’s allegations in support of those claims are fatally lacking. In
addition to the lack of service, there are problems on the face of most of Plaintiff’s claims
against non-Commonwealth Defendants, Saavedra and MHM, too. We will remand the
14 case for proceedings consistent with this opinion, and we express no view on whether and
to what extent leave to amend may be appropriate.
Chelsey N. Kelso [Argued] Michael J. Scarinci Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania Counsel for Appellees
Elizabeth Beling [Argued] Kamran King [Argued] Yale Law School
Tadhg Dooley David R. Roth Wiggin & Dana Counsel for Court Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant