Quinteros v. Dyncorp

271 F.R.D. 397, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130970
District Court, District of Columbia·Decided December 10, 2010·No. Civil Action No. 2007-1042·Published

Opinion

*398 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DEBORAH ANN ROBINSON, United States Magistrate Judge.

Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions Against the Arias/Quinteros Plaintiffs for Violations of Discovery Orders (“Motion for Sanctions”) (Document No. 176) is pending for determination by the undersigned. 1 Upon consideration of the motion; Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions Against the Arias/Quinteros Plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs’ Opposition”) (Document No. 185); Defendants’ Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Sanctions Against the Arias/Quinteros Plaintiffs for Violations of Discovery Orders (“Defendants’ Reply”) (Document No. 186); Defendants’ Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Their January 26, 2010 Motion for Sanctions Against the Arias/Quinteros Plaintiffs for Their Violations of Discovery Orders (“Defendants’ Supplemental Memorandum”) (Document No. 190); Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief in Support of Their Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions Against the Arias/Quinteros Plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum”) (Document No. 191), and the entire record herein, the motion will be denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs — who now number approximately 3,200 citizens of the Republic of Ecuador— seek monetary and injunctive relief for personal injuries and property damages allegedly caused by the actions of Defendants with respect to their contract with the United States to spray pesticides over cocaine and heroin crops in the Republic of Columbia. See generally First Amended Consolidated Complaint (Document No. 23). 2

A detailed account of the course of discovery which provides the context in which the instant dispute arises appears in Arias v. Dyncorp Aerospace Operations, LLC, 677 F.Supp.2d 330 (D.D.C.2010). Of immediate relevance is the determination of the court, during the management of discovery, to require that the individual Plaintiffs complete questionnaires regarding the “factual basis of their claims”. Id. at 332-33. 3 The court thereafter required that 20 so-called “test Plaintiffs” be made available to be deposed by Defendants.

In the pending motion for sanctions, Defendants represent that in October and November, 2009, they took the depositions of the 20 test Plaintiffs, and that during the depositions, “each of the test [PJlaintiffs repeatedly departed from their [sic] earlier sworn Questionnaire responses regarding the purported factual bases for their [sic] claims ... and relied instead on new allegations of different purported exposures and damages.” Motion for Sanctions at 1. Defendants submit that “[tjhe test [PJlaintiffs’ disavowals of the most basic elements of their prior sworn disclosures ... makes clear that [they] have willfully and repeatedly violated Court Orders over the past two years in which the Court required ‘verified, factual and complete’ disclosures, with the explicit warning of dismissal for noncompliance.” Id. (footnote omitted). 4

Defendants maintain that the “unambiguous violations of the Court’s Orders” by the test Plaintiffs “require[sj that each of the test [PJlaintiffs’ claims be dismissed with prejudice.” Id. at 2. In the alternative, Defendants principally ask that if the test Plaintiffs are allowed to proceed to trial, then “they be precluded from offering any argu *399 ment to explain away their misconduct and that the jury be instructed by the Court that the [test Plaintiffs] provided false answers under oath in their 2008 Questionnaire responses.” Id. 5

Plaintiffs, in their opposition, generally maintain that Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the imposition of any sanction — particularly the harsh sanction of dismissal — is warranted. Plaintiffs characterize any discrepancies between the test Plaintiffs’ questionnaire responses and their deposition testimony as “minor testimonial inconsistencies,” and submit that a jury “[should be allowed] to make credibility determinations where any testimonial inconsistencies actually exist.” Plaintiffs’ Opposition at 4; see also id. at 3-16, 21-30, 36; Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum at 2-5 (Rule 37 sanctions “are simply not an available remedy for any minor ... inconsistencies between interrogatory responses (or similar submissions) and deposition testimony.”).

Defendants, in their reply, submit that Plaintiffs have failed “to rebut” Defendants’ showing that the test Plaintiffs “[h]ave [k]nowingly [violated [t]he Court’s [discovery [o]rders.” Defendants’ Reply at 6. More specifically, Defendants submit that “[t]he issue is whether the Court-ordered factual disclosures set forth in each individual test [Plaintiffs] Questionnaire response are ‘verified, factual, and complete,’ as the Court has required. They are not.” Id.; see also Defendants’ Supplemental Memorandum at 2 (“the test [P]laintiffs’ own deposition testimony revealed material misstatements and omissions in their 2008 Questionnaire responses,” and that the misstatements and omissions “related to the same foundational facts that the Court expressly addressed in its discovery orders!]”).

DISCUSSION

Defendants rely entirely upon Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in support of their motion for sanctions. While Defendants generally maintain that the test Plaintiffs “[h]ave [k]nowingly [violated [t]he Court’s [discovery [o]rders[]” (Defendants’ Reply at 6), the premise of their motion remains the assertion that “the test [Plaintiffs’ own deposition testimony revealed material misstatements and omissions in their 2008 Questionnaire responses ... which related to the same foundational facts that the Court expressly addressed in its discovery orders!]” Defendants’ Supplemental Memorandum at 2.

Rule 37(b)(2)(A) provides for an array of sanctions, including the dismissal of an action whole or in part. See generally Moore v. Chertoff 255 F.R.D. 10, 30-32 (D.D.C.2008), affd sub nom. Moore v. Napolitano, No. 00-953, 2009 WL 2450280, at *9 (D.D.C. August 7, 2009). However, the very terms of the rule cabin the court’s authority to impose any sanction pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) to an instance in which “a party ... fails to obey an order to provide or permit diseovery[.]” Robinson-Reeder v. Am. Council on Educ., 262 F.R.D. 41, 43 (D.D.C.2009); see also Azamar v. Stern, 269 F.R.D. 53, 54-55 (D.D.C.2010) (imposition of Rule 37 sanctions appropriate “because Stern has repeatedly failed to respond to plaintiffs’ written discovery requests.”); Perez v. Berhanu,

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Quinteros v. Dyncorp, 271 F.R.D. 397, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130970 (D.D.C. 2010).

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Related

Perez v. Berhanu
583 F. Supp. 2d 87 (District of Columbia, 2008)
Arias v. DYNCORP
738 F. Supp. 2d 46 (District of Columbia, 2010)
Arias v. DYNCORP AEROSPACE OPERATIONS, LLC
677 F. Supp. 2d 330 (District of Columbia, 2010)
Robinson-Reeder v. American Council on Education
262 F.R.D. 41 (District of Columbia, 2009)
Moore v. Chertoff
255 F.R.D. 10 (District of Columbia, 2008)
Azamar v. Stern
269 F.R.D. 53 (D.C. Circuit, 2010)