Quint v. Vail Resorts Inc.

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Civil Action No. 20-cv-03569-DDD-NRN RANDY DEAN QUINT, JOHN LINN, and MARK MOLINA, Individually and On Behalf Of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, V. VAIL RESORTS, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TOSTAY PROCEEDINGS UNTIL CLASS SETTLEMENT IN PARALLEL ACTION IS FINAL (Dkt. # 191)

N. REID NEUREITER United States Magistrate Judge This case is before the Court pursuantto an Order (Dkt. #192) referring the subject motion (Dkt. #191) issued by Judge Daniel D. Domenico. Now before the Court is Defendant Vail Resorts, Inc.’s (“Vail”) Motion to Stay Proceedings Until Class Settlement in Parallel Action is Final (Dkt. #191). The Courthas carefully considered the motion, Plaintiffs’ response (Dkt. #205), and Vail’s reply (Dkt. #206), and has heard argumentfrom the parties (see Dkt. #210). The Court has taken judicial notice of the Court’ file and has considered the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and case law. The Court now being fully informed makes the following order.

BACKGROUND In this wage and hour case, Plaintiffs, who worked for Vail as Snow Sports Instructors (“Instructors”) or Ticket Scanners, allege that Vail did not pay them for all hours they worked, including overtime premiums. They assert 22 separate claims pursuantto the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and various state wage and hour laws. On November 21, 2022, (then-Magistrate, now-District) Judge Gordon P. Gallagher issued a Recommendation on Motion to Certify Class and Order on Motions to Compel and to Strike (Dkt. #183), in which he, among other things, recommended that Plaintiffs’ state law claims be bifurcated from the FLSA claims and stayed pending a resolution of the FLSA claims, and that a Hoffmann-LaRoche notice be sentonly to Instructor employees. That Recommendation has not yet been ruled on. Judge Gallagher briefly addressed Vail’s argumentthat the Hoffmann-LaRoche notice should be further narrowed due to the resolution of a FLSA lawsuit brought against Vail in California state court, Hamilton v. The Vail Corporation, et al., No. $C20210148 (Cal. Sup. Ct.) (“Hamilton”). ln Hamilton, the court, over these Plaintiffs’ objections, approved a nationwide settlement for all claims of alleged unpaid wages and any other violations of state or federal law. See Quint v. Vail Resorts, Inc., No. 22-1226, 2023 WL 3746892 (10th Cir. June 1, 2023) (describing the parallel proceedings and dismissing as moot Plaintiffs’ interlocutory appeal of Judge Domenico’s denial of their emergency motion seeking to enjoin Vail for consummating settlementin Hamilton because the settlement had already been approved, also found at Dkt. #212). These

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Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the final judgmentin Hamilton was denied (see Dkt. #191-2), and Plaintiffs’ appeal of that order remains pending in the California Court of Appeals. Judge Gallagher rejected Vail’s argument that the settlement in Hamilton bars FLSA claims here from any members of the Hamilton settlement class, meaning a Hoffmann-LaRoche notice should be sent only to the 1,603 individuals that expressly opted out of the Hamilton settlement. Judge Gallagher explained: By its terms, the settlement of the Hamilton case is not effective until all appeals to the order approving that settlement are resolved, and the Plaintiffs assert that they have filed an appeal of that order. It may very well be that the Hamilton settlementis ultimately affirmed and any plaintiffs who opt into this case in the interim without having timely opted out of the Hamilton settlement may have their claims in this case dismissed on res judicata grounds, butthat is a matter for another day. The Courtalso rejects Vail’s argument that issuing a Hoffmann-LaRoche notice in this case may be confusing to employees who are also receiving notice in the Hamilton case. Although the Courtcan appreciate the possibility of confusion arising from laypeople receiving multiple legal notices on closely-related cases, that potential confusion is an unavoidable consequence of independent lawsuits running in parallel. As between employees receiving a confusing notice in this case (an outcome this Court will endeavor to avoid) or receiving no notice whatsoever of a case they are otherwise eligible to participate in, justice favors the former even with its attendant flaws. (Dkt. #183 at 22—23.) Vail now asks the Court to stay these proceedings until all appeals have been resolved and the Hamilton settlement is finalized. LEGAL STANDARD In an October 9, 2021 Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings for Ninety Days (Dkt. #81), Judge Gallagher forth the proper standard to apply when considering a request to stay: Courts in this District generally disfavor the stay of all discovery. See Rocha v. CCCF Admin., No. 09-cv-01432-CMA-MEH, 2010 WL 291966, at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 20, 2010) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the decision to grant or deny a motion to stay discovery is vested in the district court's discretion.

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Or. Steel Mills, Ine., 322 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2003). While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for a stay of proceedings, the power for a court to stay a proceeding “is incidental to the power inherentin every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). When determining whethera stay is appropriate, the court should consider the: (1) “plaintiff's interests in proceeding expeditiously with the civil action and the potential prejudice to [the] plaintiff of adelay”; (2) “burden on the defendants”; (3) “convenience to the court’; (4) “interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation”; and (5) “public interest.” String Cheese Incident, LLC v. Stylus Shows, Inc., No. 1:02-cv-01934-LTB-PA, 2006 WL 894955, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2006); see United Steelworkers of Am., 322 F.3d at 1227. Nevertheless, a stay of discovery may be appropriate when a “pending nationwide settlement could impact the claims.” Wince v. Easterbrooke Cellular Corp., 681 F. Supp. 2d 688, 692 (N.D.W. Va. 2010). A court, in its sound discretion, “may hold one lawsuitin abeyance to abide the outcome of another which may substantially affect it or be dispositive of the issues.” Bechtel Corp. v. Loc. 215, Laborers’ Int! Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO, 544 F.2d 1207, 1215 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Ali v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CIV-13-876-D, 2014 WL 819385, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 3, 2014) (granting a stay because if the settlement in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida “is approved, it will likely preclude all claims of the class Plaintiff seeks to represent in this case, and will resolve Plaintiffs claims unless she opts out of the certified class.”); Branca v. lovate Health Scis. USA, Inc., No. 12CV01686-LAB WMC, 2013 WL 1344306, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2013) (granting a ninety-day stay pending approval of a settlement in a substantively identical class action in state court); Chartener v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 02-8045, 2003 WL 22518526, at “4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2003) (granting a six-month stay pending approval of a state court settlement). Anda stay of discovery may be appropriate even when there are other non-overlapping issues, as a stay on only the class claims would render the stay of discovery meaningless and not conserve resources should the settlement be finalized. In re JPMorgan Chase LPI Hazard Litig., No. C-11-03058 JCS, 2013 WL 3829271, at *3-5 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2013). (Id. at 2-4.)'

1 Judge Domenico overruled Plaintiff's objections to Judge Gallagher's order (see Dkt. #111), andthe stay was extended another 60 days in January 2022 (Dkt. #106).

ANALYSIS As stated above, Vail seeks to stay any further proceedings in this case until Plaintiffs’ appeal of the Hamilton settlement has been resolved. Vail claims that the resolution of Hamilton will clarify and narrow the claims of this putative class/collective action. They further argue that the String Cheese factors favor a stay. Plaintiffs oppose any further stay of the proceedings on several grounds. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs argue that String Cheese is inapposite and the Court should apply the legal standard set forth in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Chilcott Portfolio Management, Inc., 713 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1983). The Court need not address this argument as Judge Domenico has already expressly rejected it (see Dkt. #111 at 3-4). Substantively, Plaintiffs claim that staying this case pending the resolution of Hamilton would violate the doctrine set forth in Colorado River Water District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976), where the Supreme Court recognized that a federal court faced with parallel state proceedings may in “exceptional” circumstances abstain “for reasons of wise judicial administration.” The Supreme Courthas made clear that courts engaging in a Colorado River analysis should out to “find some substantial reason for the exercise of federal jurisdiction” but should instead “ascertain whether there exist ‘exceptional’ circumstances, the ‘clearest of justifications,’ that can suffice under Colorado River justify the surrender of that jurisdiction.” Moses H. Cone Mem Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 (1983) (emphasis in original). Here, the Court agrees with Vail that its request for a stay does not implicate the Colorado River doctrine. First, Colorado River applies only where the state and federal

proceedings are parallel, and “[sJuits are parallel if substantially the same parties litigate substantially the same issues in differentforums.” Fox v. Maulding, 16 F.3d 1079, 1081 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting New Beckley Mining Corp. v. Intl Union, UMWA, 946 F.2d 1072, 1073 (4th Cir.1991)). Here, Plaintiffs are not parties to Hamilton. It is also undisputed that, regardless of the outcome of Plaintiffs’ California state court appeal, this case will proceed, at the very least, as to those 1,600 individuals who opted out of Hamilton and those employed after December 2021. Thisis important as “the decision to invoke Colorado River necessarily contemplates that the federal court will have nothing further to do in resolving any substantive part of the case, whether it stays or dismisses.” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 28 (citations omitted). In otherwords, the Court would not be surrendering its jurisdiction over this case if it grants Vail’s motion. Since the Colorado River doctrine does not apply, the Courtturns to the appropriate String Cheese factors. First, the Court recognizes that Plaintiffs have an interest in proceeding expeditiously with their case, and acknowledge that this case has already been stayed for five months. However, this is militated by the fact that Vail’s present request for a stay was triggered by Plaintiffs’ decision to file their appeal in Hamilton. Absent that appeal, the Hamilton settlement would be finalized and there would be no grounds to stay this case. Moreover, as Judge Gallagher stated, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they would be prejudiced by the settlement in Hamilton and, to the extent that they can make such a showing, the California state court is the proper venue to do so. More significantly, the Courtfinds that Plaintiffs’ interests are outweighed by the undue burden Vail will experience with having to produce discovery regarding

employees who have already released their claims againstit. And even a cursory review of the docket indicates that, should this case proceed, innumerable discovery disputes and motion practice is certain to follow. Further, while the Court typically discourages stays of discovery, the Court acknowledges the efficiency and fairness of delaying the proceedings pending a final resolution of Hamilton. As stated above, courts routinely exercise the discretion to grant stays when a pending nationwide settlement could impact the claims in the case before them. See, e.g., Ali, 2014 WL 819385, at *3 (collecting cases and staying case pending final approval of settlement in another federal court); In re RC2 Corp. Toy Lead Paint Prod. Liab. Litig., No.07 C 7184, 2008 WL 548772, at*5 (N_D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2008), as amended (Feb. 28, 2008) (staying federal MDL litigation pending approval of state court settlement because if the “settlement is not approved by the state court, then Plaintiffs can proceed with this action[, but i]f the settlement is approved, then some or all of the claims of Plaintiffs who do not opt out will be barred by res judicata). This factor weighs in favor of entering the stay. The interests of non-parties, specifically non-party employees of Vail, will be furthered by a stay. In this instance, the Courtrespectfully disagrees with Judge Gallagher and believes that distributing Hoffman-LaRoche notices in this case to thousands of Vail’s Instructors nationwide who have already released claims and expect to receive settlement funds will likely sow confusion. Upon resolution of Hamilton, the Court and those who either opted out or did not receive adequate notice of Hamilton can proceed expeditiously here.

Finally, the Courtfinds that the public interest does not greatly favor one side or the other. WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings Until Class Settlement in Parallel Action is Final (Dkt. #191) is GRANTED. Discoveryis STAYED the final resolution of all appeals in the Hamilton case. Within five (5) days of such final resolution, the parties shall file a Status Report with the Court. BY THE COURT

Date: June 16, 2023 iL Ka d Neuadd, Denver, Colorado N. Reid Neureiter United States Magistrate Judge