Quinn v. Austin

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: January 12, 2024
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00665
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE

9 10 DION QUINN, CASE NO. C23-0665JLR 11 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 12 LLOYD J. AUSTIN, III, 13 Defendant. 14

15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Before the court is Defendant Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin, III’s motion 17 to dismiss pro se Plaintiff Dion Quinn’s complaint and transfer any remaining claims to 18 the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts (the “District of 19 Massachusetts”). (Mot. (Dkt. # 26); Reply (Dkt. # 29); see also Compl. (Dkt. # 4).) Mr. 20 Quinn opposes Secretary Austin’s motion. (Resp. (Dkt. # 28).)1 The court has 21

1 After Secretary Austin filed his reply brief, Mr. Quinn filed an improper sur-reply. 22 (Sur-Reply (Dkt. # 31).) Aside from certain exceptions not applicable here, sur-reply briefs “will 1 considered the parties’ submissions, the relevant portions of the record, and the governing 2 law. Being fully advised,2 the court GRANTS Secretary Austin’s motion to transfer and

3 DENIES the motion to dismiss without prejudice. 4 II. BACKGROUND 5 Mr. Quinn is a Black man in his late 40s. (See Compl. at 5, 39.3) This case arises 6 out of his work as a testing clerk for the Department of the Army (the “Army”) at a 7 Military Entry Processing Facility (“MEPS”) in Boston, Massachusetts from 2016 8 through 2020. (See id. at 4, 11; Mot. at 2.) Mr. Quinn alleges that, throughout his

9 employment, the Army discriminated against him on the basis of his race, color, gender, 10 sex, and age. (Compl. at 4-5, 11.) He brings claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights 11 Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (the 12 “ADEA”). (Id. at 3.) It appears that Mr. Quinn intends to proceed under theories of 13 hostile work environment and retaliation under Title VII and age discrimination under the

14 ADEA. (See generally id. See Mot. at 3.) 15 III. ANALYSIS 16 Secretary Austin moves to dismiss Mr. Quinn’s complaint for (1) failure to 17 exhaust his administrative remedies under Title VII and the ADEA, (2) failure to state a 18

19 not be considered.” Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(g)(2). The court therefore excludes Mr. Quinn’s sur-reply brief from its consideration of Secretary Austin’s motion. 20 2 Neither party requests oral argument (see Mot. at 1; Resp. at 1), and the court concludes that oral argument would not be helpful to its disposition of the motion, see Local 21 Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(4).

3 When citing Mr. Quinn’s complaint, the court uses the page numbers in the CM/ECF 22 header. 1 claim under the ADEA, and (3) failure to name the proper defendant. (Mot. at 5-10.) 2 Secretary Austin also moves to transfer this case to the District of Massachusetts. (Id. at

3 10-12.) The court declines to rule on Secretary Austin’s motion to dismiss and instead 4 proceeds directly to the motion to transfer venue. 5 A. Improper Venue 6 Secretary Austin argues that this matter should be transferred to the District of 7 Massachusetts. (Id.) The court agrees. 8 In a Title VII case, venue is proper in: (1) “any judicial district in the State in

9 which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed”; (2) “the 10 judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained 11 and administered”; or (3) “the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have 12 worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3). 13 When a plaintiff brings claims under Title VII and the ADEA, Title VII’s “restrictive

14 venue provision” “controls.” Walker v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., No. 1:11-cv-01195 AWI 15 SKO, 2012 WL 1424495, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2012) (quoting Dehaemers v. Wynne, 16 522 F. Supp. 3d 240, 249 (D.D.C. 2007)). Where a case is filed in the wrong venue, the 17 court “shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer” the case to any district or 18 division in which it could have originally been brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). For the

19 reasons stated below, the court will transfer this matter to the District of Massachusetts. 20 First, venue is improper in this District. Although Mr. Quinn resides in 21 Washington (Compl. at 1), all of the conduct he describes in the complaint occurred 22 while he was employed at the MEPS in Boston. There is no indication that any records 1 pertaining to his claims are maintained in this District. (See generally id.) And Mr. 2 Quinn does not contend that he would have worked in Washington but for the Army’s

3 allegedly unlawful practices. (See generally id.) Accordingly, venue is improper in the 4 Western District of Washington. Because the allegedly unlawful employment practices 5 occurred in Boston, the District of Massachusetts is the appropriate venue for this action. 6 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3). 7 Second, the District of Massachusetts is a district in which Mr. Quinn could have 8 originally brought his case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Mr. Quinn timely filed his

9 complaint in federal court. (See Mot. at 3 (“Less than 90 days” after the EEOC denied 10 Mr. Quinn’s request for reconsideration, Mr. “Quinn filed suit in this District.”)); see also 11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (providing 90 days to bring a civil action). He simply filed in 12 the wrong district. 13 Third, the interests of justice favor transfer rather than dismissal. The choice

14 between dismissal or transfer to a proper venue is a matter within the sound discretion of 15 the district court. See Cook v. Fox, 537 F.2d 370, 371 (9th Cir. 1976). “Normally 16 transfer will be in the interest of justice because normally dismissal of an action that 17 could be brought elsewhere is ‘time-consuming and justice-defeating.’” Miller v. 18 Hambrick, 905 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369

19 U.S. 463, 467 (1962)). The court concludes that transfer, rather than dismissal, is the 20 most efficient and just resolution under the circumstances. Accordingly, the court will 21 transfer this matter to the District of Massachusetts. 22 // 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Secretary Austin’s motion to

3 transfer venue (Dkt. # 26) and TRANSFERS this case to the United States District Court 4 for the District of Massachusetts. Having granted the motion to transfer venue, the court 5 declines to address Secretary Austin’s motion to dismiss and therefore DENIES that 6 portion of the motion without prejudice to re-filing it after the transfer has been effected. 7 Dated this 12th day of January, 2024. A 8 JAMES L. ROBART 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

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