Andrews, J.
If the rights of the parties depend upon the contract of insurance as expressed in the policy, there can be no hesitation in affirming the judgment of nonsuit.
The provision as to the commencement of foreclosure proceedings ; the requirement that the insured, in case of loss, shall give immediate notice in writing to the company, and the other requirement that within sixty days after a fire he shall render to the company a sworn statement of the particulars specified, are conditions precedent to a right to recover on the policy, and each of the three conditions mentioned was violated. Foreclosure proceedings were commenced to the knowledge of the insured before the fire; no notice of loss was served at any time by him, and the letter of Kelsey to the company written thirty-three days after the fire, even if it could be treated as having been written in behalf of the insured, was not immediate notice; and finally the proofs of loss were not served until months after the sixty days’ limitation in the policy had expired. The authorities are conclusive that the non-performance of these conditions, or any one of them, constituted a complete defense to a claim to recover on the policy as printed.
(Inman
v.
Western F. Ins. Co.,
12 Wend. 460;
Blossom
v.
Lycoming F. Ins. Co.,
64 N. Y. 162;
Titus
v.
Glens Falls Ins. Co.,
81 id. 411.)
The plaintiff was driven to the claim that the company-had waived the right to insist upon the conditions of the contract as contained in the policy, or had consented to be bound, notwithstanding the violation of the conditions. He relied, to establish this contention, upon certain transactions between himself and Kelsey, the agent who acted: for the company in making the contract of insurance and. issuing the policy, fully recited in the statement of facts.. It is to be assumed that Kelsey learned of the commencement of the foreclosure proceedings, and thereupon assured the-plaintiff that his rights under the policy would not be prejudiced thereby; also that he knew of the fire when it occurred,, and after writing the company the letter of July 19, 1889, informed the plaintiff that he had done so, and that he need take no further steps towards giving notice or securing proofs of loss, and it is to be admitted also that the plaintiff had not-read the policy, and did not know what conditions it contained..
It is insisted that upon the whole evidence a question was. presented for the jury whether the company had waived the-conditions relied upon to defeat a recovery or had consented-to be bound notwithstanding their violation. The transactions-, and interviews between Kelsey and the plaintiff took place after Kelsey had ceased to act as the agent for the defendant but it is claimed that the plaintiff did not know that his agency had terminated, and we shall consider the case upon the assumption that the company was bound by his acts to the-same extent as if there had been no change in his relation to. the defendant. The substance of the claim made by the-plaintiff is that the agent of the company, invested with the-power to make contracts of insurance and issue and countersign policies, may subsequently change or modify conditions therein and waive forfeitures; in short, that in respect to policies issued by him he stands in place of the company and. may do whatever the company itself might do in the premises.
The powers possessed by agents of insurance companies, like those of agents of any other corporations, or of an individual principal, are to be interpreted in accordance with the
general law of agency. No other or different rule is to be applied to a contract of insurance, than is applied to other contracts. The agent of an insurance company possesses such powers and such powers only as have been conferred verbally or by the instrument of authorization, or such as third persons have a right to assume that he possesses. Where the act or representation of the agent of an insurance company is alleged as the act of the principal and, therefore, binding upon the latter, the test of the liability of the principal is the same as in other cases of agency. No principle is better settled in the law, nor is there any founded on more obvious justice than that if a person dealing with an agent knows that he is acting under a circumscribed and limited authority, and that his act is outside of and transcends the authority conferred, the principal is not bound, and it is immaterial whether the agent is a general or special one, because a principal may limit the authority of the one as well as that of the other.
(Walsh
v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
73 N. Y. 10.)
The limitations upon the authority of Kelsey were written on the face of the policy. It declared that “no officer, agent or representative of the company should have power to waive any provision or condition ” embraced in the printed and authorized policy, but power is given to agents to waive added provisions or conditions, provided such' waiver is written upon or attached to the policy. Where a policy permits an agent to exercise a specified authority, but prescribes that the company shall not be bound unless the execution of the power shall be evidenced by a written indorsement on the policy, the condition is of the essence of the authority, and the consent or act •of the agent not so indorsed is void.
(Walsh
v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., supra ; Marvin
v.
Universal life Ins. Co.,
85 N. Y. 278.) The conditions violated in this case were contained in the authorized blank, and as to these the agent had no power in any manner, in writing, or otherwise, to waive them.
In determining the question of liability in this case it is immaterial whether the plaintiff read the policy or not, or that
he had no actual knowledge of the conditions or of the limitations of the power of Kelsey. The conditions and limitations were a part of the contract and he was bound to take notice of them, and is not excused upon the plea that he omitted to acquaint himself with the provisions of the policy, and his arrangement with Kelsey to take charge of his insurance interests was a matter with which the defendant had no concern.
The act (Chap. 486, of the Taws of 1886) providing for a uniform policy known as the standard policy, and which makes its use compulsory upon insurance companies, marks a most important and useful advance in legislation relating to contracts of insurance. The practice which prevailed before this enactment, whereby each company prescribed the form of its contract, led to great diversity in the provisions and conditions of insurance policies and frequently to great abuse. Parties taking insurance were often misled by unusual clauses or obscure phrases concealed in a mass of verbiage and often so printed as almost to elude discovery. Unconscionable defenses based upon such conditions were not infrequent, and courts seem sometimes to have been embarrassed in the attempt to reconcile the claims of justice with the law of contracts. Under the law of 1886 companies are not permitted to insert conditions in policies at their will. The policies they now issue must be uniform in their provisions, arrangement and type.
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Andrews, J.
If the rights of the parties depend upon the contract of insurance as expressed in the policy, there can be no hesitation in affirming the judgment of nonsuit.
The provision as to the commencement of foreclosure proceedings ; the requirement that the insured, in case of loss, shall give immediate notice in writing to the company, and the other requirement that within sixty days after a fire he shall render to the company a sworn statement of the particulars specified, are conditions precedent to a right to recover on the policy, and each of the three conditions mentioned was violated. Foreclosure proceedings were commenced to the knowledge of the insured before the fire; no notice of loss was served at any time by him, and the letter of Kelsey to the company written thirty-three days after the fire, even if it could be treated as having been written in behalf of the insured, was not immediate notice; and finally the proofs of loss were not served until months after the sixty days’ limitation in the policy had expired. The authorities are conclusive that the non-performance of these conditions, or any one of them, constituted a complete defense to a claim to recover on the policy as printed.
(Inman
v.
Western F. Ins. Co.,
12 Wend. 460;
Blossom
v.
Lycoming F. Ins. Co.,
64 N. Y. 162;
Titus
v.
Glens Falls Ins. Co.,
81 id. 411.)
The plaintiff was driven to the claim that the company-had waived the right to insist upon the conditions of the contract as contained in the policy, or had consented to be bound, notwithstanding the violation of the conditions. He relied, to establish this contention, upon certain transactions between himself and Kelsey, the agent who acted: for the company in making the contract of insurance and. issuing the policy, fully recited in the statement of facts.. It is to be assumed that Kelsey learned of the commencement of the foreclosure proceedings, and thereupon assured the-plaintiff that his rights under the policy would not be prejudiced thereby; also that he knew of the fire when it occurred,, and after writing the company the letter of July 19, 1889, informed the plaintiff that he had done so, and that he need take no further steps towards giving notice or securing proofs of loss, and it is to be admitted also that the plaintiff had not-read the policy, and did not know what conditions it contained..
It is insisted that upon the whole evidence a question was. presented for the jury whether the company had waived the-conditions relied upon to defeat a recovery or had consented-to be bound notwithstanding their violation. The transactions-, and interviews between Kelsey and the plaintiff took place after Kelsey had ceased to act as the agent for the defendant but it is claimed that the plaintiff did not know that his agency had terminated, and we shall consider the case upon the assumption that the company was bound by his acts to the-same extent as if there had been no change in his relation to. the defendant. The substance of the claim made by the-plaintiff is that the agent of the company, invested with the-power to make contracts of insurance and issue and countersign policies, may subsequently change or modify conditions therein and waive forfeitures; in short, that in respect to policies issued by him he stands in place of the company and. may do whatever the company itself might do in the premises.
The powers possessed by agents of insurance companies, like those of agents of any other corporations, or of an individual principal, are to be interpreted in accordance with the
general law of agency. No other or different rule is to be applied to a contract of insurance, than is applied to other contracts. The agent of an insurance company possesses such powers and such powers only as have been conferred verbally or by the instrument of authorization, or such as third persons have a right to assume that he possesses. Where the act or representation of the agent of an insurance company is alleged as the act of the principal and, therefore, binding upon the latter, the test of the liability of the principal is the same as in other cases of agency. No principle is better settled in the law, nor is there any founded on more obvious justice than that if a person dealing with an agent knows that he is acting under a circumscribed and limited authority, and that his act is outside of and transcends the authority conferred, the principal is not bound, and it is immaterial whether the agent is a general or special one, because a principal may limit the authority of the one as well as that of the other.
(Walsh
v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
73 N. Y. 10.)
The limitations upon the authority of Kelsey were written on the face of the policy. It declared that “no officer, agent or representative of the company should have power to waive any provision or condition ” embraced in the printed and authorized policy, but power is given to agents to waive added provisions or conditions, provided such' waiver is written upon or attached to the policy. Where a policy permits an agent to exercise a specified authority, but prescribes that the company shall not be bound unless the execution of the power shall be evidenced by a written indorsement on the policy, the condition is of the essence of the authority, and the consent or act •of the agent not so indorsed is void.
(Walsh
v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., supra ; Marvin
v.
Universal life Ins. Co.,
85 N. Y. 278.) The conditions violated in this case were contained in the authorized blank, and as to these the agent had no power in any manner, in writing, or otherwise, to waive them.
In determining the question of liability in this case it is immaterial whether the plaintiff read the policy or not, or that
he had no actual knowledge of the conditions or of the limitations of the power of Kelsey. The conditions and limitations were a part of the contract and he was bound to take notice of them, and is not excused upon the plea that he omitted to acquaint himself with the provisions of the policy, and his arrangement with Kelsey to take charge of his insurance interests was a matter with which the defendant had no concern.
The act (Chap. 486, of the Taws of 1886) providing for a uniform policy known as the standard policy, and which makes its use compulsory upon insurance companies, marks a most important and useful advance in legislation relating to contracts of insurance. The practice which prevailed before this enactment, whereby each company prescribed the form of its contract, led to great diversity in the provisions and conditions of insurance policies and frequently to great abuse. Parties taking insurance were often misled by unusual clauses or obscure phrases concealed in a mass of verbiage and often so printed as almost to elude discovery. Unconscionable defenses based upon such conditions were not infrequent, and courts seem sometimes to have been embarrassed in the attempt to reconcile the claims of justice with the law of contracts. Under the law of 1886 companies are not permitted to insert conditions in policies at their will. The policies they now issue must be uniform in their provisions, arrangement and type. Persons seeking insurance will come to understand to a greater extent than heretofore the contract into which they enter. ¡Now, as heretofore, it is competent for the parties to a contract of insurance, by agreement in writing or by paroi, to modify the contract after the policy has been issued or to waive conditions or forfeitures. The power of agents, as expressed in the policy, may be enlarged by usage of the company, its course of business, or by its consent express or implied. The principle that courts lean against forfeitures is unimpaired, and in weighing evidence tending to show a waiver of conditions or forfeitures, the court may take into consideration the nature of the particular condition in question,
whether a condition precedent to any liability, or one relating !to the remedy merely, after a loss has been incurred. But "where the restrictions upon an agent’s authority appear in the policy, and there is no evidence tending to show that his powers have been enlarged, there seems to be no good reason "why the authority expressed should not be regarded as the measure of his power; nor is there any reason why courts should refuse to enforce forfeitures plainly incurred, which have not been expressly or impliedly waived by the company.
The acts and representations of Kelsey, upon which the plaintiff relies were in excess of his authority as expressed in "the policy and did not bind the defendant, there being no evidence upon which it can be held that the company had enlarged -his powers or waived the violated conditions."
These views lead to an affirmance of the judgment.
All concur, Peokiiam and Maynard, JJ., in result; O’Brien, • J., not sitting.
Judgment affirmed.