OPINION AND ORDER
JOHN W. PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.
This complex case, or rather series of cases, had its origin in Armour v. Ohio which was filed in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio in 1988. The district judge to whom the case was assigned referred it to a magistrate who recommended denial of relief for the plaintiffs. The district court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation. On appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the decision of the district court was reversed by the court sitting en banc, 925 F.2d 987 (6th Cir.1991), which remanded with directions to certify the case to the Chief Circuit Judge for the appointment of a three-judge court under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2284. Challenged in that case was the plan devised and promulgated by the Ohio Apportionment Board which is charged under the Ohio constitution with the drawing of the districts from which the members of the Ohio General Assembly which consists of the House of Representatives and the Senate, are elected. The specific plan under attack was adopted by the board in 1981. The three-judge court appointed pursuant to the certification held that a voting district boundary line in Mahoning County which split a large cohesive black population between two districts violated the Voting Rights Act and the fifteenth amendment, 775 F.Supp. 1044 (N.D.Ohio 1991). No appeal to the Supreme Court was perfected from that decision.
The present action placed the validity of the apportionment plan promulgated in 1991 as it applied to the entire state at issue. This court held the plan to be invalid in a two. to one decision. Quilter v. Voinovich, No. 5:91-CV-2219, 794 F.Supp. 695 (N.D.Ohio Jan. 31, 1992). Thereafter, the Apportionment Board prepared another plan which this court decided, by a divided court, to be unconstitutional. No. 5:91-CV-2219, 794 F.Supp. 756 (N.D.Ohio Mar. 10, 1992). That plan was neither published nor promulgated as required by the Ohio constitution and one of the issues in the present case is whether that plan was in fact a new plan or simply a revision containing “technical corrections” of the 1991 Plan, as contended by the defendants. We hold that the “technical corrections” were so extensive and pervasive that the result[762]*762ing document constituted a new plan, hereinafter referred to as the 1992 Plan.
Meanwhile, two original actions involving additional aspects of the entire situation were filed in the Supreme Court of Ohio, which were removed to the district court for the Southern District of Ohio. Neither of those actions is directly involved herein at this juncture. This court appointed a Special Master charged with the responsibility of preparing a plan of redistricting, authorizing him to employ such technical assistance as was deemed necessary for the drafting of the plan, and providing that the cost of this process be assessed against the state of Ohio. On application of the defendants, the Supreme Court of the United States issued on April 20,1992, an order staying orders of this court entered March 10 and 31. Thereafter, the Special Master filed a Status Report and Request for Instructions pointing out that the plan he had been directed to prepare was 75% to 80% complete, that completion could be accomplished within a matter of days, but that if discontinued at that time would be more difficult and time consuming, and therefore more expensive, to complete at a subsequent time. In response, we ordered the Special Master to proceed to complete the plan, then to file it with this court under seal in order to be available in the event the Supreme Court feels that it may be of assistance. It is parenthetically observed that the members of this court are not aware of the details nor of the thrust of the proposed report, and when and if such a plan is filed under seal its integrity will be maintained pending further instructions from the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, the passage of time placed the date of the primary election in jeopardy and has placed the political process in a hazardous position. Originally scheduled for May 5, 1992, it was rescheduled by order of this court for September 8, 1992, but is presently scheduled to be conducted June 2, 1992. The Secretary of State of Ohio, who is the chief elections officer of the state, formally advised the Boards of Elections of the eighty-eight counties in the state to do all acts necessary for the conducting of the election on the latter date. Additionally, the plaintiffs in Armour v. Ohio filed a motion asking, inter alia, for the issuance of an order to show cause why the state of Ohio should not be held in contempt of court because use of the 1992 Plan was in conflict with the April 23rd order of the Armour court requiring the election to take place under the 1991 Plan. We decline, however, to take cognizance of the entire motion, including the request for a show cause order, because the motion was filed in Armour v. Ohio. Because we hold that the election may proceed under the 1992 Plan, the Armour plaintiffs’ other requested relief can be resolved by the Armour court at a later date.
The need for a resolution of the issues in this case has become critical because of the time requirements and cut-off dates for the filing of nominating petitions, other periods established by state statutes and regulations, and allowance for time for the printing of ballots and incidental literature. A full literal compliance with the administrative time requirements would necessitate a rescheduling of the announced date for the primary. The election officials are therefore empowered and directed to make such truncations of time periods or other appropriate adjustments to the end that the goal of conducting the primary election on June 2, 1992 can be accomplished.
Pursuant to a motion filed by the plaintiffs herein, a status conference was conducted yesterday in open court which was attended by counsel for all of the parties, and at which many of the parties were personally present. In the course of that conference, which lasted for three hours, attorneys for all of the parties, including those for and against the motion filed by the plaintiffs in Armour v. Ohio made extensive, detailed arguments. Upon one point all of counsel, and indeed, the parties themselves, were in agreement; all agreed that only an immediate decision by this court, deciding first under which plan the election is to be conducted, and truncating to the greatest reasonable extent the time periods indicated above, could the June 2, 1992 date become a reality. Following recognition of such agreement, at the conclu[763]*763sion of the hearing the presiding judge announced that the case would be considered as submitted and that an opinion deciding the salient issues would be forthcoming within twenty-four hours. It is against that deadline that this opinion is in preparation.
Turning to the major issue facing us for decision, we face the task of, in effect, selecting the least flawed of the proposed redistricting plans, since none is without legal imperfections. One possible alternative, it should be noted, that of simply ordering that no primary election be held for legislative offices until a legally flawless plan is presented, thus automatically permitting incumbents to hold office until that eventuality occurred, we reject out of hand as inappropriate.
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OPINION AND ORDER
JOHN W. PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.
This complex case, or rather series of cases, had its origin in Armour v. Ohio which was filed in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio in 1988. The district judge to whom the case was assigned referred it to a magistrate who recommended denial of relief for the plaintiffs. The district court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation. On appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the decision of the district court was reversed by the court sitting en banc, 925 F.2d 987 (6th Cir.1991), which remanded with directions to certify the case to the Chief Circuit Judge for the appointment of a three-judge court under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2284. Challenged in that case was the plan devised and promulgated by the Ohio Apportionment Board which is charged under the Ohio constitution with the drawing of the districts from which the members of the Ohio General Assembly which consists of the House of Representatives and the Senate, are elected. The specific plan under attack was adopted by the board in 1981. The three-judge court appointed pursuant to the certification held that a voting district boundary line in Mahoning County which split a large cohesive black population between two districts violated the Voting Rights Act and the fifteenth amendment, 775 F.Supp. 1044 (N.D.Ohio 1991). No appeal to the Supreme Court was perfected from that decision.
The present action placed the validity of the apportionment plan promulgated in 1991 as it applied to the entire state at issue. This court held the plan to be invalid in a two. to one decision. Quilter v. Voinovich, No. 5:91-CV-2219, 794 F.Supp. 695 (N.D.Ohio Jan. 31, 1992). Thereafter, the Apportionment Board prepared another plan which this court decided, by a divided court, to be unconstitutional. No. 5:91-CV-2219, 794 F.Supp. 756 (N.D.Ohio Mar. 10, 1992). That plan was neither published nor promulgated as required by the Ohio constitution and one of the issues in the present case is whether that plan was in fact a new plan or simply a revision containing “technical corrections” of the 1991 Plan, as contended by the defendants. We hold that the “technical corrections” were so extensive and pervasive that the result[762]*762ing document constituted a new plan, hereinafter referred to as the 1992 Plan.
Meanwhile, two original actions involving additional aspects of the entire situation were filed in the Supreme Court of Ohio, which were removed to the district court for the Southern District of Ohio. Neither of those actions is directly involved herein at this juncture. This court appointed a Special Master charged with the responsibility of preparing a plan of redistricting, authorizing him to employ such technical assistance as was deemed necessary for the drafting of the plan, and providing that the cost of this process be assessed against the state of Ohio. On application of the defendants, the Supreme Court of the United States issued on April 20,1992, an order staying orders of this court entered March 10 and 31. Thereafter, the Special Master filed a Status Report and Request for Instructions pointing out that the plan he had been directed to prepare was 75% to 80% complete, that completion could be accomplished within a matter of days, but that if discontinued at that time would be more difficult and time consuming, and therefore more expensive, to complete at a subsequent time. In response, we ordered the Special Master to proceed to complete the plan, then to file it with this court under seal in order to be available in the event the Supreme Court feels that it may be of assistance. It is parenthetically observed that the members of this court are not aware of the details nor of the thrust of the proposed report, and when and if such a plan is filed under seal its integrity will be maintained pending further instructions from the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, the passage of time placed the date of the primary election in jeopardy and has placed the political process in a hazardous position. Originally scheduled for May 5, 1992, it was rescheduled by order of this court for September 8, 1992, but is presently scheduled to be conducted June 2, 1992. The Secretary of State of Ohio, who is the chief elections officer of the state, formally advised the Boards of Elections of the eighty-eight counties in the state to do all acts necessary for the conducting of the election on the latter date. Additionally, the plaintiffs in Armour v. Ohio filed a motion asking, inter alia, for the issuance of an order to show cause why the state of Ohio should not be held in contempt of court because use of the 1992 Plan was in conflict with the April 23rd order of the Armour court requiring the election to take place under the 1991 Plan. We decline, however, to take cognizance of the entire motion, including the request for a show cause order, because the motion was filed in Armour v. Ohio. Because we hold that the election may proceed under the 1992 Plan, the Armour plaintiffs’ other requested relief can be resolved by the Armour court at a later date.
The need for a resolution of the issues in this case has become critical because of the time requirements and cut-off dates for the filing of nominating petitions, other periods established by state statutes and regulations, and allowance for time for the printing of ballots and incidental literature. A full literal compliance with the administrative time requirements would necessitate a rescheduling of the announced date for the primary. The election officials are therefore empowered and directed to make such truncations of time periods or other appropriate adjustments to the end that the goal of conducting the primary election on June 2, 1992 can be accomplished.
Pursuant to a motion filed by the plaintiffs herein, a status conference was conducted yesterday in open court which was attended by counsel for all of the parties, and at which many of the parties were personally present. In the course of that conference, which lasted for three hours, attorneys for all of the parties, including those for and against the motion filed by the plaintiffs in Armour v. Ohio made extensive, detailed arguments. Upon one point all of counsel, and indeed, the parties themselves, were in agreement; all agreed that only an immediate decision by this court, deciding first under which plan the election is to be conducted, and truncating to the greatest reasonable extent the time periods indicated above, could the June 2, 1992 date become a reality. Following recognition of such agreement, at the conclu[763]*763sion of the hearing the presiding judge announced that the case would be considered as submitted and that an opinion deciding the salient issues would be forthcoming within twenty-four hours. It is against that deadline that this opinion is in preparation.
Turning to the major issue facing us for decision, we face the task of, in effect, selecting the least flawed of the proposed redistricting plans, since none is without legal imperfections. One possible alternative, it should be noted, that of simply ordering that no primary election be held for legislative offices until a legally flawless plan is presented, thus automatically permitting incumbents to hold office until that eventuality occurred, we reject out of hand as inappropriate. A reincarnation of the 1981 Plan is not, of course, an option, it having been replaced by the properly published and promulgated 1991 Plan. The 1991 Plan, however, contained several serious errors and omissions as detailed in a thirteen page submission from the defendants. For instance, in Cleveland, War 4 Precinct CC was completely omitted from the 1991 Plan. Similarly, Coventry Township, Precinct J, in Summit County was omitted. Numerous wards, precincts, and townships were erroneously divided. These deficiencies were corrected in the 1992 Plan. It is now our conclusion that deficiencies of the 1992 Plan are less egregious than those of the 1991 Plan.
In reaching this conclusion, we are in no way depreciating the importance of providing full enlightenment to the electorate by the publication and promulgation process. On the contrary, we regard public education concerning issues and candidates to be a paramount element of the democratic process. In the present instance, however, we conclude that that educational process has been more completely accomplished by the news media than it could have been accomplished through strict compliance with the legal requirements, which could have been met through bare-bones, back-page material which seldom, if ever, is studied by a substantial number of voters. In the present situation, we take judicial notice of the widespread publicity that has been given to this case. The media throughout the state of Ohio has accorded space and time to a discussion of the entire matter, and, indeed, this morning’s newspapers, television and radio stories have afforded full coverage, including mention of yesterday’s notation that this court would announce a decision today. We therefore hold that substantial compliance with the publication and promulgation requirements have been met.
The fact remains, however, that the Apportionment Board promulgated the 1992 Plan on February 18,1992, the Secretary of State issued instructions to the county election boards on February 19, 1992, and the filing deadline was February 20, 1992. As previously noted, considerable media interest was focused on this matter. Despite the degree of public attention, we are forced to conclude that the amount of time allowed to decide whether to run in the new districts was inadequate. Accordingly, we direct the Secretary of State to accept new candidate filings in any Ohio House or Senate district reconfigured by the February 18, 1992 amendments. The filing deadline is Friday, May 8, 1992, at 4:00 p.m. The Secretary of State is empowered to take all actions, notwithstanding any state election law or time period to the contrary, to assure that any candidates filing under this court-ordered grace period are included in the June 2, 1992 primary election.
IT IS SO ORDERED.