IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
QUIKRETE HOLDINGS INC. and ) CIVIL NO. 24-00515 HG-WRP CONTINENTAL CASUALTY ) COMPANY, ) FINDINGS AND ) RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT Plaintiffs, ) PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ) DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS TO vs. ) DEFENDANT KEALII BASHAM ) KEALII BASHAM, ) ) Defendant. ) )
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANT KEALII BASHAM
Before the Court is Plaintiffs Quikrete Holdings, Inc. (Quikrete) and Continental Casualty Company’s (CCC) (collectively, Plaintiffs) Motion for Default Judgment as to Defendant Kealii Basham (Motion), ECF No. 23. Defendant Kealii Basham (Basham or Defendant) did not respond to the Motion, and Plaintiffs did not file a reply memorandum. At the Court’s request, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment (Supplement) on November 10, 2025, ECF No. 27. The Court finds this Motion suitable for disposition without a hearing pursuant to Rule 7.1(c) of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Hawai’i. After careful consideration of the record in this action and the relevant legal authority, the Court FINDS AND RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs’ Motion be GRANTED.1
FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. The Underlying Lawsuit The present action is related to the state court case captioned,
Jeremiah, et al., v. Deer, et al., Civ. No. 1CCV-23-00001076, in the First Circuit Court, State of Hawaii (Underlying Lawsuit). Complaint, ECF No. 1 ¶ 7. The Underlying Lawsuit was filed on August 18, 2023, by Shelly Kahealani Jeremiah – proceeding individually and as personal representative of the estate of Darryl
Gamaliel Kanani Jeremiah, Jr. (Jeremiah) – and three of Jeremiah’s minor children (collectively, Underlying Plaintiffs). Id. The Underlying Lawsuit alleges that Jeremiah was employed as a
driver at BOMAT Holdings dba Bonded Materials Company (Bomat), which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Quikrete. Id. ¶ 8. The state court complaint asserts claims against Jeffrey H. Deer (the President of Bomat), Robert Taylor (a manager at Bomat), and Defendant (a supervisor at Bomat) (collectively, Underlying
Defendants). Id. ¶ 9.
1 Within fourteen days after a party is served with the Findings and Recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), a party may file written objections in the United States District Court. A party must file any objections within the fourteen-day period to preserve appellate review of the Findings and Recommendation. According to the state court complaint, on August 20 and 23, 2021, Defendant reported to work with COVID-19 symptoms, including fever, coughing,
and body aches. Id. ¶ 10. On each of those days, the Underlying Defendants required Jeremiah to work in tight, confined indoor spaces with no ventilation, safety gear, or safety standards, and in close proximity to other employees,
including Defendant. Id. Jeremiah was therefore exposed to COVID-19 on those two days and tested positive for COVID-19 one week later. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12. Less than two months later, on October 21, 2021, Jeremiah died from COVID-19 complications. Id. ¶ 12.
The state court complaint asserts Underlying Defendants failed to adhere to, implement or enforce safety policies and protocols concerning COVID- 19 exposure in the workplace. Id. ¶ 13. Underlying Plaintiffs claim that
Jeremiah’s death and other associated injuries and damages were directly and proximately caused by the intentional, wanton, reckless, grossly negligent and/or negligent actions and/or omissions of the Underlying Defendants. Id. ¶ 14. Underlying Plaintiffs seek to recover special and general damages, including
medical care, wage loss, physical injuries, emotional and mental trauma and distress, psychological injuries, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and loss of consortium. Id. ¶ 15. Deer and Taylor were served with the state court complaint, and insurance defense counsel was appointed to represent them by Quikrete pursuant to
the CCC Policy No. 6049837965, effective 01/01/2021 to 01/01/2022 (the Policy). Id. ¶¶ 16, 18; Exhibit B to Complaint, ECF No. 1-2. Insurance defense counsel contacted Deer and Taylor and obtained their agreement to represent them.
Complaint, ECF No. 1 ¶ 19. Regarding Defendant, Underlying Plaintiffs were unable to contact him. Id. ¶ 22. After Defendant was served by publication and failed to appear, the First Circuit Court entered default against him. Id. ¶¶ 24-25.
Insurance defense counsel was also unable to contact Defendant, even after hiring a private investigator and attempting to contact Defendant by mail and phone. Id. ¶¶ 20-21.
B. The Policy At all times relevant, Quikrete was the named insured under the Policy. Complaint, ECF No. 1 ¶ 27. For purposes of this Motion, Plaintiffs “do not contest whether the underlying defendants, including Basham, are insureds
under the Policy.” Motion, ECF No. 23 at 18. Subject to a full reservation of rights, Plaintiffs are providing a defense to Green and Taylor in the Underlying Lawsuit. Id. at 19. Regarding bodily injury, the Policy provides in part: COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY 1. Insuring Agreement a. We will pay those sums that the Insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the Insured against any suit seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to defend the Insured against any suit seeking damages for bodily injury . . . to which this insurance does not apply . . . . b. This insurance applies to bodily injury . . . only if: (1) The bodily injury . . . is caused by an occurrence . . . .
Complaint, ECF No. 1 ¶ 29. “Bodily injury” is defined as: Bodily injury means physical injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person, including death, humiliation, shock, mental anguish or mental injury sustained by that person at any time which results as a consequence of the physical injury, sickness or disease.
Id. An “occurrence” is defined in the Policy as: Occurrence means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.
Id. However, the Policy also provides: [W]e will have no duty to defend the Insured against any suit seeking damages for bodily injury . . . to which this insurance does not apply.
-Id-. ¶ 29. One of the coverage exclusions in the Policy is in the Employment- Related Practices Exclusion Endorsement, which provides: It is understood and agreed that under COVERAGES, Coverage A – Bodily Injury . . . , the paragraphs entitled Exclusions, are amended to add the following exclusion: This insurance does not apply to: Bodily injury . . . to: (1) a person arising out of any: . . . (c) employment-related practices, policies, acts or omissions, such as coercion, demotion, evaluation, reassignment, discipline, defamation, harassment, humiliation, discrimination or malicious prosecution directed at that person; or (2) the spouse, child, parent, brother or sister of that person as a consequence of bodily injury to that person at whom any of the employment-related practices described in Paragraphs (a), (b), or (c) above is directed. This exclusion applies: (1) whether the injury-causing event described in Paragraphs (a), (b), or (c) above occurs before employment, during employment or after employment of that person; (2) whether the Insured may be liable as an employer or in any other capacity; and (3) to any obligation to share damages with or to repay someone else who must pay damages because of the injury. Exhibit B to Complaint, ECF No. 1-2 at 87 (emphases added). Thus, pursuant to the Employment-Related Practices Exclusion Endorsement, insurance coverage
does not apply to claims of “bodily injury” to “a person arising out of any” “employment-related practices, policies, acts or omissions[.]” Motion, ECF No. 23 at 20-21.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On December 6, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint against Defendant, asserting claims for: (1) failure to cooperate (Count I); and (2) declaratory relief (Count II). Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 17-18. The Complaint
prays for, among other things, “a binding judicial declaration that [Plaintiffs] have no duty to defend and/or indemnify [Defendant] under the CCC Policy for underlying plaintiffs’ claims of bodily injury asserted against him in the underlying
lawsuit[.]” See id. at 18. On March 5, 2025, this Court granted Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time and to Serve Defendant Kealii Basham by Publication. Minute Order, ECF No. 12. Specifically, the deadline to serve Defendant was extended to
June 4, 2025, and the Court granted Plaintiffs’ request to serve Defendant by publication. Id. The Amended Summons in a Civil Case and Notice of Complaint was thereafter published in the Honolulu Star-Advertiser four times during April
2025. See Affidavit of Publication, ECF No. 18. A Publication Return Hearing was held on June 26, 2025, but Defendant did not appear. See Publication Return Hearing Minutes, ECF No. 19.
On June 30, 2025, default was entered against Defendant. See Clerk’s Entry of Default, ECF No. 21. The present Motion for Default Judgment followed, in which
Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief that they owe no duty to defend or indemnify Defendant in the Underlying Lawsuit. See Motion, ECF No. 23. DISCUSSION Default judgment may be entered if the defendant has defaulted by
failing to appear. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). The grant or denial of a motion for default judgment is within the discretion of the court. Haw. Carpenters’ Trust Funds v. Stone, 794 F.2d 508, 511-12 (9th Cir. 1986). Default judgments are ordinarily disfavored, and cases should be decided on their merits if reasonably
possible. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986). The court should consider the following factors in deciding whether to grant a motion for default judgment:
(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. Id. at 1471-72 (citation omitted). On default, “the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v.
Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)). The allegations in the complaint regarding liability are deemed true, but the plaintiff must establish the relief to
which it is entitled. See Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). Also, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
A. Jurisdiction Before considering the merits of default judgment, the Court has an affirmative obligation to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over
this action and personal jurisdiction over Defendant. See In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999) (“To avoid entering a default judgment that can later be successfully attacked as void, a court should determine whether it has the power, i.e., the jurisdiction, to enter the judgment in the first place.”). The Court is
satisfied that it has diversity jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between--(1) citizens of different States[.]”); see also Supplement, ECF No. 27. The Court also has personal jurisdiction over Defendant
because he was properly served in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Brenneke, 551 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A federal court is without personal jurisdiction over a
defendant unless the defendant has been served in accordance with [FRCP] 4.” (citations omitted)); see also Affidavit of Publication, ECF No. 18; Publication Return Hearing Minutes, ECF No. 19. B. Eitel Factors
Following a determination that jurisdiction is proper, the Court must consider whether default judgment is appropriate under the Eitel factors outlined above.
1. The Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiffs The first factor considers whether Plaintiffs would suffer prejudice if default judgment is not entered. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Defendant has not defended against Plaintiffs’
claims in this case at all. Defendant neither responded to the Complaint nor entered an appearance in this case. Absent entry of default judgment against Defendant, Plaintiffs would be without recourse for the claims in this case.
Therefore, the first Eitel factor favors default judgment. 2. Merits of Plaintiffs’ Substantive Claims As noted above, for purposes of liability, the factual allegations in the
complaint are taken as true on default. See TeleVideo Sys., Inc., 826 F.2d at 917- 18; Fair Hous. of Marin, 285 F.3d at 906. In the present Motion, Plaintiffs seek default judgment in the form of declaratory relief that they owe no duty to defend
or indemnify Defendant in the Underlying Lawsuit. See Motion, ECF No. 23. As noted above, this Court has diversity jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal courts sitting in diversity apply federal procedural rules and substantive
state law. See Burlington Ins. Co. v. United Coatings Mfg. Co., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1246 (D. Haw. 2007). Therefore, Hawaii insurance law governs the interpretation of the Policy. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Willison, 833 F.
Supp. 2d 1200, 1214 (D. Haw. 2011) (“In a diversity action, Hawaii insurance law governs.” (Citation omitted.)). Under Hawaii law, courts must look to the language of the insurance policy to determine the scope of the insurer’s duties. See Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First
Ins. Co. of Haw., 76 Hawai‘i 277, 287, 875 P.2d 894, 904 (1994). The Hawaii Supreme Court has provided the following guidance for interpreting insurance policies:
[I]nsurance policies are subject to the general rules of contract construction; the terms of the policy should be interpreted according to their plain, ordinary, and accepted sense in common speech unless it appears from the policy that a different meaning is intended. Moreover, every insurance contract shall be construed according to the entirety of its terms and conditions as set forth in the policy. Nevertheless, adherence to the plain language and literal meaning of the insurance contract provisions is not without limitation. We have acknowledged that because insurance policies are contracts of adhesion and are premised on standard forms prepared by the insurer’s attorneys, we have long subscribed to the principle that they must be construed liberally in favor of the insured and any ambiguities must be resolved against the insurer. Put another way, the rule is that policies are to be construed in accord with the reasonable expectations of a layperson.
Dairy Rd. Partners v. Island Ins. Co., Ltd., 92 Hawai‘i 398, 411-12, 992 P.2d 93, 106-07 (2000) (internal citations, quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted). The duty to defend “is broader than the duty to pay claims and arises wherever there is the mere potential for coverage.” Sentinel Ins. Co., 76 Hawai‘i at 287, 875 P.2d at 904 (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “In other words, the duty to defend rests primarily on the possibility that coverage exists. This possibility may be remote, but if it exists, the insurer owes the insured a defense.” Id. (citations, internal quotation marks, and internal brackets omitted) (emphasis in original). “All doubts as to whether a duty to defend exists are resolved against the insurer and in favor of the insured.” Id. (citations, internal quotation marks, and internal brackets omitted). Hawaii adheres to the “‘complaint allegation rule.’” Burlington Ins.
Co. v. Oceanic Design & Constr., Inc., 383 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Pancakes of Hawaii, Inc. v. Pomare Props. Corp., 85 Hawai‘i 286, 291, 944 P.2d 83, 88 (Ct. App. 1997)). The duty to defend “‘is limited to situations where the
pleadings have alleged claims for relief which fall within the terms for coverage of the insurance contract.’” Id. (citing Hawaiian Holiday Macadamia Nut Co. v. Indus. Indem. Co., 76 Hawai‘i 166, 169, 872 P.2d 230, 233 (Haw. 1994)). Where the pleadings “fail to allege any basis for recovery within the coverage clause, the
insurer has no obligation to defend.” Id. (citing Hawaiian Holiday, 76 Hawai‘i at 169, 872 P.2d at 233) (internal quotation marks omitted). Insurers “owe[] a duty to indemnify the insured ‘for any loss or injury which comes within the coverage
provisions of the policy, provided it is not removed from coverage by a policy exclusion.’” Gemini Ins. Co. v. ConstRX Ltd., 360 F. Supp. 3d 1055, 1065 (D. Haw. 2018) (citations omitted). Turning to the Policy at issue here, the Policy states: “We will pay
those sums that the Insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury . . . to which this insurance applies.” Complaint, ECF No. 1 ¶ 29. Further, “insurance applies to bodily injury . . . only if . . . [t]he bodily injury . . .
is caused by an occurrence[.]” Id. Plaintiffs do not dispute that Defendant is an “insured” under the Policy. See Motion, ECF No. 23 at 18. Additionally, Plaintiffs --- do not appear to dispute that “bodily injury” occurred or was caused by an “occurrence.” However, the Policy also states: “we will have no duty to defend the Insured against any suit seeking damages for bodily injury . . . to which this
insurance does not apply.” Complaint, ECF No. 1 ¶ 29. To that end, the Employment-Related Practices Exclusion Endorsement provides: This insurance does not apply to: Bodily injury . . . to: (1) a person arising out of any: . . . (c) employment-related practices, policies, acts or omissions, such as coercion, . . . ; or (2) the spouse, child, parent, brother or sister of that person as a consequence of bodily injury to that person at whom any of the employment-related practices described in Paragraphs (a), (b), or (c) above is directed.
Exhibit B to Complaint, ECF No. 1-2 at 87. In sum, this endorsement states that insurance coverage does not apply to claims of “bodily injury” to “a person arising out of any” “employment-related practices, policies, acts or omissions[.]” Motion, ECF No. 23 at 20-21. According to the state court complaint, Defendant was a supervisor at Bomat and “required Jeremiah to work in tight, confined indoor spaces with no ventilation, safety gear, or safety standards, and in close proximity to other employees, including BASHAM, who presented with COVID-19-related symptoms.” Complaint, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 9-10. Defendant also “failed to adhere to,
implement or enforce safety policies and protocols concerning COVID- 19 exposure in the workplace, including, but not limited to, requiring proper social distancing in non-ventilated workspaces and providing or requiring the use of
appropriate safety protection and equipment.” Id. ¶¶ 11, 13. As a result of Defendant’s “intentional, wanton, reckless, gross negligent and/or negligent actions and/or omissions,” Jeremiah was exposed to COVID-19 at his workplace, which resulted in his death and Underlying Plaintiffs’ damages. Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
Based on the allegations in the state court complaint, Jeremiah’s bodily injury resulted in part from Defendant’s “employment-related practices, policies, acts or omissions[.]” Exhibit B to Complaint, ECF No. 1-2 at 87.
Additionally, the state court complaint confirms that any injury to Jeremiah’s spouse or children was “a consequence of bodily injury to [Jeremiah] at whom . . . the employment-related practices . . [were] directed.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Therefore, based on the allegations against Defendant in the state court complaint
and considering the plain language of the Employment-Related Practices Exclusion Endorsement, the Court finds that insurance coverage “does not apply to” the claims against Defendant and that, therefore, Plaintiffs have no duty to defend or indemnify Defendant in the Underlying Lawsuit.1
Furthermore, even if the Court determined that Plaintiffs have a duty to defend or indemnify Defendant, Defendant has not responded to the insurance defense counsel’s efforts to represent him in the Underlying Lawsuit. Complaint,
ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 20-21 (detailing counsel’s efforts at contacting Defendant). As such, Defendant has failed to satisfy his duty to cooperate with the insurer, as required by the Policy. Id. ¶ 39; Exhibit B to Complaint, ECF No. 1-2 at 38. Accordingly, the Court FINDS that Plaintiffs’ allegations, taken as
true, are sufficient to establish that Plaintiffs owe no duty to defend or indemnify Defendant with respect to the Underlying Lawsuit. The Court therefore finds that this factor (merits of Plaintiffs’ substantive claims) weighs in favor of default
judgment. 3. Sufficiency of the Complaint As discussed above, the allegations in the Complaint are sufficiently pled. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of default judgment as to all claims in
the Complaint.
1 This Court’s finding applies only to Defendant and is not intended to be interpreted as applying to any other Underlying Defendant. 4. Sum of Money at Stake The Court “must consider the amount of money at stake in relation to
the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. However, where declaratory relief is sought rather than monetary damages, this factor weighs in favor of default judgment. See Maxum Indem. Co. v. Kaur, No.
1:17-cv-01467-LJO-JLT, 2019 WL 7605677, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2019) (“The fourth Eitel factor, the sum of money at stake in the action, also weighs in favor of default judgment as [the plaintiff] does not seek monetary damages in this declaratory relief action.”). Here, Plaintiffs seek only declaratory relief. See
Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 18. Thus, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of default judgment. 5. Possibility of Dispute Concerning Material Facts
As noted above, the well-pled factual allegations of the Complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true. See TeleVideo Sys., Inc., 826 F.2d at 917-18. Defendant has been given a fair opportunity to defend this action and has not done so at all. Therefore, the Court
finds that this factor favors default judgment. 6. Whether Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect “The sixth Eitel factor considers whether defendant’s default may
have been the product of excusable neglect.” Ho v. Tan Trinh, No. 8:16-cv-481- JLS-JCGx, 2016 WL 11520810, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2016) (citation omitted). “This factor favors a default judgment when the defendant has been properly
served or the plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant is aware of the lawsuit.” Id. (citation omitted). As noted above, Defendant was served by publication and a Publication Return Hearing was held, but Defendant has not appeared in this case.
See Affidavit of Publication, ECF No. 18; Publication Return Hearing Minutes, ECF No. 19. The Court therefore finds that this factor favors entry of default judgment. 7. Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits
Defendant’s default renders a decision on the merits impractical, if not impossible. Under Rule 55, “termination of a case before hearing the merits is allowed whenever a defendant fails to defend an action.” PepsiCo., Inc., 238
F. Supp. 2d at 1177; see Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 501 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“the mere existence of Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) indicates that the seventh Eitel factor is not alone dispositive”) (citation omitted). Here, Defendant has failed to defend this action and has consequently rendered
adjudication on the merits before this Court impracticable. This factor does not preclude the Court from entering default judgment against Defendant. 8. Totality of Eitel Factors
The Court finds that the totality of the factors discussed above weighs in favor of entering default judgment against Defendant. Therefore, this Court recommends entry of default judgment in favor of Plaintiffs in the form of declaratory relief that Plaintiffs do not owe Defendant a duty to defend or indemnify him in the Underlying Lawsuit. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court FINDS and RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment as to Defendant Kealii Basham, ECF No. 23, be GRANTED. The Court further recommends that the Court enter declaratory relief in favor of Plaintiffs that Plaintiffs do not owe Defendant a duty to defend or indemnify him in the Underlying Lawsuit. IT IS SO FOUND AND RECOMMENDED. DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, December 31, 2025.
SSI, NON dof Wes Reber Porter Qn, ai SS United States Magistrate Judge
Quikrete Holdings, Inc., et al. v. Basham; CV. NO. 24-00515 HG-WRP; FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANT KEALII BASHAM.