Quijano v. United States
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Quijano v. United States. Read the opinion of the Court — 93 F.3d 26 →
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 96-1053
CARLOS J. QUIJANO AND JEAN M. QUIJANO,
Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Cyr, Circuit Judge, _____________
Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Gertner,* U.S. District Judge. ___________________
____________________
Paula N. Singer, with whom Robert S. Grodberg and Vacovec, _________________ ____________________ ________
Mayotte & Singer were on brief for appellants. ________________
Kenneth W. Rosenberg, Attorney, Tax Division, Department of ______________________
Justice, with whom Jay P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, Loretta _________________ _______
C. Argrett, Assistant Attorney General, Gary R. Allen and Richard __________ ______________ _______
Farber, Attorneys, Tax Division, Department of Justice, were on brief ______
for appellee.
____________________
August 21, 1996
____________________
____________________
*Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
CYR, Circuit Judge. Appellants Carlos J. and Jean M. CYR, Circuit Judge. _____________
Quijano, husband and wife, appeal from a district court order
rejecting their joint claim for a federal income tax refund
relating to the 1990 sale of their residence located in the
United Kingdom. We affirm the district court judgment.
I I
BACKGROUND BACKGROUND __________
Appellants, United States taxpayers, acquired their
residence for 297,500 pounds sterling on September 30, 1986. The
entire purchase price was financed through a mortgage loan in
pounds sterling. On October 12, 1988, it was increased to
330,000 pounds (exchange rate: $1.73 to 1 pound); on March 27,
1990, to 333,180 pounds (exchange rate $1.62 to 1 pound).
Ultimately, their capital improvements to the residence cost
45,647 pounds. No U.S. funds were used either to purchase or
improve the residence. On July 27, 1990, it was sold for 453,374
pounds, net of selling expenses, and the mortgage loan was
retired.
Appellants' 1990 joint federal income tax return
originally reported a $308,811 capital gain, utilizing the
exchange rate at date of purchase ($1.49 to 1 pound) to calculate
the adjusted cost basis, but using the exchange rate at date of
sale ($1.82 to 1 pound) to calculate the sale price. Appellants
later amended their 1990 return to claim a $30,610 refund arrived
at by utilizing the exchange rate at date of sale ($1.82 to 1
pound) to determine the adjusted cost basis as well as the sale
2
price, thus resulting in a reduced $199,491 capital gain.
After the Internal Revenue Service disallowed their
amended refund claim, appellants initiated the present action.
The complaint alleged that Revenue Ruling 90-79 misinterprets our
decision in Willard Helburn, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 815 ______________________ ____________
(1st Cir. 1954), and that the tax imposed violates the Sixteenth
Amendment, see Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). In due ___ ______ ________
course, appellants moved for summary judgment. The government
responded that the total cost basis of the residence must be
arrived at by utilizing the respective dollar-pound exchange
rates in effect when the residence was purchased and each
capital-improvement payment was made. The parties stipulated
that, thus calculated, appellants had overpaid $2,668, plus
related interest and penalties not presently relevant.
Ultimately, the district court entered judgment for appellants in
the amount of $2,668 plus interest and penalties as provided by
law. On appeal, appellants challenge the district court order
rejecting their motion for summary judgment in the larger amount
of $30,610.
II II
DISCUSSION1 DISCUSSION __________
____________________
1In a civil action for refund under 26 U.S.C. 7422(a),
"the taxpayer must bear the burden of proving that the challenged
IRS tax assessment was erroneous." Webb v. Internal Revenue ____ _________________
Service of the United States, 15 F.3d 203, 205 (1st Cir. 1994) _____________________________
(citing Lewis v.
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