Quietwater Entertainment, Inc. v. United States

80 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 84 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5007, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11350, 1999 WL 535282
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Florida
DecidedJune 28, 1999
Docket3:98CV160/RV
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 80 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (Quietwater Entertainment, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Quietwater Entertainment, Inc. v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 84 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5007, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11350, 1999 WL 535282 (N.D. Fla. 1999).

Opinion

ORDER

VINSON, Chief Judge.

Pending are the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and the defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (doc. 13).

I. BACKGROUND

This is an action brought by the plaintiff for a refund of Federal Insurance Contribution Act (“FICA”) taxes paid to the Internal Revenue Service. Except where noted, the following facts are not in dispute.

Plaintiff Quietwater Entertainment, Inc., owns and operates a restaurant on Pensacola Beach, Florida, known as Jubilee/Captain Fun Restaurant. The plaintiff receives and records employee tip reports and withholds employee taxes and the employer share of FICA taxes on the basis of reported tips.

By letters dated May 5, 1993, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) mailed notice of an assessment and demand for payment of the employer share of FICA taxes allegedly due on tips unreported by the plaintiffs employees for the years 1990 and 1991. The IRS determined that the plaintiff owed additional unpaid FICA taxes on unreported tips in the amount of $7,880 for tips received in 1990, and $12,220 for tips received in 1991. The IRS requested that the amount due be included on the plaintiffs Form 941 tax return for the second quarter of 1993, which was due on July 31, 1993.

The notice and demand did not identify the tip earnings of individual employees, but was made on an aggregate basis using the gross earnings of the plaintiffs restaurant as reported by the plaintiff on its Annual Information Return of Tip Income and Allocated Tips [Form 8027]. The IRS computed taxes owed using a modification of the so-called “McQuatters formula.” 1 The plaintiff paid the full amount of the taxes assessed on the Form 941 due on July 31, 1993. The IRS subsequently refunded the full amount, but informed the plaintiff that the amount was refunded in error.

On February 28, 1995, the plaintiff filed an amended Form 941, a corresponding Form 941(c) and a Form 843 containing a claim for a refund of the taxes paid and abatement of the taxes assessed. The IRS filed a lien and levy for the balance of the taxes due, and the plaintiff paid the amount in full during the summer of 1995. The IRS notified the plaintiff on May 3, 1996, that the refund claim was disallowed.

In the plaintiffs restaurant, employees who receive tips share or “tip out” a portion of their tips to the support staff. Employees who might receive such indirect tips include bartenders, barbacks, bread persons, bus persons, and dessert tenders. The management encourages directly tipped employees to share a portion of their tips, and although the portion shared is left to the discretion of the employee, the management gives suggested guidelines: (1) 1.5 percent of sales to bus persons; (2) 1 percent of sales to bartenders; and (3) 1.5 percent of sales to dessert tenders, (doc. 11, Guerra aff.)

The plaintiff contends that the IRS erroneously assessed the employer-only portion of FICA taxes against the plaintiff, and that the IRS should be ordered to refund $21,108 to the plaintiff for the years 1990 and 1991. The plaintiff filed the present action on May 1, 1998, seeking the refund of taxes paid and the abatement of taxes assessed.

*1325 II. ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

A motion for summary judgment should be granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. As the Supreme Court of the United States has instructed, “the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 273 (1986); Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1510 (11th Cir.1987).

However, summary judgment is improper “[i]f a reasonable fact finder could draw more than one inference from the facts, and that inference creates a genuine issue of material fact.” Cornelius v. Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 351 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066, 110 S.Ct. 1784, 108 L.Ed.2d 785 (1990). An issue of fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 211 (1986). It is “genuine” if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. Id.; see also Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 552 (1986).

On summary judgment motion, the record and all inferences that can be drawn from it must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Souran v. Travelers Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 1497, 1502 (11th Cir.1993). Nevertheless, the non-moving party must provide more than a mere “scintilla” of evidence supporting his position, for if the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, supra, 477 U.S. at 249-50,106 S.Ct. at 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d at 212; Johnson v. Fleet Finance, Inc., 4 F.3d 946, 949 (11th Cir.1993). Furthermore, although the non-moving party must designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,” the court must consider the entire record in the case, not just those pieces of evidence which have been singled out for attention by the parties. See Hargett v. Valley Fed. Sav. Bank, 60 F.3d 754, 763 n. 9 (11th Cir.1995) (quoting Celótex Corp., supra, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d at 274, (1986)); Clinkscales v. Chevron USA Inc., 831 F.2d 1565, 1570 (11th Cir.1987). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d at 552.

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80 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 84 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5007, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11350, 1999 WL 535282, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/quietwater-entertainment-inc-v-united-states-flnd-1999.