Quaysa Flumo v. Ricolcol

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedJuly 24, 2025
Docket5:25-cv-01729
StatusUnknown

This text of Quaysa Flumo v. Ricolcol (Quaysa Flumo v. Ricolcol) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Quaysa Flumo v. Ricolcol, (C.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 EASTERN DIVISION 11 12 QUAYSA FLUMO, No. 5:25-cv-01729-RGK-BFM 13 Petitioner, v. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 14 E. RICOLCOL, Warden, 15 Respondent. 16 17 18 SUMMARY 19 This order concerns a habeas petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 20 Petitioner Quaysa Flumo is currently serving a sentence in federal custody. He 21 alleges that in May 2025, his unit was locked down, not because of something 22 he did, but because of the actions of other prisoners in his unit. As a result of 23 the lockdown, Petitioner lost certain privileges, including access to his personal 24 property, phone calls, and recreation, for three weeks. 25 For what he is trying to accomplish, it appears that Petitioner has filed 26 the wrong kind of suit: a § 2241 habeas petition challenges the legality of 27 confinement and requests earlier release from service of a sentence; it is not the 28 proper way to hold a federal officer liable for constitutional violations relating 1 to conditions of confinement. Nor, given the differences between the two suits, 2 does it appear that the case is an appropriate one for conversion. The Court 3 orders Petitioner to show cause—to explain in writing—why his Petition should 4 not be dismissed without prejudice to Petitioner raising his claims in a different 5 kind of suit. 6 7 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 8 On July 9, 2025, Petitioner Quayso Flumo filed a Petition for Writ of 9 Habeas Corpus by a person in federal custody, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 10 (ECF 1.) Petitioner alleges that on May 8, 2025, his unit was locked down 11 because of the actions of other individuals. For three works, he and his entire 12 unit lost access to their property, and were deprived recreation time, access to 13 email and the phone, and commissary. (ECF 1 at 3.) In an administrative 14 complaint attached to his Petition, Petitioner explains that he has been 15 repeatedly subjected to similar lockdowns because of the actions of others in his 16 unit, each time losing access to privileges such as recreation, showers, law 17 library, and phone calls. (ECF 1 at 8.) 18 19 ANALYSIS 20 The court is required to screen all habeas petitions upon filing, and to 21 summarily dismiss “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached 22 exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, 23 Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitions brought pursuant to Section 24 2241 are subject to the same screening requirements. See Rule 1(b) (a district 25 court may “apply any or all of these rules” to any habeas petition); see also Bostic 26 v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming district court's 27 dismissal of a Section 2241 petition under Habeas Rules 1(b) and 4). 28 1 Petitioner claims that he has been subjected to harsh conditions of 2 confinement based on the actions of other individuals in his unit. It appears that 3 Petitioner may have filed the wrong kind of suit to raise that claim. Before the 4 Court recommends that his Petition be dismissed, however, the Court will give 5 Petitioner a chance to explain why it should not be dismissed. 6 A habeas petition under § 2241 is appropriate where a person alleges that 7 he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 8 States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1), (3). A habeas petition is not the right method to 9 challenge conditions of confinement that do not relate to the legality or duration 10 of confinement. Pinson v. Carvajal, 69 F.4th 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2023). Put 11 more concretely, habeas jurisdiction is appropriate for claims that, if successful, 12 would “necessarily spell speedier release” from prison. Id. at 1072 (citation 13 omitted). 14 Here, Petitioner claims that he has been subjected to harsh conditions of 15 confinement. Such a claim is not generally appropriate for a habeas petition 16 because it does not go to whether Petitioner can legally be required to finish 17 serving his sentence. Instead, a claim that conditions of confinement violate a 18 federal prisoner’s constitutional rights is generally brought by way of a lawsuit 19 pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), 20 or through some other form of civil action. Such claims usually seek monetary 21 relief, not a shorter sentence. 22 Assuming the Court is right that this claim should have been brought as 23 a civil suit, the Court has the discretion to construe Petitioner’s flawed § 2241 24 filing as a civil suit alleging violations of constitutional rights—essentially, to 25 treat this filing as if it had raised a civil rights claim. See Wilwording v. 26 Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971). The Court is not inclined to do so here, 27 however, for several reasons. First, civil suits are subject to a more substantial 28 filing fee: $350, and not the $5 filing fee that applies to habeas petitioners. Even 1 if Petitioner is granted in forma pauperis status, he will still be required to pay 2 the full amount of the filing fee over time, at least as long as he in custody. 28 3 U.S.C. § 1915(b). And he would have to execute an authorization to have the 4 $350 filing fee deducted from his trust account over time. Given the significant 5 financial consequences of converting a habeas petition to a civil rights action, 6 the Court is hesitant to do so—at least without the Petitioner’s consent. 7 Second, if the Petition were converted, the Court would be obligated to 8 screen the converted Petition pursuant to the screening provisions of the 9 Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 10 1997e(c)(1). If the converted Petition were dismissed for failure to state a claim 11 upon which relief may be granted, that dismissal could count as a “strike” 12 against Petitioner for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Whether or not Petitioner 13 wishes to risk that possibility, as well as incur the full filing fee, are decisions 14 he should make, not decisions this Court can make for him. In doing so, 15 Petitioner would have to consider the strict limitations put on the kinds of 16 claims that can be subject to a Bivens action. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 17 135 (2017). 18 Finally, Petitioner has not alleged what remedy he is seeking in 19 connection with his allegations or alleged who the defendant in such a suit 20 would be. All these problems suggest that the claim is not “amenable to 21 conversion on its face, meaning that it names the correct defendants and seeks 22 the correct relief.” See Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 936 (9th Cir. 2016).

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Quaysa Flumo v. Ricolcol, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/quaysa-flumo-v-ricolcol-cacd-2025.