ON REHEARING EN BANC
PER CURIAM: **
In 1991, the Council of the District of Columbia, confronted with a serious revenue shortfall, enacted legislation, subsequently signed by the Mayor, which reduced the benefit entitlements of AFDC recipients1 to October 1, 1989 levels and eliminated the annual COLA2 which recipients had previously received. See Budget Conformity Amendment Act of 1991, D.C. Law 9-27 (August 17, 1991). Appellants, AFDC recipients who were adversely affected by these benefit reductions, brought a class action in the Superior Court against the Mayor and other District officials (collectively the District), seeking injunctive and other relief. Appellants contended that the Council had unlawfully reduced their benefits, in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2017(b) (1988), by improperly taking into consideration AFDC recipients’ entitlement to receive food stamps. They also claimed that the Council had failed to reassess the current minimum needs of AFDC recipients, in violation of D.C.Code § 3-205.44.3 Finally, appellants asserted that the individual notices advising AFDC recipients of the reductions were not in compliance with statutory and constitutional requirements.
Parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and, on April 13, 1993, the trial judge issued a comprehensive opinion in which he granted the District’s motion. Quattlebaum v. Dixon, 120 Daily Wash. L.Rptr. 1925 (Super.Ct.D.C.1992) (Quattlebaum I). The AFDC recipients appealed and, on October 20, 1994, in Quattlebaum II, supra note 1, a division of this court reversed the judgment, holding that the Council had improperly considered the AFDC recipients’ entitlement to food stamps and that the notices to the recipients were insufficient.4 On [883] March 27, 1995, this court, sitting en banc, vacated the division opinion and granted the District’s petition for rehearing en banc. We now affirm the trial court’s principal rulings and sustain the validity of the benefit reductions.5
I.
THE FOOD STAMP ACT CLAIM
A The Facts.
The facts of record are largely undisputed. They are described in detail both in the trial judge’s memorandum opinion, Quattlebaum I, 120 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. at 1928-31, and in the opinion of the division. Quattlebaum II, 648 A.2d at 952-54. We recite only those facts, and address only those issues, which we view as necessary to decide this appeal.
In March 1991, during a fiscal crisis which has not abated in the interim, former Mayor Sharon Pratt Kelly presented to the Council her budget proposal for Fiscal Years 1991 and 1992. She recommended that the Council suspend the previously automatic annual COLA for AFDC recipients, and that individual entitlements be rolled back by 4.5% to 1989 levels.
On April 25,1991, the Council’s Committee on Human Services issued a Report6 recommending that the Mayor’s budget proposals be adopted. The Committee reported that “funding simply does not exist to fund adequately each and every program which the District has provided for in the past.” 7
Under federal law, the value of food stamp allotments which state agencies are authorized to issue increases as an eligible recipient’s income decreases. See 7 U.S.C. § 2017(a) (1991). Recognizing that the law operates in this manner, the Committee noted that the loss of AFDC benefits would be partially offset by an increase in the food stamp allotment for which some affected recipients would be eligible. Report, at 6. The Report contained the following table:
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Id. The Report further described a meeting of the Committee at which
Councilmember [Wilhelmina] Rolark noted that these types of reductions were devastating, because they “hit the most vulnerable of our population, the poor.” She further noted that she understood that we are [884] in a budget crisis, and inquired as to whether this bill was one of those budget conformity pieces of legislation. Chairman [H.R.] Crawford responded in the affirmative. Mr. Crawford further indicated that this bill was requested by the Executive and that some of the difference in the public assistance reductions would be offset in the allocation of [flood [s]tamps.... Mr. Crawford further reminded the Committee that he had to work within the funds that “were allocated to the human services budget, that we did not allow the workers of the District of Columbia a COLA, or pay an increase in the last 2 years.” He noted that everyone must participate in the terrible budgetary crisis we are facing in the District. Couneilmember Rolark indicated that she understood and commended the chairman for having worked hard to off-set the reductions.
Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
B. The Trial Judge’s Decision.
The provision of the Food Stamp Act on which appellants rely states that
[t]he value of the allotment provided any eligible household shall not be considered income or resources for any purpose under any Federal, State, or local laws, including ... welfare, and public assistance programs, and no participating State or political subdivision thereof shall decrease any assistance otherwise provided an individual or individuals because of the receipt of an allotment under this chapter.
7 U.S.C. § 2017(b) (1988) (emphasis added). Appellants claimed at trial, and now contend in this court, that the references to food stamp eligibility in the Committee’s Report demonstrated that AFDC benefits were rolled back “because of’ recipients’ eligibility for food stamps, in violation of § 2017(b).
The trial judge rejected this contention. He wrote that a state may undoubtedly reduce AFDC benefit levels because of financial exigencies, and that the Food Stamp Act “does not prohibit the defendants from lowering their guaranteed income level in order to protect their solvency.” Quattlebaum I, 120 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. at 1929 (quoting Foster v. Center Township, 527 F.Supp. 377, 379 (N.D.Ind.), aff'd. mem. 673 F.2d 1334 (7th Cir.1981)). He perceived it to be “clear from the record ... that the principal factor precipitating defendants’ reduction of AFDC benefits and suspension of the [COLA’s] was the District’s fiscal crisis.” Id. The judge noted that the Council attempted to alleviate this crisis by making “across the board” budget cuts and adjustments, and that the Act was originally passed as emergency legislation “in order to alleviate budget problems as quickly as possible.” Id.
Turning to the legislative history on which the AFDC recipients largely based their case, the judge wrote as follows:
Plaintiffs insist that Chairman Crawford’s remarks concerning food stamps at the Council meeting on April 25, 1991, combined with the table in the Committee report, demonstrate the requisite causation. This hardly suffices to support plaintiffs’ conclusion. These references merely called attention to the fact that increased food stamp allotments would offset approximately one-third of the AFDC decrease. In times of budgetary constraints an elected legislative body can scarcely be expected to forego pointing out that disagreeable medicine is not quite so bad as may first appear. Plaintiffs’ broad interpretation of the statutory expression “because of’ would put a virtual gag on legislators faced with the unpopular task of reducing AFDC benefit levels. The legislative history demonstrates unequivocally that the “cause” of the reductions was the District’s severe fiscal crisis, not the consideration of food stamp allotments. Consequently, the Court concludes that the reduction did not violate the second prohibition of 7 U.S.C. § 2017(b).
Id.
C. Legal Discussion.
It appears to be undisputed that the question whether the District was entitled to summary judgment is one of law. Accordingly, we must review the trial judge’s decision de novo. See, e.g., Colbert v. Georgetown University, 641 A.2d 469, 472 (D.C. 1994) (en bane).
[885] In conducting our review, we view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. In the present case, however, all parties sought disposition of the case by summary judgment, and no claim was made by anyone, either in the Superior Court or on appeal, that there are genuine issues of material fact requiring development at trial. Moreover, the resolution of the Food Stamp Act issue turns upon the intent of the Council in enacting the challenged legislation. No party has suggested that a trial could shed further light upon that intent, and we agree with the parties that the issue before us is one of law.
It is important to recognize, at the outset, the nature of the claim which the AFDC recipients are asserting under the Food Stamp Act, and the kind of relief which they are seeking. Appellants have asked the court to order the elected branches of the government to spend more money on the AFDC program because, they claim, the Council made the decision to reduce benefits for a legally impermissible reason. Moreover, appellants predicate their request for a judicial finding that the Council acted with an improper legislative purpose or motive solely on the fact that the Committee, and Councilman Crawford individually, provided to the Council factual information relating to the operation of the Food Stamp Act.
Especially in times of budgetary crisis, there are many competing claims on the District’s limited financial resources. The Council cannot accommodate them all. Hard and painful choices must be made. The constitutional responsibility to make such choices falls upon our elected officials. They, and not the courts, are obliged “to reconcile the demands of ... needy citizens with the finite resources available to meet those demands.” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 472, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1155, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). We are not authorized “to second-guess [District] officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients.” Id. at 487, 90 S.Ct. at 1163. We should accede to a request for judicial intrusion upon what we regard as a core legislative function only if it is plain that the Council’s action contravenes the federal legislation upon which appellants rely.
It is also surely essential to the proper functioning of democratic institutions that elected representatives be accorded the fullest possible opportunity to engage in free, open, and robust debate. Indeed, the Speech and Debate Clause, and by analogy the common law rule which that Clause expounds, were designed to protect the right of legislators to speak freely on the issues that come before them. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2622, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). The Food Stamp Act should not be interpreted to preclude all mention of food stamp entitlements during the course of a legislative session, for such a construction would chill the exercise by Councilmembers of their right to free expression, and would raise obvious constitutional problems which should be avoided if reasonably possible. See, e.g., Malone v. Robinson, 614 A.2d 33, 38 n. 8 (D.C.1993) (per curiam), and authorities there cited.
With these general principles in mind, we turn to the specific issue before us. The trial judge correctly noted that the statute on which appellants rely requires them to show—and they must show clearly, in our view—that the AFDC recipients’ benefits were reduced “because of the receipt of a [food stamp] allotment.” 7 U.S.C. § 2017(b) (emphasis added). But according to the Report of the Committee on Human Services, these reductions were designed to avoid a looming budget deficit. Absent compelling evidence to the contrary, we must take the Council at its word as to why the legislation was enacted. See 2A Norman J. SingeR, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 45.1, at 49 (1992).
Significantly, the reduction of AFDC benefits was not measured by the food stamp benefits which would become available, but rather by the rollback of a COLA which AFDC recipients had previously received. Unless we treat the Committee’s explication of the reasons for the legislation as a subterfuge or charade—and we discern nothing in the record which would permit us to do so— we are bound to agree with the trial judge’s [886] assessment of the record with respect to the Council’s principal purpose. The AFDC cuts were accompanied by a variety of other cost-reduction measures which had no connection whatever with food stamps, including a proscription against salary increases and cost-of-living adjustments for District employees. The Council also enacted substantial spending reductions in various other District-funded programs. See note 7, supra.
We do not believe that the accurate references in the Committee’s Report to the operation of the Food Stamp Act validate appellants’ position. The Council would have been compelled to deal with severe budget restraints brought on by the recession even if there had been no partially offsetting increase in food stamp allotments. Neither the Committee nor Councilman Crawford suggested that benefits should be reduced because food stamps would be available. Indeed, dining the very exchange between Chairman Crawford and Councilmember Ro-lark on which appellants rely, Mr. Crawford emphasized that the Council was being forced to make unpalatable cuts because of “the terrible budgetary crisis we are facing in the District,” and Mrs. Rolark said she understood.8 The facts about food stamps were mentioned to the Council in order to reflect accurately the consequences of the proposed legislation, and perhaps to show that there would be at least a modest partial palliative to the bitter pill which the Council-members’ less affluent constituents would be forced to swallow.
“A spoonful of sugar,” in the words of Mary Poppins, “helps the medicine go down.” The trial judge explicitly recognized as much. Quattlebaum I, 120 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. at 1929. To expect politicians to announce grim realities about the dark clouds in the financial sky, but to seal their lips as to the very modest silver lining, would be both unrealistic and unreasonable. A ruling that the mere mention of the existence of the sweetener establishes unlawful intent and dooms the legislation would have the inevitable tendency to coerce members of the Council into silence on matters relevant to the issues of the day. Legislators who wish to do their duty, and to avoid spending money which the District does not have, would be compelled either to bite their tongues and say nothing or to speak the truth and invite judicial invalidation of their efforts.
The Council has the right, notwithstanding the Food Stamp Act, to reduce AFDC benefits in order to protect the District’s solvency. Foster, supra, 527 F.Supp. at 379. If the Council had decided, without regard to any financial crisis, simply to use food stamps as a substitute for funds previously provided through AFDC, this would be a different ease. This is what occurred in some other jurisdictions in which the reductions were properly invalidated. See pages 13-14, infra. Here, however, the budget crisis — a “terrible” one according to Chairman Crawford — required wide-ranging spending reductions which applied not only to AFDC recipients but to other citizens as well. Persons eligible for food stamps were not singled out. We do not believe that Congress intended, through the “because of’ language in the Food Stamp Act, either to proscribe necessary budgetary measures or to prohibit accurate references to the operation of the Act. Further, Congress could hardly have intended a reading of the statute which would predictably stifle debate and inhibit members of the legislature from referring to financial realities, even if the discussion in question was about food stamps.
Appellants contend that the trial judge construed the words “because of’ too narrowly. They rely on cases such as Montana v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 869 F.2d 100 (2d Cir.1989), in which the court held that under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which proscribes discrimination “because of’ age, the plaintiff need not prove that age was the “sole” reason for the defendant’s unfavorable employment action. Id. at 105. This court has [887] likewise recognized, in the context of statutory and constitutional provisions designed to assure equal opportunity, that there is “no acceptable place in the law for partial racial discrimination.” Tursio v. United States, 634 A.2d 1205, 1213 n. 7 (D.C.1993) (quoting Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 350 (7th Cir.1970)). But such provisions are remedial and must be generously construed. Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392, 398 (D.C.1991); see also Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212, 93 S.Ct. 364, 368, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972). Cases like Montana and Tursio are faithful to that enlightened canon, but have no application to the present context. Here, the broad construction of “because of’ for which appellants contend would effect a most unusual intrusion by the courts into a traditional legislative domain. It would also potentially chill the exercise by Councilmembers of their right and obligation to speak their minds freely when proposed legislation is submitted to them for debate. These considerations were not present in the decisions cited to us by appellants.
Appellants also rely on cases such as Dupler v. City of Portland, 421 F.Supp. 1314 (D.Me.1976), in which the court said:
The legislative history of the [Food Stamp] Act makes [it] clear that the intent of Congress was not to provide a substitute for other forms of aid to low-income persons but to supplement that aid in order to improve their level of nutrition.... It is evident that if welfare assistance is reduced to take into account the value of food stamps received under the Act, the ultimate effect of the Act will be not to raise but merely to maintain pre-existing levels of nutrition and the purpose of the Act will be frustrated.
Id. at 1319 (emphasis added). Seizing on the italicized language, which has also been used in several other decisions,9 appellants assert that the Council took the availability of increased food stamp allotments “into account,” and thus violated the Food Stamp Act.
In Dupler, however, the city of Portland effectively reduced general assistance benefits by the exact amount of the newly available food stamp allotment. Instead of receiving the $18 which she was previously paid for food expenses under Portland’s general assistance program, Ms. Dupler was now to be provided only with one dollar, for with that single dollar she could apparently obtain $18 in federal food stamps. Dupler, 421 F.Supp. at 1318. Portland never claimed, as does the District, that the benefits were reduced for any reason other than the availability of food stamps. On the contrary, the city’s welfare officials had determined that, in order to avoid duplicative payments, receipt of federal food stamps should be taken into account in calculating the weekly food expenses for recipients of general assistance. Id. at 1318-19. In contrast, the District simply reduced the benefits and suspended the cost-of-living adjustments to address a fiscal crisis. Although the Council made reference to the impact of legislation on food stamp payments, it did not use the availability of food stamps to calculate the reduction in AFDC benefits.
In these circumstances, the use of the phrase “take into account” in the Dupler opinion cannot be carried over to the entirely different situation in the present case without removing the language from its moorings. See Khiem v. United States, 612 A.2d 160, 164 (D.C.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 924, 113 S.Ct. 1293, 122 L.Ed.2d 684 (1993) (broad and general statements of law in judicial opinions must be read in the context of the facts before the court, and cannot be uncritically transposed to different factual circumstances).10
In Smith v. Dep’t. of Public Aid, 67 Ill.2d 529, 10 Ill.Dec. 520, 367 N.E.2d 1286 (1977), [888] the Supreme Court of Illinois found that there was no violation of the Food Stamp Act where the State, “unlike [in] the Dupler case, ma[de] no distinction in its granting of welfare between food stamp recipients and those who do not receive food stamps.” Id. at 525, 367 N.E.2d at 1291. In the present case, as in Smith, the reduction in AFDC benefits was “across the board,” and applied to those who did not receive food stamps as well as to those who did. We conclude that the Food Stamp Act was not violated.11
II.
THE PROCEDURAL CLAIM
Appellants also contend, and our dissenting colleague agrees, that the Council rolled back AFDC benefits to 1989 levels without determining the current minimum needs of recipients, in violation of D.C.Code § 3-205.44.12 We reject the premise of this argument — that the Council altered benefits unaware of the current level of needs for assistance — and therefore find no statutory or other violation.
At the heart of this dispute is section 544 of the District of Columbia Public Assistance Act of 1982 (now codified as D.C.Code § 3-205.44), which became effective on April 6 of that year. It provides:
(a) The amount of public assistance which any person shall receive shall be determined by the Council.
(b) Such amount as referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall not be less than the full amount determined as necessary on the basis of the minimum needs of such person as established by the Council.
The parties are in agreement that, despite the “not ... less than the full amount” language of subsection (b), Congress has relieved the District annually of the duty to set actual payment levels at one hundred percent of the established minimum needs. See, e.g., District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 1970, § 17, Pub.L. No. 91-155, 83 Stat. 433; District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 1990, § 107, Pub.L. No. 101-168, 103 Stat. 1267, 1275, 1276.13 For example, in 1986 the standard of assistance for a family of three persons was $712 per month, but the actual payment level was $364, or a little over fifty percent.
In keeping with subsection (b), in 1982 the Council of the District of Columbia established new standards of minimum need (termed “standards of assistance”). In 1986, the Council redetermined these needs of as[889] sistance, see D.C.Code § 3-205.52(c) (1981 ed; 1988 repl.). At the same time, it required for the first time that “[o]n or before January 31st of each year, beginning with January 31, 1987, the Mayor shall calculate and submit to the Council a determination of the percentage increase, during the preceding calendar year, in the consumer price index for urban consumers for all items, as published by the United States Department of Labor (‘Consumer Price Index’) [CPI].” Thereafter, “[t]he level of public assistance payments for assistance units set forth in subsection (c) of this section shall be increased annually as of October 1st of each year, beginning with October 1, 1987, by an amount equal to the percentage increase, if any, in the consumer price increase [sic; index?] as determined by the Mayor.” Id, § 3-205.52(d).14
Appellants do not, nor could they at this late date, challenge the Council’s rede-termination of the standards of need or assistance in 1986. Since 1987, therefore, continuing until the 1991 enactment in controversy here, the standards of assistance have effectively — though indirectly — been updated annually through an increase in payment levels by reference to cost of living increases shown in the CPI. We say “indirectly” because, while the standards of assistance themselves have not changed, each year the percentage level at which the District pays benefits has increased automatically to reflect increases (if any) in the cost of living. The ratio has thus been maintained between the needs of recipients in real dollars and the District’s willingness to fund those needs. It follows that at the time the Council acted in 1991 to roll back payment levels to the 1989 mark, it was aware of current minimum needs for assistance as reflected in the 1986 standards supplemented each year thereafter by annual cost of living increases in the level of payments. In other words, because the 1986 enactment built into the District’s scheme an automatic incorporation of cost of living increases annually, the Council was presumptively aware of current needs when it determined nonetheless to reduce benefits to 1989 levels.
Accordingly, appellants’ contention cannot be that the Council was unaware of current minimum needs in 1991, but that the information which informed it of those needs — the cumulative tally of annual cost of living increases reflected in the payment levels — was too imprecise or unreliable. But D.C.Code § 3-205.44(b) does not specify the means by which the Council must apprise itself of current needs; on the contrary, it refers solely to the minimum needs of aid recipients “as established by the Council.” Manifestly, the Council was not required to consult particular studies or obtain its own experts to assess cost of living increases in the District between 1986 and the present; the CPI provides an objective gauge of any such increase in minimum wants, one widely accepted as reliable.
Our dissenting colleague charges us with reading into the Council’s 1991 action a disfavored “implied repeal.” He does not say that (under our analysis) the Council repealed D.C.Code § 3-205.44(b) itself; he could not say so because, as explained above, that section does not dictate the method by which the Council must inform itself of current minimum needs. Instead, the dissent says we are relying on an implied repeal of § 3-205.44(b) “as previously implemented ad hoc through § 3-205.52(c),” a repeal of the Council’s prior “interpretation ... given to §§ 3-205.44 and 3-205.52(c).” Post at 46, 47 (emphasis added). This is, to say the least, an unorthodox notion of implied repeal. Moreover, the “implementation]” the dissent speaks of — the Council’s revision of the actual standards of assistance in 1986 and earlier — was done without benefit of the automatic cost of living adjustment the Council established in 1986 to account for increases in recipient needs in 1987 and each year thereafter. Thus the Council did not “repeal” anything when, in revising the level of payments downward in 1991, it did so aware [890] of current minimum needs as reflected in the cumulative cost of living increases since 1986.
Finally, the Council’s action was consistent with Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970). In Rosa-do, the Supreme Court considered an amendment to the Social Security Act of 1935 which required states, by July 1, 1969, to adjust “the amounts used by the State to determine the needs of individuals [eligible for AFDC] ... to reflect fully changes in living costs since such amounts were established,” and to “proportionately adjust[]” any “máximums that the State imposes on the amount of aid paid to families_” While the Court recognized that this provision did not require the states to pay benefits equal to the minimum needs thereby established, it discerned in the language an important purpose “to require States to face up realistically to the magnitude of the public assistance requirement and lay bare the extent to which their programs fall short of fulfilling actual need....” Id. at 412-13, 90 S.Ct. at 1218. D.C.Code § 3-205.44(b) similarly requires the District’s elected officials to keep abreast of “changes in living costs” so that, while they need not fund minimum needs completely, they do not “obscure the actual standard of need” and are mindful of “the political consequence of [any] cutback” such as that imposed by the 1991 enactment. Id. at 413, 90 S.Ct. at 1218. The CPI adjustments in payment levels made since 1987 insure that, when the Council rolled back payments in 1991, it was aware of the current, actual needs of recipients. As indicated, while the standards of assistance themselves had not changed since 1986, the annual changes in the ratio of payment levels to the standards corresponded directly to increases in the cost of living. Therefore, nothing masked from the Council the current needs of recipients when it concluded, nonetheless, that these could not be funded beyond 1989 payment levels for at least the next two fiscal years. We accordingly reject appellants’ argument that the 1991 roll-back transgressed a duty of the Council to inform itself of current minimum needs before modifying payment levels.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed in part. The opinion of the division is reinstated as to the notice issue only, see note 5, supra, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings as to that issue, as specified by the division. See Quattlebaum II, 648 A.2d at 958 n. 19.
So ordered.