Quant-Zepeda v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 27, 2026
• Docket: 25-691
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIO JOSE QUANT-ZEPEDA; No. 25-691 JENNIFER IVETH JIMENEZ-VALDIVIA; JAKE STANLEY QUANT-JIMENEZ, Agency Nos. A240-182-106 Petitioners, A240-182-107 A240-182-108 v.

TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney MEMORANDUM* General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 22, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: LEE, BUMATAY, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Mario Jose Quant-Zepeda, his wife, and their minor son—all natives and

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). citizens of Nicaragua—seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (BIA’s)

decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) denial of their applications for

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

Torture (CAT). 1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), and we deny

the petition.

We review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence. Ruiz-

Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022). These findings are

“conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to

the contrary.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). We review de novo

questions of law. Id.

1. Asylum claim: “To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner has the burden to

demonstrate a likelihood of ‘persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion.’” Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Petitioners failed

to establish past persecution. Before the IJ, Quant-Zepeda testified that he had been

1 Quant-Zepeda listed as derivatives on his asylum application both Jimenez- Valdivia and their minor son. Jimenez-Valdivia and her son each also filed separate applications for withholding of removal and CAT protection. Because the three applications contain the same operative facts, we refer to them collectively.

2 25-691 employed as a public schoolteacher in Nicaragua when the government placed

conditions with which he did not agree on his employment. These included acts of

loyalty to the Ortega administration, such as salary contributions and monitoring

students and their families for behavior deemed “anti-government.” Quant-Zepeda

also testified that he was able to resign without incident and soon found work in the

private sector.

The agency reasonably concluded that the mistreatment Quant-Zepeda

suffered in the workplace did not rise to the severity of persecution. See Duran-

Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (persecution is an “extreme

concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as

offensive”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1062 (economic

harm amounts to persecution in only those cases where harm threatens life or

freedom). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that

Petitioners failed to show past persecution.

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s conclusion that Petitioners

failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. A petitioner must offer

credible, direct, and specific evidence that he faces an individualized threat of

persecution, or that there is a “pattern or practice” of persecution of similarly situated

individuals. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); Sarkar v. Garland, 39 F.4th 611, 622-

23 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Petitioners testified that after they moved to

3 25-691 the United States, government officials contacted Jimenez-Valdivia’s mother to ask

about Petitioners’ whereabouts. But the IJ found this testimony unreliable because

Jimenez-Valdivia’s mother did not testify or submit a statement to the court, and

Petitioners did not challenge this finding on appeal to the BIA. Petitioner also

highlights government authorities’ arrest and abuse of his childhood friend as an

example of the harms suffered by vocal opponents of the government. But

substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Petitioner is not similarly

situated to his friend because, unlike his friend, Petitioner did not join opposition

groups, attend protests, or otherwise publicly oppose the government. Additionally,

Petitioners testified that they lived safely in Nicaragua for three years following

Quant-Zepeda’s resignation from his teaching position and that his wife’s mother

continues to live there safely despite her public opposition to the government. See

Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1066 (family members’ ongoing safety in home country

undermined well-founded fear of persecution).

2. Withholding of removal claim: Eligibility for withholding of removal

requires a petitioner to demonstrate a “clear probability” of persecution, meaning it

is “more likely than not that he or she would” experience persecution in the absence

of relief. Silva v. Garland, 993 F.3d 705, 719 (9th Cir. 2021), abrogated on other

grounds by Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), as recognized

in Lopez v. Garland, 116 F.4th 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 2024). “The ‘more likely than

4 25-691 not’ standard for withholding of removal is more stringent than the ‘reasonable

possibility’ standard for asylum, and therefore an applicant who is unable to show a

‘reasonable possibility’ of future persecution necessarily fails to satisfy the more

stringent standard for withholding of removal.” Id. (citation modified). Because

Petitioners’ asylum claim fails, their withholding of removal claim necessarily fails,

too.

3. CAT claim: “The same ‘more likely than not’ standard applies to CAT

protection as it does to withholding of removal; however, for CAT protection, the

harm feared must meet the definition of torture.” Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083,

1095 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 649 (9th Cir. 2021).

And the “concept [of torture] is more severe than persecution.” Guo v. Sessions, 897

F.3d 1208, 1217 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the

record evidence does not compel a finding that Petitioners face a clear probability of

persecution, that same evidence does not compel a finding that they are more likely

than not to experience torture if removed.

PETITION DENIED.2

2 The Motion to Stay Removal (Dkt. No. 2) is denied.

5 25-691