Quang Vinh Duong v. Marcos Charles, Warden, California City Correctional Facility, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: November 14, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-01375
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8

9 QUANG VINH DUONG, Case No. 1:25-cv-01375-SKO

10 Petitioner, O W R R D IT E R O F G R H A A N B T E I A N S G C P O E R T P I U T S IO U N N F D O E R R 28 11 U.S.C. § 2241 v. 12 (Docs. 1, 2)

13 MARCOS CHARLES, Warden, California City Correctional Facility, et al., 14 Respondents. 15 _____________________________________/

16 17 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Quang Vinh Duong’s Amended Petition for Writ of 18 Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). The undersigned has reviewed the petition and 19 supporting documentation and determines that the matter is suitable for decision without oral 20 argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g).1 For the reasons detailed below, the Court GRANTS 21 the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, DENIES AS MOOT the Motion for Temporary 22 Restraining Order, and ORDERS Petitioner’s immediate release from custody. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner is a citizen of Vietnam who came with his family to the United States as a 25 refugee or humanitarian parolee in 1992. (Doc. 1 at 4). He then became a lawful permanent 26 resident (a “green card” holder). (Id. at 5). In 1997, he pleaded nolo contendere to one count of 27 1 Both parties consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. (See Docs. 5, 10). Accordingly, this case was reassigned 28 to the undersigned for all future proceedings, including final adjudication of Petitioner’s petition, as of October 20, 1 assault with a deadly weapon under California Penal Code § 245. (Doc. 1-4 (“Duong Decl.”) at 2 2). While Duong was originally charged as an adult, his case was later transferred to juvenile 3 court where he was sentenced to a term of detention by the California Youth Authority. (Id.). 4 Duong represents that he was not advised of any collateral immigration consequences of his plea 5 prior to pleading nolo contendere. (Id.). 6 In 2002, after being released from the California Youth Authority at age 21, he was ordered 7 removed by an immigration judge, spending several months in detention while Immigration and 8 Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) attempted to remove him. (Id. at 6–7). When Vietnam failed to 9 issue him a travel document, he was released on supervision in 2002. (Id. at 7). He complied 10 with all check-in appointments and appeared yearly in person to renew his Employment 11 Authorization Document. (Id. at 7). In late 2009, Duong was arrested and later pleaded no contest 12 to two charges in a California state court: (1) cultivation of marijuana and (2) theft of utility 13 services (for bypassing an electrical meter). (Id. at 8). Duong represents that these charges 14 stemmed from a “failed small-scale marijuana grow venture during a period of economic 15 hardship.” (Id.). Duong represents that he was again not advised of any collateral immigration 16 consequences that may be implicated by his plea. (Id. at 9). Upon release from state custody, he 17 was not detained by ICE as Vietnam continued to maintain its policy of not accepting those who 18 had emigrated prior to 1995. (See Doc. 1 at 9). 19 Duong remained under an order of supervision and did not commit any crimes for the next 20 16 years. (Id.). Still, on July 1, 2025, ICE arrested him at his residence while he was watering 21 his garden. (Id. at 11). At the time of his detention, the Government represents that Duong was 22 provided with a Notice of Revocation of Release (the “Notice”), which stated the following:

23 This letter is to inform you that your case has been reviewed, and it has been determined that you will be kept in the custody of [ICE] at this time. This decision 24 has been made based on a review of your file. ICE has determined that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future in your case. . 25 . . Based on the above, and pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, you are to remain in ICE custody at this time. You will promptly be afforded an informal interview at which 26 time you will be given an opportunity to respond to the reasons for the revocation. 27 (Doc. 14-1 at 35). 28 Duong currently remains in ICE custody. 1 On October 15, 2025, Petitioner sought his release though a writ of habeas corpus on five 2 grounds: (1) that his detention is unlawful under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), and 8 3 U.S.C. § 1231; (2) that his detention violates his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment; 4 (3) that removal is improper while he has pending motions to reopen in front of an immigration 5 judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals; (4) that ICE may unlawfully seek to remove him to 6 a third country without notice and an opportunity to be heard; and (5) that ICE may unlawfully 7 seek to remove him to Vietnam without considering his plausible fear of persecution and torture. 8 (Doc. 1, at 14–21). On October 14, 2025, the Government indicated that it had secured travel 9 documents for Petitioner’s removal to Vietnam. (Doc. 14). 10 The Court will start and end its review with Petitioner’s due process claim. 11 II. DISCUSSION 12 A. Jurisdiction 13 Before turning to the merits, the Court must first assure itself of jurisdiction. See Ruhrgas 14 AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577, 583 (1999). Courts have long had jurisdiction to 15 issue writs of habeas corpus to petitioners held in custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws 16 or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C § 2241(c)(3). In doing so, we carry out the “historic 17 purpose of the writ,” namely “to relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial trial.” 18 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. But the Supreme Court has consistently “rejected” any suggestion 19 that section 1252(g) covers all claims arising from deportation proceedings or imposes a general 20 jurisdictional limitation. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 19 21 (2020). Had Petitioner sought to challenge the Government’s decision to execute his removal 22 order, it would indeed bar this Court’s review. But because, Petitioner’s due process claim 23 contests only his detention resulting from violations of the Government’s mandatory duties under 24 certain statutes, regulations, and the Constitution, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction to 25 determine the lawfulness of Petitioner’s detention. See Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 800 26 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have limited [section 1252(g)]’s jurisdiction-stripping power to actions 27 challenging the Attorney General’s discretionary decisions to initiate proceedings, adjudicate 28 cases, and execute removal orders.”). 1 B. Due Process 2 Upon review, the Court finds that the Government has, in three ways, violated its own 3 regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. Section 241.13 provides “special review procedures” governing 4 ICE’s authority to revoke a removable alien’s release in cases where, as here, ICE has (1) 5 previously determined “that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably 6 foreseeable future,” and then (2) subsequently seeks to revoke release based on changed 7 circumstances resulting in a “determin[ation] that there is a significant likelihood that the alien 8 may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” (See Docs. 1 at 7; 14-1 at 35). 9 First, to revoke a removable alien’s release under section 241.13(i)(2), ICE must determine 10 that the alien is significantly likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future “on account 11 of changed circumstances.”2 § 241.13(i)(2). The Government asserts that it has assessed that 12 changed circumstances will result in Petitioner’s removal to Vietnam in the reasonably foreseeable 13 future. (See Doc. 12 at 3). “While that may certainly be the case now, § 241.13(i)(2) requires that 14 this determination is made before the removable alien has had his release revoked.” Tran v. Noem, 15 No. 25-cv-2391-BTM-BLM, 2025 WL 3005347, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025) (emphasis 16 added); see also Sphabmixay v. Noem, No. 25CV2648-LL-VET, 2025 WL 3034071, at *2 (S.D. 17 Cal. Oct. 30, 2025); Phakeokoth, v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-02817-RBM-SBC, 2025 WL 3124341, 18 at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2025); Nguyen, v. Noem, No. 25CV2792-LL-VET, 2025 WL 3101979, at 19 *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025) (“However, courts ‘have found that when ICE fails to follow its own 20 regulations in revoking release, the detention is unlawful, and the petitioner's release must be 21 ordered.. . . . This is so even when [] the Government has obtained a petitioner’s travel document 22 back to his or her country of origin after their re-detainment.” (quoting Truong v. Noem, No. 25- 23 cv-2597-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2988357, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025)). And, here, the record 24 does not show that a changed-circumstances determination was made at or before Petitioner’s re- 25 detention on July 1, 2025. Instead, the record shows that the Government did not even submit a 26

27 2 The Court notes that section 241.13(i)(1) provides another avenue for the Government to revoke release under section 241.13 in instances where an alien “violates the conditions of release.” But nowhere in the record does the 28 Government purport to rely on this authority for the July 1, 2025 revocation of Petitioner’s release, so the Court will 1 request to Vietnam for travel documents until July 30, 2025—almost a month after re-detaining 2 Petitioner. (Doc. 14 at 3). And, to the extent that the Government advances an argument that this 3 kind of determination may be supported by evidence showing a general change in a country’s 4 policy of accepting removable aliens on a case-by-case basis, such arguments have been 5 repeatedly rejected. See, e.g., Phan v. Beccerra, No. 2:25-CV-01757-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 6 1993735, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (“Respondents contention that Petitioner’s removal is 7 reasonably foreseeable because removals to Vietnam are in fact occurring is unpersuasive” where 8 “[p]re-1995 Vietnamese immigrants may be repatriated to Vietnam on ‘a case-by-case basis’” and 9 Vietnam has “discretion whether to issue a travel document to any individual.” (quoting Hoi 10 Thanh Duong v. Tate, No. 24-cv-04119-H, 2025 WL 933947, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2025))). 11 Therefore, the Court concludes based on this record that if ICE assessed a likelihood of 12 Petitioner’s removal before revoking his release, it could not have been “on account of” legally 13 relevant changed circumstances pursuant to section 241.13(i)(2). With “no evidence of an actual 14 determination of changed circumstances that justified the initial revocation of [Petitioner’s] 15 release,” the Court finds the Government has violated section 241.13(i)(2). See, e.g., Sphabmixay, 16 2025 WL 3034071, at *2 (finding the same). 17 Second, even if the Government had made a determination based on legally sufficient 18 “changed circumstances,” the Court finds the Government also violated the section 241.13(i)(3)’s 19 notice requirement. Section 241.13(i)(3) sets forth “revocation procedures” governing revocation 20 carried out pursuant to this section. To revoke a removable alien’s release under section 21 241.13(i)(3), an alien must “be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release” and 22 those reasons must be “stated in the [written] notification.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3); see Tran, 2025 23 WL 3005347, at *3 (holding that this “notice must be in writing and contain all the reasons for the 24 revocation of the alien’s release”). 25 Based on the record before the Court, ICE represents that it provided sufficient written 26 notice to Petitioner on the day of his arrest.3 (See Docs. 14 at 3; 14-1 at 35–36). That Notice 27 states the Government made “a determination that there is a significant likelihood of removal in 28 1 the reasonably foreseeable future” and that Petitioner is to remain in ICE custody “pursuant to 8 2 C.F.R. § 241.4.” (Doc. 14-1 at 35–36). This notice fails to comport with the requirements of 3 section 241.13 in several ways. 4 One, “[s]imply [stating] that circumstances had changed or there was a significant 5 likelihood of removal in the foreseeable future is not enough.” Phakeokoth, 2025 WL 3124341, 6 at *4 (quoting Sarail A. v. Bondi, 25-cv-2144 (ECT/JFD), 2025 WL 2533673, at *10 (D. Minn. 7 2025)). “Petitioner must be told what circumstances had changed or why there was now a 8 significant likelihood of removal in order to meaningfully respond to the reasons and submit 9 evidence in opposition.” Id. (quoting Sarail A., 2025 WL 2533673, at *10). The Notice the 10 Government purports to have provided Petitioner provides neither the what nor the why. (See 11 Doc. 14-1 at 35–36). 12 Two, the Notice cites the wrong authority, an error the Government compounds in its 13 filings in this Court, which further undermines any argument that the Notice was sufficient to 14 allow petitioner to “meaningfully respond at [any] post-detention informal interview” as required 15 by section 241.13(i)(3). Diaz v. Wofford, Case No. 1:25-CV-01079 JLT EPG, 2025 WL 2581575, 16 at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025). 17 To start, the Notice puzzlingly does not cite section 241.13. Instead, it cites to section 18 241.4, which provides for the discretionary authority to revoke release

19 when, in the district director’s opinion, revocation is in the public interest and circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of the case to the Executive Associate Commissioner. 20 Release may be revoked in the exercise of discretion when, in the opinion of the revoking official: (i) The purposes of release have been served; (ii) The alien violates any condition 21 of release; (iii) It is appropriate to enforce a removal order or to commence removal proceedings against an alien; or (iv) The conduct of the alien, or any other circumstance, 22 indicates that release would no longer be appropriate. 23 § 241.4(l). Yet, despite invoking authority to revoke under section 241.1, the Notice does not 24 invoke any of the circumstances authorizing revocation of release that are enumerated in that 25 section. (See Doc. 14-1 at 35–36). Instead, the Notice’s basis for revocation was a “determination 26 that there is significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” (id.)— 27 language clearly mirroring the language of section 241.13, not 241.1. And as the regulations 28 themselves makes clear, Petitioner’s revocation of release is indeed governed by section 241.13, 1 not section 241.1. See § 241.13(b)(1) (“[s]ection 241.4 shall continue to govern the detention of 2 aliens under a final order of removal, including aliens who have requested a review of the 3 likelihood of their removal under this section, unless the Service makes a determination under this 4 section that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”). 5 Simply put, the Notice cited the wrong authority to justify revoking Petitioner’s release.4 6 And the Government’s erroneous invocations of authority continue—this time, even more 7 confoundingly. The Government, in its opposition to the petition, now states that Petitioner was 8 detained “for expedited removal.” (Doc. 12 at 2). But expedited removal is governed by 8 U.S.C. 9 § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) and 8 C.F.R. § 235.3, which are (1) not cited in the Notice and (2) are 10 plainly inapplicable to Petitioner, as Petitioner has been paroled into the United States on several 11 occasions and has been under an order of supervision for the better part of two decades, (see Doc. 12 1 at 5–7, 9); Espinoza v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-CV-01101 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 2581185, at *4 (E.D. 13 Cal. Sept. 5, 2025) (adopting the interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) as set forth in 14 Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, No. 25-CV-872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *22 15 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025), that expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) is not 16 available is a noncitizen was ever paroled into the United States). 17 In sum, ICE’s conclusory, conflicting, and legally inapplicable explanations for revoking 18 Petitioner’s release “did not offer him adequate notice of the basis for the revocation decision such 19 that he could meaningfully respond at [any] post-detention informal interview,” as required under 20 section 241.13. Diaz, 2025 WL 2581575, at *8 (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 21 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (“The purpose of notice under the Due Process Clause is to apprise the 22 affected individual of, and permit adequate preparation for, an impending hearing.”)); see also 23 McSweeney v. Warden of Otay Mesa Det. Facility, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02488-RBM-DEB, 2025 24 WL 2998376, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025) (granting habeas petition because “Petitioner could 25 not have meaningfully responded to the proffered reasons for revocation when he had not yet even 26 been informed of those reasons”). 27 4 Even assuming one could read the Notice as invoking section 241.13 rather than 241.1, the bare-bones explanation 28 included in the Notice does not satisfy the “the due-process notification requirement of § 241.13(i)(3).” See Tran, 1 Finally, even if the Court found the Government had made a legally sufficient 2 determination of “changed circumstances” and that the Notice was sufficient under section 3 241.13(i)(3), the Court finds the Government also violated section 241.13(i)(3)’s opportunity to 4 be heard requirement. In addition to the notice provision, section 241.13(i)(3) requires ICE to 5 “promptly,” after re-detainment, conduct “an initial informal interview” to “afford the alien an 6 opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation.” Petitioner argues that after detention he 7 was not provided “a meaningful opportunity to contest the grounds for his continued detention,” 8 (Doc. 1 at 13), and the Government provides no evidence to the contrary that Petitioner was 9 promptly provided an informal interview as required by section 241.13(i)(3). The Court, 10 therefore, again finds the Government violated Petitioner’s due process rights by not complying 11 with its own rule under section 241.13(i)(3). See Tran, 2025 WL 3005347, at *3 (finding the 12 same); see also Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (“The fundamental requisite of due 13 process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”); Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 172 (2021) 14 (“If men must turn square corners when they deal with the government, it cannot be too much to 15 expect the government to turn square corners when it deals with them.”). 16 The Government does not seem to dispute that it has failed to follow its own rules for re- 17 detainment. In fact, the Government does not engage at all with Petitioner’s argument that his 18 due process rights were violated by the Government failing to abide by section 241.13’s 19 requirements. And instead of clarifying the record as to what authority entitled the Government 20 to revoke Petitioner’s release, the Government’s opposition to the petition obscures far more than 21 it illuminates. 22 Courts “have found that when ICE fails to follow its own regulations in revoking release, 23 the detention is unlawful, and the petitioner’s release must be ordered.” Truong v. Noem, No. 25- 24 cv-2597-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2988357, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025) (collecting cases). This 25 is so even when, as here, the Government has obtained a petitioner’s travel document back to his 26 or her country of origin after their re-detainment. See id. at *1–6 (granting habeas and releasing 27 the petitioner with a deportation order back on supervision when the respondents failed to comply 28 with § 241.13(i) and § 241.4(l) despite later securing travel documents for his country of origin); 1 Tran, 2025 WL 3005347, at *1–4 (same); Sphabmixay, 2025 WL 3034071, at *3; Phakeokoth, 2 2025 WL 3124341, at *5 (“Respondents also fail to specify whether ICE requested travel 3 documents for Petitioner before or after his arrest. Thus, ICE’s revocation of Petitioner's release 4 does not appear to have been ‘on account of’ changed circumstances.”). This Court will follow 5 suit. 6 Because the Government was required to, but failed to comply with, section 241.13(i) 7 when it revoked Petitioner’s supervised release on July 1, 2025, issuing a writ to reinstate that 8 release is warranted. This will be “without prejudice” to the remedies that the Government may 9 otherwise have, namely their readiness to deport Petitioner to Vietnam in the coming weeks. See 10 Tran, 2025 WL 3005347, at *3. Given Petitioner’s “apparently unblemished record” the last 16 11 years and his nearly four and a half months of unlawful detention, “Respondents may exercise 12 their discretion to allow him to say goodbye to his family, settle his affairs, and report for his 13 removal.” See id. 14 III. CONCLUSION 15 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. 16 § 2241 and DENIES AS MOOT the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. The Government 17 SHALL immediately release Petitioner from custody on the July 1, 2025, revocation of release 18 and arrest. Petitioner shall comply with all conditions that were in effect before his July 1, 2025, 19 re-detainment. By November 15, 2025, at 12:00 p.m., the parties must also file a joint status report 20 to confirm that Petitioner has been released, after which the Clerk will close this case. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22

23 Dated: November 14, 2025 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24

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