Pure Distributors v. Baker

2000 DNH 116

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: May 10, 2000
• Docket: CV-99-412-M
• Status: Published

Opinion

Pure Distributors v. Baker CV-99-412-M 05/10/00 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Pure Distributors, Inc, d/b/a/ Environ International and Matthew J. F r eese, Plaintiffs

v. Civil No. 99-412-M Opinion No. 2000 DNH 116 Christopher B a k e r , Defendant

O R D E R

Defendant, Christopher Baker, moves to dismiss plaintiffs'

complaint, asserting that the court lacks personal jurisdiction

over him and saying that plaintiffs' claims are barred by the

statute of limitations. In the alternative, he moves to transfer

this action to the United States District Court for the District

of Massachusetts, where a related suit is pending. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1404(a). Plaintiffs object.

Background In 1993, Dr. Barry Sears of Surfactant Technologies, Inc.

("STI") and Matthew Freese of Pure Distributors, Inc. (d/b/a

Envion International) entered into an agreement under which Pure

Distributors acquired the exclusive marketing rights to all

consumer products developed by STI. In 1996, STI sued Pure

Distributors and Freese in the United States District Court for

the District of Massachusetts. That dispute apparently involves,

among other things, STI's claim that Pure Distributors and Freese

failed to pay any royalties to STI and Sears, notwithstanding the

fact that they allegedly sold over $30 Million worth of products

covered by the parties' distribution agreement.

Subsequently, Freese and Pure Distributors filed claims

against Baker's company, Eicotech Corporation, alleging that

Eicotech wrongfully induced Sears and STI to abandon the

distribution agreement by urging Sears to use Eicotech as a

vehicle to develop products to compete with those developed for

Pure Distributors. The record before this court is sparse and

unclear, but it appears that in June of 1999, the District Court

2 in Massachusetts dismissed that claim (at least in p a r t ) , and

that claim is substantially similar to the one Pure Distributors

and Freese now advance in this court. The only apparent

difference is that Pure Distributors and Freese are now pursuing

Eicotech's principal. Baker, rather than Eicotech itself, on an

intentional interference with contractual relations claim.

Discussion

Baker moves, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), to transfer

this case to the United States District Court for the District of

Massachusetts. Section 1404(a) provides:

For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any district where it might have been brought.

Authority to transfer a case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is

committed to the court's broad discretion. See United States ex

rel. LaVallev v. First Nat. B a n k , 625 F.Supp. 591, 594 (D.N.H.

1985). Although no single factor is dispositive, a court should

consider: "(1) the convenience of the parties, (2) the

3 convenience of the witnesses, (3) the relative ease of access to

sources of proof, (4) the availability of process to compel

attendance of unwilling witnesses, (5) [the] cost of obtaining

willing witnesses, and (6) any practical problems associated with

trying the case most expeditiously and inexpensively." F .A .I .

Electronics Corp. v. C h a mbers, 944 F.Supp. 77, 80-81 (D.Mass.

1996) (citation omitted); see also Cianbro Corp. v. Curran-

L a v o i e , I n c ., 814 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1987) ("Factors to be

considered by the district court in making its determination

include the convenience of the parties and witnesses, the order

in which jurisdiction was obtained by the district court, the

availability of documents, and the possibilities of

consolidation."). Here, Baker bears the burden of demonstrating

that those factors weigh in favor of transfer.

Applying that standard, and in the exercise of its

discretion, the court concludes that this is a case warranting

transfer. First, the Massachusetts action has been pending for

approximately three years, during which time the parties have

4 engaged in substantial discovery and the court has issued several

pre-trial rulings. It has (apparently) also conducted what Baker

refers to as the "first phase of a trial on issues that affect

this case." Defendant's memorandum (document no. 8) at 10.

Additionally, virtually the same claims raised in this case have

also been raised in the Massachusetts case; as noted above, the

only difference is that in this proceeding, Freese and Pure

Distributors are pursuing Baker personally for intentional

interference, whereas in the Massachusetts action they assert

claims against his corporation.

Because this case raises many of the same legal and factual

issues raised in the Massachusetts action, and because it will,

no doubt, involve many of the same witnesses and documentary

exhibits, it would be both inconvenient to those witnesses and an

inefficient use of judicial resources to allow substantially

similar actions to proceed in different forums. S e e , e.g.,

Cianbro C o r p ., 814 F.2d at 11 ("Where identical actions are

proceeding concurrently in two federal courts, entailing duplicative litigation and a waste of judicial resources, the

first filed action is generally preferred in a choice-of-venue

decision.") (citation omitted); Continental Grain Co. v. The

Barge FBL - 5 8 5 , 364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960) ("To permit a situation in

which two cases involving precisely the same issues are

simultaneously pending in different District Courts leads to the

wastefulness of time, energy and money that § 1 4 0 4 (a) was

designed to p r e v e n t . " ) .

Moreover, the Massachusetts District Court is very familiar

with this case and the parties' respective claims and defenses,

having already resolved, at least in part, the claims advanced by

Freese and Pure Distributors against Eicotech. Finally, because

the parties have already been litigating this dispute in

Massachusetts for three years, appearing in that forum would pose

no substantial burden or inconvenience to anyone.

In the end, the court concludes that the balance of

conveniences and the interests of justice counsel in favor of

6 transferring this proceeding to the United States District Court

for the District of Massachusetts. See generally Gulf Oil Corp.

v. G i l b e r t , 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) .

Conclusion

Defendant's motion to dismiss or transfer (document no. 8)

is granted in part and denied in part. Insofar as defendant

seeks the transfer of this proceeding to the United States

District Court for the District of Massachusetts, the motion is

granted. In all other respects, it is denied as moot. The Clerk

of Court shall arrange for the transfer of this action to the

United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

May 10, 2000

cc: James E. Higgins, Esq. Brian T. Tucker, Esq.