Puma v. Marriott

348 F. Supp. 18, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11961
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedSeptember 15, 1972
DocketCiv. A. 3275
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 348 F. Supp. 18 (Puma v. Marriott) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Puma v. Marriott, 348 F. Supp. 18, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11961 (D. Del. 1972).

Opinion

OPINION

CALEB M. WRIGHT, Chief Judge.

This is a derivative stockholders’ suit brought on behalf of Marriott-Hot Shoppes, Inc. (Marriott) and arising out of Marriott’s purchase at an allegedly unfair price of the stock of six corporations principally owned by insiders of Marriott. The plaintiff, John Puma, is the owner and holder of record of several hundred shares of Marriott common stock and was a Marriott stockholder at the time of the transactions involved herein. The individual defendants include all of the directors of Marriott at the time of the purchase and all of the insiders and members of their families who were the sellers of the stock acquired.

The complaint is fashioned into two counts. The first count is predicated upon the defendants’ alleged contravention of Sections 14(a) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S. C. §§ 78n(a) and 78j(b), and Rules 14a-9 and 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and the second count is based upon the defendants’ alleged breach of their common law fiduciary duties as directors and insiders of Marriott.

The case is presently before the Court on the plaintiff’s motion for a partial summary judgment on the issue of liability under Section 14(a). It is direct *20 ed against the four defendants who were both owners of the properties purchased and directors of Marriott when the acquisition was approved; namely, J. Willard Marriott, Sr., J. Willard Marriott, Jr., Alice S. Marriott and Milton A. Barlow.

The plaintiff contends that the present record unequivocally evidences that the proxy statement which preceded the acquisition in issue and sought stockholder approval for it was materially false and misleading.

The defendants argue that this suit is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel by reason of the decision of Vice Chancellor Short in a companion case litigated in the Delaware Court of Chancery. The case in Chancery Court was primarily premised on the plaintiff’s claims that the purchase was unfair to Marriott and that the defendants were liable for breach of their common law fiduciary duties. In addition, the plaintiff raised the allegation that the proxy was false and misleading. The case was tried in June 1970. The Court rendered its opinion in favor of the defendants and dismissed the complaint on the grounds that an independent board of directors had approved the transaction and that no actual fraud had been proved. If the suit is not barred by Vice Chancellor Short’s decision, the defendants maintain that the proxy statement fully and accurately detailed the acquisition and that there were no omissions of material facts. Finally, they deny numerous factual allegations made by the plaintiff and contend that summary judgment cannot be granted because of such factual disputes.

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must bear the burden of producing undisputed evidence to entitle him to judgment. Cram v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 375 F.2d 670, 674 (4th Cir. 1967); 6 Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 56.15[3] (2nd ed.). Moreover, the party opposing the motion is entitled to have the record viewed in a light most favorable to its position. Id.

THE FACTS

Marriott is a Delaware corporation having its principal place of business in Bethesda, Maryland. Historically, its principal business was the operation of restaurant facilities on leased premises. In the 1950’s, Marriott entered the Motor Hotel business. Various members of the Marriott family played a dominant role in conducting the corporation, and in many instances, were owners of the premises leased to Marriott.

In 1953, Marriott sold its shares to the public for the first time. However, the affiliated landlord interests were not terminated prior to Marriott’s going public and, therefore, possible conflicts of interest were created. In 1963-1964, discussions were initiated concerning the possibility of Marriott purchasing from the various insiders several of the property companies which owned certain land and buildings leased by Marriott for utilization in its business. After considerable investigation and negotiation, 1 on September 10, 1965, the five outside members of the board of directors authorized Marriott to acquire six property companies which owned the land and buildings for seven of the Marriott facilities — six restaurants and a motor hotel — and one leasehold interest in a restaurant facility. 2 The six companies and a description of their facilities were as follows: Parkview Properties, Inc. (Parkview), a restaurant in the Philadelphia area; Sellers Real Estate Co. (Sellers), a restaurant in Washington, D. C.; Potomac Properties, Inc. (Potomac), a restaurant in Arlington, Va., and a leasehold interest in a restaurant in *21 Richmond, Va.; Brentwood Properties, Inc. (Brentwood), a restaurant in Washington, D. C.; Kirkwood Properties, Inc. (Kirkwood), a restaurant in Fairfax, Va.; and Woodmar Realty, Inc. (Wood-mar), a restaurant in Washington, D. C., and a wholly-owned subsidiary, Monument Properties, Inc. (Monument), a motel in Philadelphia. Three of the companies, Parkview, Sellers and Potomac, were to be obtained in tax-free stock-for-stock exchanges between Marriott and the properties’ owners. The remaining three companies were to be merged into Marriott with the owners receiving Marriott stock in a tax-free statutory merger.

The acquisition was approved by the five Marriott directors who were neither members of the Marriott family nor owners of the property companies. It was presented to the shareholders for their approval in a proxy statement issued October 14, 1965. It received shareholder approval at Marriott’s annual meeting on November 9, 1965 and was consummated at the January 4, 1966 final closing.

THE APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

The defendants’ reliance on res judicata or collateral estoppel as a bar to this action is unfounded. Vice Chancellor Short expressly declined to reach the question of stockholder ratification of the transaction and the related issue of whether the proxy materials were false and misleading. More importantly, in Section 27 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, federal courts are given exclusive jurisdiction over violations of the Act, and the plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to have his Section 14(a) complaint determined by this Court under the standards governing the 1934 Act. See Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 285 F.Supp. 61 (D.Del. 1968). The effect of Vice Chancellor Short’s findings on specific factual issues raised in or related to this case under the doctrine of collateral estoppel has not been briefed or argued and must be determined prior to an ultimate resolution herein.

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Related

Atlas Corp. v. Blasius Industries, Inc.
705 F. Supp. 190 (D. Delaware, 1988)
Bacardi v. Bacardi Corp.
677 F. Supp. 253 (D. Delaware, 1988)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
348 F. Supp. 18, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11961, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/puma-v-marriott-ded-1972.