1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MOSES PULU, Case No.: 23cv1582-JO-BGS CDCR #H-86891, 12
Plaintiff, 13 ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT v. PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915 14 A. COSTA, M. McVAY and CDCR, 15 Defendants. 16 17 18
19 Plaintiff Moses Pulu (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner incarcerated at the Richard J. 20 Donovan Correctional Facility (“Donovan”) in San Diego, California. Proceeding pro se, 21 he filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Correctional Officer 22 Costa slammed a cell door on him and that Warden McVay and the California Department 23 of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) failed to properly supervise Costa or 24 investigate the incident. Dkt. 1, Complaint. For the reasons below, the Court dismisses 25 Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants McVay and CDCR and allows his claims against 26 Officer Costa to proceed. 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff, an inmate at Donovan, alleges that Correctional Officer Costa retaliated 3 against him by slamming a cell door on his chest and denying him proper medical care. As 4 the Vice Chairman of the Inmate Advisory Council, Plaintiff had submitted various 5 grievances against Costa complaining that she has a habit of purposefully closing doors on 6 inmates. On August 1, 2022, Costa opened Plaintiff’s cell door halfway and instructed him 7 to exit his cell to get his medication. Id. at 3. As he stepped through the doorway, Costa 8 deliberately “close[d] the cell door on his chest and laugh[ed] on the PA system.” Id. 9 Despite the fact that Plaintiff was yelling in anguish and pleading with Officer Costa to 10 open the door, she waited approximately five minutes before doing so. Id. at 3–4. After 11 opening the door, Costa laughed and told Plaintiff, “now you have a reason to snitch me 12 out rat.” Id. at 4. She then refused to summon medical care, and Plaintiff ultimately did 13 not receive medical care until approximately 72 hours after his injury. Id. Three days later, 14 Costa stated to Plaintiff “I know you been ratting me out, and your continual complaining 15 of the way I close doors is going to cost you.” Id. at 3. To this day, Plaintiff continues to 16 suffer chest and muscle pain from the incident. Id. at 6. 17 Based on these facts, Plaintiff alleges First Amendment claims for retaliation and 18 Eighth Amendment claims for excessive force and denial of medical care against 19 Defendant Costa. See generally id. Additionally, he alleges that Warden McVay and the 20 CDCR failed to supervise Officer Costa in violation of the First and Eighth Amendment 21 and failed to investigate Plaintiff’s grievances in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 Id. at 5–7. 23 II. LEGAL STANDARD 24 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the Court must sua sponte screen prisoner 25 complaints seeking redress from a government entity or officer and dismiss any portions 26 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek damages from defendants who 27 are immune. Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dept. of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017) 28 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the 1 familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of 2 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 3 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to 4 relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 5 quotation marks omitted). While detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare 6 recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do 7 not suffice” to state a claim. Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 8 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 9 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Although failure to state a claim under § 1915(e) 10 incorporates the above Rule 12(b)(6) standards, a pro se litigant need only satisfy a “low 11 threshold” to “proceed past the screening stage.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121, 1123. 12 When a court dismisses a complaint, it must then decide whether to grant leave to 13 amend. Federal Rule 15(a) provides that a district court should “freely give leave [to 14 amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). A district court has discretion to 15 deny leave to amend when a proposed amendment would be futile. Chappel v. Lab. Corp. 16 of America, 232 F.3d 719, 725–26 (9th Cir. 2000). Amendment is futile “if no set of facts 17 can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and 18 sufficient claim or defense.” Miller v. Rykoff–Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 19 1988) (overruled on other grounds). 20 III. DISCUSSION 21 After screening Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has satisfied 22 the “low threshold” for stating his retaliation, excessive force, and denial of medical care 23 claims against Defendant Costa. See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. The Court will, therefore, 24 only address his claims against the remaining defendants, Warden McVay and CDCR. 25 First, the Court will consider whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pled that Defendants McVay 26 and CDCR violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights by failing to supervise Costa. 27 Second, the Court will consider whether these Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth 28 Amendment rights by failing to investigate Plaintiff’s grievances regarding Costa’s 1 wrongful actions. 2 A. First and Eighth Amendment Claim Against McVay and CDCR 3 The Court first considers whether Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts that 4 Defendants McVay and CDCR violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights by failing 5 to properly supervise Officer Costa. A plaintiff “must plead that each Government official 6 defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” 7 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77 (rejecting argument that “a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his 8 subordinate’s [unconstitutional actions] amounts to the supervisor’s violating the 9 Constitution.”). Because there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, 10 allegations “must be individualized and focus on . . . each individual defendant whose acts 11 or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 12 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370–71 (1976)); Palmer 13 v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437–38 (9th Cir. 1993).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MOSES PULU, Case No.: 23cv1582-JO-BGS CDCR #H-86891, 12
Plaintiff, 13 ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT v. PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915 14 A. COSTA, M. McVAY and CDCR, 15 Defendants. 16 17 18
19 Plaintiff Moses Pulu (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner incarcerated at the Richard J. 20 Donovan Correctional Facility (“Donovan”) in San Diego, California. Proceeding pro se, 21 he filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Correctional Officer 22 Costa slammed a cell door on him and that Warden McVay and the California Department 23 of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) failed to properly supervise Costa or 24 investigate the incident. Dkt. 1, Complaint. For the reasons below, the Court dismisses 25 Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants McVay and CDCR and allows his claims against 26 Officer Costa to proceed. 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff, an inmate at Donovan, alleges that Correctional Officer Costa retaliated 3 against him by slamming a cell door on his chest and denying him proper medical care. As 4 the Vice Chairman of the Inmate Advisory Council, Plaintiff had submitted various 5 grievances against Costa complaining that she has a habit of purposefully closing doors on 6 inmates. On August 1, 2022, Costa opened Plaintiff’s cell door halfway and instructed him 7 to exit his cell to get his medication. Id. at 3. As he stepped through the doorway, Costa 8 deliberately “close[d] the cell door on his chest and laugh[ed] on the PA system.” Id. 9 Despite the fact that Plaintiff was yelling in anguish and pleading with Officer Costa to 10 open the door, she waited approximately five minutes before doing so. Id. at 3–4. After 11 opening the door, Costa laughed and told Plaintiff, “now you have a reason to snitch me 12 out rat.” Id. at 4. She then refused to summon medical care, and Plaintiff ultimately did 13 not receive medical care until approximately 72 hours after his injury. Id. Three days later, 14 Costa stated to Plaintiff “I know you been ratting me out, and your continual complaining 15 of the way I close doors is going to cost you.” Id. at 3. To this day, Plaintiff continues to 16 suffer chest and muscle pain from the incident. Id. at 6. 17 Based on these facts, Plaintiff alleges First Amendment claims for retaliation and 18 Eighth Amendment claims for excessive force and denial of medical care against 19 Defendant Costa. See generally id. Additionally, he alleges that Warden McVay and the 20 CDCR failed to supervise Officer Costa in violation of the First and Eighth Amendment 21 and failed to investigate Plaintiff’s grievances in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 Id. at 5–7. 23 II. LEGAL STANDARD 24 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the Court must sua sponte screen prisoner 25 complaints seeking redress from a government entity or officer and dismiss any portions 26 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek damages from defendants who 27 are immune. Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dept. of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017) 28 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the 1 familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of 2 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 3 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to 4 relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 5 quotation marks omitted). While detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare 6 recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do 7 not suffice” to state a claim. Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 8 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 9 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Although failure to state a claim under § 1915(e) 10 incorporates the above Rule 12(b)(6) standards, a pro se litigant need only satisfy a “low 11 threshold” to “proceed past the screening stage.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121, 1123. 12 When a court dismisses a complaint, it must then decide whether to grant leave to 13 amend. Federal Rule 15(a) provides that a district court should “freely give leave [to 14 amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). A district court has discretion to 15 deny leave to amend when a proposed amendment would be futile. Chappel v. Lab. Corp. 16 of America, 232 F.3d 719, 725–26 (9th Cir. 2000). Amendment is futile “if no set of facts 17 can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and 18 sufficient claim or defense.” Miller v. Rykoff–Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 19 1988) (overruled on other grounds). 20 III. DISCUSSION 21 After screening Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has satisfied 22 the “low threshold” for stating his retaliation, excessive force, and denial of medical care 23 claims against Defendant Costa. See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. The Court will, therefore, 24 only address his claims against the remaining defendants, Warden McVay and CDCR. 25 First, the Court will consider whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pled that Defendants McVay 26 and CDCR violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights by failing to supervise Costa. 27 Second, the Court will consider whether these Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth 28 Amendment rights by failing to investigate Plaintiff’s grievances regarding Costa’s 1 wrongful actions. 2 A. First and Eighth Amendment Claim Against McVay and CDCR 3 The Court first considers whether Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts that 4 Defendants McVay and CDCR violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights by failing 5 to properly supervise Officer Costa. A plaintiff “must plead that each Government official 6 defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” 7 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77 (rejecting argument that “a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his 8 subordinate’s [unconstitutional actions] amounts to the supervisor’s violating the 9 Constitution.”). Because there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, 10 allegations “must be individualized and focus on . . . each individual defendant whose acts 11 or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 12 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370–71 (1976)); Palmer 13 v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437–38 (9th Cir. 1993). A supervisor may only be held liable 14 under section 1983 if a plaintiff has alleged specific facts which show “‘either (1) his or 15 her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal 16 connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’” 17 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 855 F.2d 18 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). 19 Plaintiff’s general allegations that Defendants McVay and CDCR attempted to cover 20 up Costa’s actions and that they are responsible for her actions are conclusory and therefore 21 fail to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 22 of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” fail to state a claim for relief). 23 Plaintiff pleads no facts regarding these Defendants’ personal involvement in Costa’s 24 wrongful actions. He identifies no specific acts or omissions taken by them that caused 25 Plaintiff’s injury or served to conceal Costa’s actions. See Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. 26 Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s First and Eighth Amendment claims against 27 Defendants McVay and CDCR. 28 1 B. Fourteenth Amendment Claim Against McVay and CDCR 2 The Court next examines whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a Fourteenth 3 Amendment due process claim against McVay and CDCR for their failure to properly 4 investigate Costa’s use of force. To state a claim for a violation of the Fourteenth 5 Amendment, a plaintiff must, as a threshold matter, identify a liberty or property interest 6 protected by the Constitution. United States v. Guillen-Cervantes, 748 F.3d 870, 872 (9th 7 Cir. 2014). A constitutionally cognizable property or liberty interest requires a “legitimate 8 claim of entitlement”—i.e., an “existing law, rule, or understanding [that] makes the 9 conferral of a benefit ‘mandatory.’” Id. (citing Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 10 545 U.S. 748, 760 (2005)); see also Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 756 (“Our cases 11 recognize that a benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or 12 deny it in their discretion.”). The Ninth Circuit has held that, in a prison context, inmates 13 have no constitutional entitlement to have their grievances processed and/or investigated. 14 See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that claimed loss of a 15 liberty interest in the processing of grievance appeals is insufficient in order to state a claim 16 under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 17 1988) (“There is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance procedure.”). 18 Here, Plaintiff cannot make the threshold showing that he was denied a liberty 19 interest protected by the Constitution. There is no existing law that provides Plaintiff with 20 any constitutional entitlement to have his grievances against a correctional officer 21 investigated or processed. Because Plaintiff cannot establish that he has a protected liberty 22 interest in having his grievances properly investigated, McVay and CDCR’s failures in this 23 regard cannot form the basis of a due process claim. See Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860. The 24 Court thus dismisses this claim. 25 C. Leave to Amend 26 In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants him leave to amend his 27 Complaint to attempt to sufficiently allege First and Eighth Amendment claims against 28 Defendants McVay and CDCR. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 1 2015) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend 2 [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies 3 of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”). However, as to Plaintiff’s 4 Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants McVay and CDCR, the Court finds that 5 pleading additional facts could not cure the fundamental defect that the injury at issue, i.e., 6 the failure to investigate Plaintiff’s grievances, does not rise to the level of a protected 7 liberty interest. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s due process claim with prejudice 8 because amendment would be futile. See Schmier v. U.S. Ct. of Appeals for Ninth Circuit, 9 279 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding dismissal without leave to amend proper where 10 further factual allegations could not cure deficiencies). 11 IV. CONCLUSION 12 The Court has determined that Plaintiff’s First and Eighth Amendment claims 13 against Defendant Costa for retaliation, unnecessary use of force, and denial of medical 14 care survive the sua sponte screening process and may proceed. Plaintiff’s First and Eighth 15 Amendment claims against McVay and CDCR are dismissed without prejudice. His 16 Fourteenth Amendment claim against McVay and CDCR is dismissed with prejudice. 17 Plaintiff may (1) notify the Court of his intent to proceed only with the First and 18 Eighth Amendment claims alleged against Defendant Costa; or (2) file an Amended 19 Complaint that also attempts to correct the deficiencies with respect to his First and Eighth 20 Amendment claims against McVay and CDCR. Plaintiff must choose one of those 21 options within forty-five (45) days from the date this Order is filed. If Plaintiff notifies 22 the Court that he wishes to proceed only with his claims against Defendant Costa, the Court 23 will issue an Order directing the Clerk of Court to issue the summons so Plaintiff may 24 effect service of the summons and Complaint on Defendant Costa, and all remaining claims 25 and Defendants will remain dismissed from this action. 26 IT IS SO ORDERED. 27 28 | ||Dated: January 23, 2024 _ 2 CY 3 Honorable Jinsook Ohta” A United States District Judge 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28