Pulley v. Paramo

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedNovember 9, 2021
Docket3:14-cv-02034
StatusUnknown

This text of Pulley v. Paramo (Pulley v. Paramo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pulley v. Paramo, (S.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERT G. PULLEY, Case No.: 14-CV-2034 JLS (MDD)

12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S 13 v. MOTION

14 DANIEL PARAMO, Warden; and (ECF No. 68) KAMALA D. HARRIS, Attorney 15 General, 16 Respondents. 17 18 This closed federal habeas corpus action was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by pro se 19 state prisoner Robert G. Pulley. Almost two years after the conclusion of Petitioner’s most 20 recent appeal in this matter, Petitioner filed the present post-judgment motion (“Mot.,” 21 ECF No. 68). For the following reasons, Petitioner’s Motion is DENIED. 22 BACKGROUND 23 In August 2014, Petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 24 § 2254. The Court denied the Petition and entered judgment in favor of Respondents on 25 November 14, 2016. ECF Nos. 54, 55. Petitioner filed multiple notices of appeal. See 26 ECF Nos. 56, 57, 63. The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s request for a certificate of 27 appealability, finding that “appellant has not made a ‘substantial showing of the denial of 28 a constitutional right.’” ECF No. 61 at 1 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). Petitioner’s 1 subsequent appeal was dismissed as duplicative, and Petitioner’s motion for 2 reconsideration was denied on July 5, 2019. ECF Nos. 65, 66. Petitioner filed the present 3 motion almost two years after the conclusion of his third appeal from his initial Petition. 4 ANALYSIS 5 Petitioner now moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to vacate the 6 judgment so that he can file an amended habeas petition. See generally Mot. 7 I. Rule 60(b) or Successive Petition 8 The Court must question first whether Petitioner’s filing is a Rule 60(b) motion or a 9 disguised 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. “Habeas corpus petitioners cannot ‘utilize a Rule 10 60(b) motion to make an end-run around the requirements of [Antiterrorism and Effective 11 Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“]AEDPA[”)]’ or to otherwise circumvent that statute’s 12 restrictions on second or successive habeas corpus petitions.” Jones v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 825, 13 833 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 547 (1998)). A 14 legitimate Rule 60(b) motion “attacks . . . some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas 15 proceedings.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530 (2005). A second or successive 16 petition is a filing that contains one or more claims asserted as the basis for relief from a 17 state court’s judgment of conviction. Id. “[A] motion that does not attack ‘the integrity of 18 the proceedings, but in effect asks for a second chance to have the merits determined 19 favorably’ raises a claim that takes it outside the bounds of Rule 60(b) and within the scope 20 of AEDPA’s limitations on second or successive habeas corpus petitions.” Jones, 733 F.3d 21 at 834 (quoting Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 n.5). Such a motion “although labeled a Rule 22 60(b) motion, is in substance a successive habeas petition and should be treated 23 accordingly.” Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 531. 24 Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion is in truth a disguised section 2254 petition. None of 25 his arguments amounts to an allegation of a “defect in the integrity of the federal habeas 26 proceedings” that constitutes legitimate grounds for a Rule 60(b) motion. Gonzalez, 545 27 U.S. at 530. Rather, Petitioner argues the Court “fail[ed] to properly address or properly 28 consider all the evidence Appellant put forth in his effort to amend his original, timely 1 federal petition for writ of habeas corpus[.]” Mot. at 2. Petitioner asserts claims for 2 ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis for relief from the state court judgment. 3 Petitioner’s Motion “in effect asks for a second chance to have the merits determined 4 favorably[.]” Jones, 733 F.3d at 834 (quoting Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 n.5). His filing, 5 then, must be treated as a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 6 II. Successive Petition 7 AEDPA “generally bars second or successive habeas petitions.” Balbuena v. 8 Sullivan, 980 F.3d 619, 634 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied sub nom. Balbuena v. Cates, 141 9 S. Ct. 2755 (2021). Section 2244(b)(1) states that “[a] claim presented in a second or 10 successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior 11 application shall be dismissed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). In order to file a second or 12 successive petition, a federal habeas petitioner first must obtain an order from the Court of 13 Appeals authorizing the district court to consider the petition. See 28 U.S.C. 14 § 2244(b)(3)(A). This bar can be avoided if the petitioner “shows” that the “claim relies 15 on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 16 Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). 17 First, Petitioner has not shown that he has obtained an order from the Court of 18 Appeals authorizing this Court to consider the petition. Second, Petitioner did not 19 announce a new rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively, Jones, 733 F.3d at 836, 20 840, and therefore it cannot underpin a second or successive petition, id. at 843; Buenrostro 21 v. United States, 697 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012). Instead, Petitioner argues that “had 22 the court properly considered all the evidence Appellant put forth to demonstrate his factual 23 innocence, it would have found the extraordinary circumstances of a Fundamental 24 Miscarriage of Justice.” Mot. at 14. The Court previously evaluated Petitioner’s 25 ineffective assistance of counsel claim and found the claim was untimely. See ECF No. 47 26 at 26 (finding neither delayed accrual pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) nor delayed 27

28 1 || accrual for the ineffective assistance of counsel claims apply to Petitioner’s new claims). 2 || As Petitioner has not met the requirements to file a successive petition, the Court declines 3 || to revisit the merits of his Petition. 4 Accordingly, this second or successive petition is DISMISSED. 5 CONCLUSION 6 Insofar as Petitioner’s filing is a Rule 60(b) motion, it is DENIED. Insofar as 7 || Petitioner’s filing is a second or successive petition, it is DISMISSED. 8 A certificate of appealability will not issue. Petitioner has not shown “that jurists of 9 ||reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a 10 || constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district 11 |}court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.

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Related

Calderon v. Thompson
523 U.S. 538 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Slack v. McDaniel
529 U.S. 473 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Gonzalez v. Crosby
545 U.S. 524 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Jose Buenrostro v. United States
697 F.3d 1137 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Garuti v. Roden
733 F.3d 18 (First Circuit, 2013)
Robert Jones, Jr. v. Charles Ryan
733 F.3d 825 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)

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Pulley v. Paramo, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pulley-v-paramo-casd-2021.