Pueppka v. Iowa Mutual Insurance Co.

87 N.W.2d 410, 165 Neb. 781, 1958 Neb. LEXIS 6
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 17, 1958
Docket34111
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 87 N.W.2d 410 (Pueppka v. Iowa Mutual Insurance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pueppka v. Iowa Mutual Insurance Co., 87 N.W.2d 410, 165 Neb. 781, 1958 Neb. LEXIS 6 (Neb. 1958).

Opinion

Boslaugh, J.

Appellant, for a consideration, issued and delivered to Lloyd Pueppka and Cleo Pueppka a standard fire insurance policy protecting them, within the limits thereof, from loss caused by fire or lightning to a building owned by them and described in the policy. The building was thereafter destroyed by fire and Lloyd Pueppka and Cleo Pueppka seek to recover from appellant the amount of the policy. There is no issue concerning the parties described in this court as appellees and intervener other than Lloyd Pueppka and Cleo. Pueppka and they will not be again mentioned herein. Lloyd Pueppka and Cleo Pueppka will be referred to as Pueppka and Cleo Pueppka, respectively, and collectively as appellees.

The cause of action of appellees as stated by them is as follows: They owned 5 acres of the southwest quarter of Section 10, Township 14 North, Range 30 West of the 6th P. M., in Lincoln County, on which was lo *783 cated a two-story, quonset-type building. The appellant was an insurance company authorized to conduct insurance business in the State of Nebraska. It, for a consideration paid by appellees, issued and delivered to them in Nebraska a standard policy of fire insurance and thereby indemnified them from loss or damage caused by fire to the building in the amount of $25,000. The building was destroyed by fire of unknown origin August 8, 1952. Appellant was notified of the loss as the policy provided but it failed to pay the loss as required by the policy.

The amended answer of appellant to the extent relevant to this appeal contains the following: An admission of the cause of action alleged by appellees and allegations that the consideration paid by them for the policy of insurance had been returned to them by appellant and the policy had been canceled; that the policy of insurance contained a provision “Unless otherwise provided in writing added hereto- this Company shall not be liable for loss accruing (a) while the hazard is increased by any means within the control or knowledge of the insured”; that appellees caused the building described in the policy to- be burned and destroyed by fire on August 8, 1952; and that the burning and destruction of the building by either or both appellees voided the contract of insurance.

Appellees replied by a denial of new matter in the amended answer of appellant.

Appellant, at the termination of the evidence, by motion asked the court to direct the jury to return a verdict for it on the ground that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain a recovery by appellees. The motion was denied. The cause was submitted to the jury and its verdict was for appellees in the amount of the insurance contract. Appellant made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, motion for a new trial. They were each overruled and judgment was rendered for appellees in accordance *784 with the verdict. This-1 appeal contests the legality of the judgment.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the evidence and in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the proof is not sufficient to sustain a verdiot for appellees.

The disputed questions of fact were resolved by the jury in favor of them and in considering and deciding this appeal the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom must be considered most favorably to- them. Boettcher v. Goethe, ante p. 363, 85 N. W. 2d 884; Long v. Whalen, 160 Neb. 813, 71 N. W. 2d 496. The credibility o-f the witnesses and the weight of the evidence were for the jury and its verdict may not be disturbed by this court unless it is clearly wrong as a matter of law. Sorter v. Citizens Fund Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 151 Neb. 686, 39 N. W. 2d 276; Conley v. Hays, 153 Neb. 733, 45 N. W. 2d 900.

The circumstances of this litigation are:

Appellees engaged in the construction o-f a building on the 5 acres of land -owned by them as described above commencing in February 1952 and continuing to July 13, 1952. It was a two-story, quonset-type building to be used and operated as a private club and a dwelling for the owners. It was 40 feet wide from north to south, 160 feet long from east to west, and had a concrete foundation. The shell or outside was corrugated 26-guage galvanized steel supported by 16-guage, 6-inch-thick steel beams 4 feet apart, except each end of the building -consisted of concrete blocks. The insulation was Celotex and there was a 6-inch air space between it and the outside steel -covering. The inside wall was knotty pine placed over the insulation. There were several -air ducts along the base of the building and there were nine roof vents equipped with rotary or revolving ventilators-. There was a free passage of air from the outside into- the 6-inch air space in the walls *785 to and through the roof vents and the ventilators. This arrangement provided ventilation and prevented condensation. The opening into each ventilator was fitted with a trap door and equipped so that it could be opened or closed from the first floor.

The kitchen was the northwest room on the first floor of the building. It was about 14 feet north and south and 40 feet east and west. There was a door on the west near the northwest corner of the kitchen, an opening in the south wall for passage to and from the dining room, and an opening to the east near the northeast corner of the kitchen for passage to the east through a corridor to the bar. The dining room was south of the kitchen and was the southwest room of the first floor. It was about 25 feet from north to south and about 40 feet from east to west. There was an opening in the east wall in the southeast comer into a corridor leading to the east and northeast into a large room in which there were located a powder room, a gentlemen’s room, the bar, the office, the stairway to the second floor, booths for serving customers, and an area for dancing. The principal entrance to the building, known as the Spur Club, was the south door situated a short distance east of the southeast passageway from the dining room. There was an emergency door in the east end of the building which was confined to that use.

There were three bedrooms, a large living room, a kitchen, a bathroom, and closets on the second floor of the building which were occupied by appellees and their two children as their home. The entrance to< the second story was a stairway from the first floor commencing a short distance east of the south door spoken of above.

The building was completely furnished and equipped for the uses intended except the gas furnaces for heating the building were not connected with gas, the fuel intended for their operation. The pipes through which gas was conducted to the appliances in the building were *786 temporary and were to be replaced by permanent installation of pipelines but that had not been done at the time of the fire important to this case. A ceiling had not been placed in the kitchen. It was open above to the beams and to the floor of the second story. Thesé and some additional minor items were to be completed after the club was open for general use on July 13, 1952.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
87 N.W.2d 410, 165 Neb. 781, 1958 Neb. LEXIS 6, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pueppka-v-iowa-mutual-insurance-co-neb-1958.