Public Service Commission of Kentucky v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth

860 S.W.2d 296, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 111, 1993 WL 313200
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedJune 25, 1993
DocketNo. 92-CA-1817-MR
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 860 S.W.2d 296 (Public Service Commission of Kentucky v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Public Service Commission of Kentucky v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth, 860 S.W.2d 296, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 111, 1993 WL 313200 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinion

McDONALD, Judge.

The appellant, Public Service Commission of Kentucky (PSC), has appealed from the declaratory judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court which determined that appellant was not authorized to charge the appellee utilities, Boone County Water and Sewer District, Campbell County Kentucky Water District and Kenton County Water District # 1, for the cost of a management and operations audit as part of a KRS Chapter 74 merger feasibility study. The issue concerns the relationship, if any, between two statutes, KRS 74.361 and KRS 278.255. In addition to these utilities, the Attorney General, City of Florence and City of Newport1 intervened in the proceedings and were joined as defendants in the declaratory judgment action commenced by the PSC.

The appellant utilizes the first several pages of its brief to educate this Court on the nature of management and operations audits, and to convince us of how essential they are to the PSC in determining whether a merger of water districts is warranted and will serve the purposes set out in KRS 74.361(1).2 The PSC has sufficiently impressed upon us the complexity of its task in determining whether or not merger of districts is practical or advisable. In fact, none of the appellees suggests that the PSC lacks the authority to conduct such audits.3

The issue is whether the PSC can conduct these audits at the expense of the utilities potentially subject to involuntary merger. The trial court’s opinion in this regard is well-reasoned, supported by ample authority and addresses the arguments made on behalf of both sides of the issue. Finding it inefficient to rehash or paraphrase the trial court’s judgment, we adopt the following portion of the judgment appealed from as our own:

KRS 74.361 gives the PSC broad powers to investigate the feasibility of the merger of water districts. KRS 74.361(2) states:
The public service commission of Kentucky is authorized and empowered to initiate, carry out, and complete such investigations, inquiries, and studies as may be reasonably necessary to determine the advisability as to the merger of water districts. Prior to ordering a hearing with reference to the merger of any water district into one or more additional water districts, the public service commission shall cause to be prepared in writing a feasibility report and study regarding the proposed merger, containing such studies, investigations, facts, historical data, and projections as in the circumstances may be required in order to enable the commission to formulate a proper decision regarding such merger.
This statute by its own terms does not assign the responsibility for the underlying costs of such a feasibility study.
The PSC considers this an ambiguity and argues that the statute must be construed with KRS 278.225(2) which authorizes the PSC to provide for management audits of “any utility under its jurisdiction [298]*298... to investigate all or any portion of the management and operating procedures or any other internal workings of the utility.” Subparagraph (3) of this statute provides that the cost of such management audits shall be borne by the utility.
We hold that the PSC’s attempt to use the provisions of KRS 278.255 as a basis for allocating the cost of the merger study to the respondent Water Districts exceeds the statutory authority granted to the PSC by the General Assembly. If the General Assembly had intended the cost of the merger study under KRS Chapter 74 to be funded like a management audit under KRS 278.255, such provision could easily have been specifically included in the language of Chapter 74. It was not.
The PSC’s powers are purely statutory. City of Olive Hill v. Public Service Commission, [305 Ky. 249], 203 S.W.2d 68 (1947). When a statute prescribes the procedures that an administrative agency must follow, the agency may not add or subtract from those requirements. Union Light, Heat and Power Company v. Public Service Commission, Ky., 271 S.W.2d 361 (1954). Here the statutory authority urged by the PSC is not present in the statute and the PSC’s effort to assign these costs to the utilities is in excess of its statutory power.
The lack of interrelationship between KRS 74.361 and KRS 278.255 is further underscored by a consideration of the legislative history of these two statutes. KRS 74.361 was enacted in 1978 [sic4]. The management audit statute was enacted in 1984. Several merger feasibility studies were made under KRS 74.361 prior to the adoption of the management audit statute. In light of this, how can the PSC now claim, as it does, that the management audit is the only available tool to assess the appropriateness of merger? The management audit statute was not used in these prior feasibility studies.
WHEREFORE, the Court declares that the PSC has no authority to impose the cost of a merger feasibility study on the respondent utilities (and presumably their rate payers) by reference to the authority of KRS 278.255.

The PSC insists Judge Graham has turned a “blind eye to the nature of the proposed audits.” Further the PSC argues that because an audit under KRS 278.255 made prior to a merger investigation can be used in the subsequent investigation, the trial court has “elevated form over substance and made timing, not public policy, the key factor in an audit’s use.” We find no merit to these arguments. It is clear from the record that the audits at issue were ordered with an eye toward merger. That the PSC enlarged the focus of the audits so that rate payers would get some benefit in case merger was found not feasible, does not alter the “nature” of the audits as being ones for use as part of a merger study under KRS Chapter 74.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
860 S.W.2d 296, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 111, 1993 WL 313200, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/public-service-commission-of-kentucky-v-attorney-general-of-the-kyctapp-1993.