(PS) The Ruth Camel, Estate v. Nash Weber

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedApril 15, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-00645
StatusUnknown

This text of (PS) The Ruth Camel, Estate v. Nash Weber ((PS) The Ruth Camel, Estate v. Nash Weber) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PS) The Ruth Camel, Estate v. Nash Weber, (E.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RUTH CAMEL ESTATE, No. 2:22–cv–645–KJM–KJN PS 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IFP REQUEST AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND 13 v. (ECF No. 2.) 14 SHIRLEY NASH WEBER, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, who is proceeding without counsel in this action, requests leave to proceed in 18 forma pauperis (“IFP”).1 (ECF No. 2.) See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (authorizing the commencement of 19 an action “without prepayment of fees or security” by a person who is unable to pay such fees). 20 Plaintiff’s affidavit makes the required financial showing, and so plaintiff’s request is granted. 21 However, the determination that a plaintiff may proceed without payment of fees does not 22 complete the inquiry. Under the IFP statute, the court must screen the complaint and dismiss any 23 claims that are “frivolous or malicious,” fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or 24 seek monetary relief against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Further, the federal 25 court has an independent duty to ensure it has subject matter jurisdiction in the case. See United 26 Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). 27 1 Actions where a party proceeds without counsel are referred to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 E.D. Cal. L.R. 302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 1 Legal Standards 2 i. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Frivolity 3 The court must dismiss a case if, at any time, it determines that it lacks subject matter 4 jurisdiction. Rule 12(h)(3).2 A federal district court generally has original jurisdiction over a 5 civil action when: (1) a federal question is presented in an action “arising under the Constitution, 6 laws, or treaties of the United States” or (2) there is complete diversity of citizenship and the 7 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). Further, a plaintiff 8 must have standing to assert a claim, which requires an injury in fact caused by defendant(s) that 9 may be redressed in court. Harrison v. Kernan, 971 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2020). 10 Federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider claims that are “so insubstantial, 11 implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit 12 as not to involve a federal controversy.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 13 83, 89 (1998); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537 (1974) (court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 14 over claims that are “essentially fictitious,” “obviously frivolous” or “obviously without merit”); 15 see also Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by & through Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 549-50 (9th Cir. 2018) 16 (noting that the “wholly insubstantial and frivolous” standard for dismissing claims operates 17 under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of federal question jurisdiction). A claim is legally frivolous when it 18 lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A 19 court may dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory 20 or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327; Rule 12(h)(3). 21 ii. Federal Notice Pleading and a Complaint’s Failure to State a Claim 22 Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading be “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the 23 court’s jurisdiction . . . ; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 24 entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the 25 alternative or different types of relief.” Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct. Rule 26 8(d)(1); see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (overruled on other grounds) 27

28 2 Citation to the “Rule(s)” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise noted. 1 (“Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus 2 litigation on the merits of a claim.”). 3 A claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon which 4 relief can be granted.” Rule 12(b)(6). A complaint fails to state a claim if it either lacks a 5 cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to allege a cognizable legal theory. Mollett v. Netflix, 6 Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a 7 complaint must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic 8 recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 9 555-57 (2007). In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 10 supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 11 (2009). Thus, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 12 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 13 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 14 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 15 When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 16 the court must accept the well-pled factual allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 17 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Papasan v. 18 Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 (1986). The court is not, however, required to accept as true 19 “conclusory [factual] allegations that are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint,” 20 or “legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Paulsen v. 21 CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). 22 Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 23 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal). Prior to dismissal, the court is 24 to tell the plaintiff of deficiencies in the complaint and provide an opportunity to cure––if it 25 appears at all possible the defects can be corrected. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 26 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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Related

Hagans v. Lavine
415 U.S. 528 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Papasan v. Allain
478 U.S. 265 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Graham v. Connor
490 U.S. 386 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.
534 U.S. 506 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Michael Lacey v. Joseph Arpaio
693 F.3d 896 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Nurre v. Whitehead
580 F.3d 1087 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Paulsen v. CNF INC.
559 F.3d 1061 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Meghan Mollett v. Netflix, Inc.
795 F.3d 1062 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Grancare v. Ruth Thrower
889 F.3d 543 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)
David Harrison v. Scott Kernan
971 F.3d 1069 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)

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(PS) The Ruth Camel, Estate v. Nash Weber, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ps-the-ruth-camel-estate-v-nash-weber-caed-2022.