(PS) Singh v. Internal Revenue Service

District Court, E.D. California·Decided June 27, 2023·No. 2:23-cv-00053·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAGHVENDRA SINGH, No. 2:23-cv-00053 KJM AC PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICES, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and this action accordingly was referred to the undersigned 18 by Local Rule 302(c)(21). Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and his 19 initial complaint was found unsuitable for service. ECF No. 3. Plaintiff was granted leave to file 20 a First Amended Complaint. Now before the court is plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint 21 (“FAC”). The FAC is also unsuitable for service. The undersigned will grant plaintiff a final 22 opportunity to submit an amended complaint that states a claim for relief. 23 I. Screening Standard 24 The federal IFP statute requires federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally 25 “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks 26 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 27 Plaintiff must assist the court in determining whether or not the complaint is frivolous, by drafting 28 the complaint so that it complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”). 1 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 2 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the 3 court will (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they 4 are clearly baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the 5 plaintiff, and (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Von 6 Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010). 7 The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint 8 states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (court 9 must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (court must 10 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a 11 less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 12 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 13 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 14 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not suffice 15 to state a claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 16 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 17 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to 18 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim 19 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 20 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 21 at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an 22 opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See 23 Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as 24 stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000)). 25 II. The Initial Complaint and the First Amended Complaint 26 Plaintiff’s initial complaint (ECF No. 1) alleged that defendant “caused loss of 27 multimillion dollars’ worth” of his property by denying him the right to pay taxes. ECF No. 1 at 28 1. Plaintiff alleged that his properties were protected by IRS liens, but that the IRS conspired 1 with state officials to allow the state to take his property by lowering the priority of IRS liens 2 without informing plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff alleged all of this was done during his incarceration 3 between 2019 and 2022. Id. Plaintiff further alleged that the Sacramento District Attorney is 4 prosecuting minorities for non-criminal, fabricated charges. Id. at 2. The body of plaintiff’s 5 complaint did not specify a cause of action, but on the civil cover sheet plaintiff marked “other 6 civil rights” and “taxes” when asked to identify the nature of the suit. ECF No. 1-1 at 1. 7 On April 25, 2023, the undersigned issued an order finding the complaint unsuitable for 8 service, noting the complaint does not contain a “short and plain” statement setting forth the basis 9 for federal jurisdiction, plaintiff’s entitlement to relief, or the relief that is sought, even though 10 those things are required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(3). ECF No. 3 at 3. The court also found 11 that the complaint did not identify a claim upon which relief can be granted because it did not 12 name a cause of action or allege facts supporting an identifiable cause of action. Id. Rather than 13 recommending dismissal of the action, the undersigned provided plaintiff an opportunity to 14 amend his complaint to allege a cognizable cause of action. Id. 15 Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on May 16, 2023. ECF No. 4. The FAC is 16 identical to the original complaint except for one paragraph purporting to identify the legal harm 17 in response to the court’s order. ECF No. 4 at 1. This addition states, in relevant part, “Singh has 18 Right to pay Taxes and Right to have properties. These Rights were violated by lowering the 19 priority of IRS’s LEINS and by taking Singh’s properties without even informing Singh, so his 20 right to due process. Right to have a Fair Trial and Right to keep properties were also denied. I 21 will file amended complaint later on.” Id. at 1. 22 III. Failure to State a Claim 23 The two-page FAC, like its predecessor, fails to specify a cognizable cause of action. The 24 IRS and David Palmer are named as defendants, but plaintiff does not clearly identify what the 25 IRS did that gives him a right to sue. The only allegation about conduct of the IRS is that it 26 “conspired with state officials to allow the state to take his property by lowering the priority of 27 IRS liens without informing plaintiff.” Id. There are no factual allegations describing a 28 conspiracy, only a conclusory assertion. There are no factual allegations whatsoever regarding 1 David Palmer. Accordingly, no claim is stated against either defendant. 2 Plaintiff appears to allege that while he was incarcerated following a wrongful criminal 3 conviction, the prosecutor and trial judge from his criminal case illegally evaded IRS liens to 4 have plaintiff’s property taken. If this is the grievance underlying plaintiff’s complaint, his 5 alleged injury was caused by the judge and prosecutor rather than the IRS.

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