1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SORAYA MARIA RIGOR, Case No. 2:23-cv-02048-TLN-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 14 MERCY PEDLERS, et al., ECF No. 2 15 Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 16 THAT PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED 17 COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND FOR FAILURE TO 18 STATE A CLAIM 19 ECF No. 3 20 21 Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Her 22 declaration makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)(1) and (2). See ECF No. 2. 23 Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 24 Under § 1915(e)(2), the court must dismiss the case at any time if it determines that the 25 allegation of poverty is untrue, or that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on 26 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. As discussed 27 below, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim. As such, I recommend that it be dismissed 28 without leave to amend. 1 Screening and Pleading Requirements 2 A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed 3 in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and 4 dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon 5 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 6 relief. Id. 7 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 9 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 10 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 11 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 12 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 13 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 14 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 15 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 16 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 17 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 18 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 19 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 20 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 21 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 22 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 23 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 24 Additionally, a plaintiff’s complaint must set forth the basis for federal court jurisdiction. A 25 federal court may adjudicate only those cases authorized by the Constitution and by Congress. 26 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The basic federal jurisdiction 27 statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332, confer “federal question” and “diversity” jurisdiction, 28 respectively. Federal question jurisdiction requires that the complaint (1) arise under a federal 1 law or the U.S. Constitution, (2) allege a “case or controversy” within the meaning of Article III, 2 § 2 of the U.S. Constitution, or (3) be authorized by a federal statute that both regulates a specific 3 subject matter and confers federal jurisdiction. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962). A case 4 presumably lies outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts unless demonstrated otherwise. 5 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376-78. 6 Analysis 7 The complaint alleges that as part of plaintiff’s senior class project at California State 8 University, Sacramento, she was tasked with creating a public relations plan for Loaves and 9 Fishes, a non-profit in Sacramento. ECF No. 3 at 7-8. At the time, defendant Sister Libby 10 Fernandez was the executive director of Loaves and Fishes. Id. Plaintiff claims that defendant 11 Fernandez used this plan to incorporate a new non-profit called “Mercy Pedlars.” Id. According 12 to the complaint, defendant Fernandez stole this idea from plaintiff, gave her and her classmates 13 no credit for the idea, and received compensation in the form of donations to Mercy Pedlars. Id. 14 Plaintiff seeks to hold defendant Fernandez liable for using her intellectual property. Id. To do 15 so, plaintiff has asserted numerous state and federal law claims, including discrimination, 16 defamation, wire fraud, copyright infringement, and RICO. Id. at 8-11. However, the complaint 17 as it stands fails to assert a cognizable claim. 18 Plaintiff’s claim that defendant Fernandez used her idea without permission does not 19 amount to a copyright infringement. “To prove copyright infringement, a plaintiff must 20 demonstrate (1) ownership of the allegedly infringed work and (2) copying of the protected 21 elements of the work by the defendant.” Pasillas v. McDonald’s Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th 22 Cir. 1991). As to the first element, there is no allegation that plaintiff holds a valid copyright over 23 her plan. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (“[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United 24 States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been 25 made in accordance with this title.”); see Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 853 F.3d 980, 26 984 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that the plaintiff was “required to show registration as an element of 27 an infringement claim”). 28 Moreover, copyright protection is available for “original works of authorship fixed in any 1 tangible medium of expression,” such as literary, musical, dramatic, and graphic works. 17 2 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SORAYA MARIA RIGOR, Case No. 2:23-cv-02048-TLN-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 14 MERCY PEDLERS, et al., ECF No. 2 15 Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 16 THAT PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED 17 COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND FOR FAILURE TO 18 STATE A CLAIM 19 ECF No. 3 20 21 Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Her 22 declaration makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)(1) and (2). See ECF No. 2. 23 Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 24 Under § 1915(e)(2), the court must dismiss the case at any time if it determines that the 25 allegation of poverty is untrue, or that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on 26 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. As discussed 27 below, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim. As such, I recommend that it be dismissed 28 without leave to amend. 1 Screening and Pleading Requirements 2 A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed 3 in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and 4 dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon 5 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 6 relief. Id. 7 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 9 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 10 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 11 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 12 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 13 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 14 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 15 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 16 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 17 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 18 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 19 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 20 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 21 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 22 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 23 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 24 Additionally, a plaintiff’s complaint must set forth the basis for federal court jurisdiction. A 25 federal court may adjudicate only those cases authorized by the Constitution and by Congress. 26 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The basic federal jurisdiction 27 statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332, confer “federal question” and “diversity” jurisdiction, 28 respectively. Federal question jurisdiction requires that the complaint (1) arise under a federal 1 law or the U.S. Constitution, (2) allege a “case or controversy” within the meaning of Article III, 2 § 2 of the U.S. Constitution, or (3) be authorized by a federal statute that both regulates a specific 3 subject matter and confers federal jurisdiction. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962). A case 4 presumably lies outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts unless demonstrated otherwise. 5 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376-78. 6 Analysis 7 The complaint alleges that as part of plaintiff’s senior class project at California State 8 University, Sacramento, she was tasked with creating a public relations plan for Loaves and 9 Fishes, a non-profit in Sacramento. ECF No. 3 at 7-8. At the time, defendant Sister Libby 10 Fernandez was the executive director of Loaves and Fishes. Id. Plaintiff claims that defendant 11 Fernandez used this plan to incorporate a new non-profit called “Mercy Pedlars.” Id. According 12 to the complaint, defendant Fernandez stole this idea from plaintiff, gave her and her classmates 13 no credit for the idea, and received compensation in the form of donations to Mercy Pedlars. Id. 14 Plaintiff seeks to hold defendant Fernandez liable for using her intellectual property. Id. To do 15 so, plaintiff has asserted numerous state and federal law claims, including discrimination, 16 defamation, wire fraud, copyright infringement, and RICO. Id. at 8-11. However, the complaint 17 as it stands fails to assert a cognizable claim. 18 Plaintiff’s claim that defendant Fernandez used her idea without permission does not 19 amount to a copyright infringement. “To prove copyright infringement, a plaintiff must 20 demonstrate (1) ownership of the allegedly infringed work and (2) copying of the protected 21 elements of the work by the defendant.” Pasillas v. McDonald’s Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th 22 Cir. 1991). As to the first element, there is no allegation that plaintiff holds a valid copyright over 23 her plan. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (“[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United 24 States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been 25 made in accordance with this title.”); see Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 853 F.3d 980, 26 984 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that the plaintiff was “required to show registration as an element of 27 an infringement claim”). 28 Moreover, copyright protection is available for “original works of authorship fixed in any 1 tangible medium of expression,” such as literary, musical, dramatic, and graphic works. 17 2 U.S.C. § 102(a). Copyright protection is limited, such that it does not “extend to any idea, 3 procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of 4 the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” 17 U.S.C. 5 § 102(b). Copyright protection is “given only to the expression of the idea—not the idea itself.” 6 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). Plaintiff’s plan is therefore not covered under 7 copyright law. 8 Plaintiff also attempts to assert several criminal statues as basis for her claims. However, 9 criminal statutes “generally do not give rise to private rights of action.” Robertson v. Cath. Cmty. 10 Servs. of W. Wash., No. 22-35965, 2023 WL 3597383, at *1 (9th Cir. May 23, 2023) (citing Cent. 11 Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994)). Only 12 where “Congress intended to create, [ei]ther expressly or by implication, a private cause of 13 action” will a civil claim be recognized. Valero v. Bac Home Loans Servicing, LP, 667 F. App’x 14 255, 255 (2016) (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979)). Courts 15 may not “infer a private right of action from ‘a bare criminal statute.’” Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 16 U.S. at 190. Accordingly, the federal statutes on which plaintiff relies upon do not confer a basis 17 for civil liability. See Valero, 667 F. App’x at 255 (affirming dismissal of civil claims asserted 18 under Title 18 “because there is no private right of action provided by those criminal statutes”). 19 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 20 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, is granted. 21 2. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, ECF No. 3, is dismissed with leave to amend. 22 3. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 23 complaint. The amended complaint must bear the docket number assigned to this case and must 24 be labeled “Second Amended Complaint.” Failure to timely file an amended complaint in 25 accordance with this order will result in a recommendation this action be dismissed. 26 27 28 1 > IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 ( | { Wine Dated: _ September 3, 2024 Q_—_—. 4 JEREMY D. PETERSON 5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28