1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BHARATH RAGHUKULTILAK., No. 2:19-CV-0455-TLN-DMC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND 15 REHABILITATION, et al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. Pending before the 19 Court is Defendants’ unopposed motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 27, supporting 20 memorandum, ECF No. 28, request for judicial notice, ECF NO. 29, separate statement of 21 undisputed facts, ECF No. 30, and exhibits, ECF No. 31. Pursuant to Eastern District of 22 California Local Rule 230(c), the matter was submitted on the papers without oral argument. 23 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment or summary 24 adjudication when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 25 together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 26 the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The 27 standard for summary judgment and summary adjudication is the same. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 28 56(a), 56(c); see also Mora v. ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). One of 1 the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. See 2 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Under summary judgment practice, the 3 moving party
4 . . . always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, 5 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a 6 genuine issue of material fact.
7 Id., at 323 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 8 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the 9 opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See 10 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to 11 establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the 12 allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the 13 form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the 14 dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The 15 opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might 16 affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 17 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th 18 Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 19 return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 20 (9th Cir. 1987). To demonstrate that an issue is genuine, the opposing party “must do more than 21 simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record 22 taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 23 ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). It is sufficient that “the 24 claimed factual dispute be shown to require a trier of fact to resolve the parties’ differing versions 25 of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, 2 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. 3 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, see Anderson, 4 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the 5 court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 6 Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to 7 produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen 8 Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 9 1987). Ultimately, “[b]efore the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the 10 judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could 11 properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is 12 imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. 13 14 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 15 This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s original complaint. See ECF No. 1. In his 16 complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following “Case Overview”:
17 California Correctional Health Care Services is located in Elk Grove, California, and provided medical health services to inmate patients 18 of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation at High Desert State Prison in Susanville, California. CDCR created a toxic work 19 environment where racists discriminatory remarks were a common occurrence. From management, to employees, the High Desert State 20 Prison engaged in a systematic campaign of harassment, discrimination, and retaliation against a highly competent physician because of his 21 national origin, ancestry, race, disability, and whistle-blowing protected categories. Despite repeated complaints made to the CEO and Medical 22 Director of the facility, no action was taken to stop the harassment, discrimination, and retaliation. In the short amount of time that Plaintiff 23 worked for Defendant, Defendant managed to create an extremely hostile environment where Plaintiff’s constant concerns regarding patient health 24 and safety were disregarded. Harassment increased after Plaintiff made valid complaints 25 regarding the hospital’s treatment of their patients. Plaintiff pressed management on the lack of ADA compliant chairs and raised concerns 26 regarding patient confidentiality. Ultimately instead of addressing the several issued in its prison, the High Desert State Prison unlawfully 27 terminated Plaintiff.
28 ECF No. 1, pg. 2. 1 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) the California Correctional Health Care Services 2 (CCHCS); (2) the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR); (3) David 3 Snell, M.D.; (4) Kevin Rueter, M.D.; and (5) Todd Murray, Psy.D. See id. at 2-3. The individual 4 defendants are sued in their official capacities only. See id. at 4. 5 Plaintiff states the facts alleged in the complaint give rise to the following causes 6 of action:
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BHARATH RAGHUKULTILAK., No. 2:19-CV-0455-TLN-DMC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND 15 REHABILITATION, et al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. Pending before the 19 Court is Defendants’ unopposed motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 27, supporting 20 memorandum, ECF No. 28, request for judicial notice, ECF NO. 29, separate statement of 21 undisputed facts, ECF No. 30, and exhibits, ECF No. 31. Pursuant to Eastern District of 22 California Local Rule 230(c), the matter was submitted on the papers without oral argument. 23 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment or summary 24 adjudication when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 25 together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 26 the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The 27 standard for summary judgment and summary adjudication is the same. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 28 56(a), 56(c); see also Mora v. ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). One of 1 the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. See 2 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Under summary judgment practice, the 3 moving party
4 . . . always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, 5 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a 6 genuine issue of material fact.
7 Id., at 323 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 8 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the 9 opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See 10 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to 11 establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the 12 allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the 13 form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the 14 dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The 15 opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might 16 affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 17 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th 18 Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 19 return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 20 (9th Cir. 1987). To demonstrate that an issue is genuine, the opposing party “must do more than 21 simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record 22 taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 23 ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). It is sufficient that “the 24 claimed factual dispute be shown to require a trier of fact to resolve the parties’ differing versions 25 of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, 2 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. 3 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, see Anderson, 4 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the 5 court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 6 Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to 7 produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen 8 Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 9 1987). Ultimately, “[b]efore the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the 10 judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could 11 properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is 12 imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. 13 14 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 15 This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s original complaint. See ECF No. 1. In his 16 complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following “Case Overview”:
17 California Correctional Health Care Services is located in Elk Grove, California, and provided medical health services to inmate patients 18 of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation at High Desert State Prison in Susanville, California. CDCR created a toxic work 19 environment where racists discriminatory remarks were a common occurrence. From management, to employees, the High Desert State 20 Prison engaged in a systematic campaign of harassment, discrimination, and retaliation against a highly competent physician because of his 21 national origin, ancestry, race, disability, and whistle-blowing protected categories. Despite repeated complaints made to the CEO and Medical 22 Director of the facility, no action was taken to stop the harassment, discrimination, and retaliation. In the short amount of time that Plaintiff 23 worked for Defendant, Defendant managed to create an extremely hostile environment where Plaintiff’s constant concerns regarding patient health 24 and safety were disregarded. Harassment increased after Plaintiff made valid complaints 25 regarding the hospital’s treatment of their patients. Plaintiff pressed management on the lack of ADA compliant chairs and raised concerns 26 regarding patient confidentiality. Ultimately instead of addressing the several issued in its prison, the High Desert State Prison unlawfully 27 terminated Plaintiff.
28 ECF No. 1, pg. 2. 1 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) the California Correctional Health Care Services 2 (CCHCS); (2) the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR); (3) David 3 Snell, M.D.; (4) Kevin Rueter, M.D.; and (5) Todd Murray, Psy.D. See id. at 2-3. The individual 4 defendants are sued in their official capacities only. See id. at 4. 5 Plaintiff states the facts alleged in the complaint give rise to the following causes 6 of action:
7 First Cause of Action Discrimination based on Race, National Origin, and Ancestry, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Against 8 Defendants CCHCS and CDCR only.
9 Second Cause of Action Violation of Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111, et seq. Against Defendants 10 CCHCS and CDCR only.
11 Third Cause of Action Violation of California Health & Safety Code § 1278.5. Against Defendants CCDCS and 12 CDCR only.
13 Fourth Cause of Action Violation of California Labor Code § 1102.5. Against Defendants CCHCS and CDCR only. 14 Fifth Cause of Action Violation of California Labor Code § 6310. 15 Against Defendants CCHCS and CDCR only.
16 Sixth Cause of Action Violation of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), California Government 17 Code § 12940(a). Against Defendants CCHCS and CDCR only. 18 Seventh Cause of Action Retaliation, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Against 19 Defendants CCHCS and CDCR only.
20 Eighth Cause of Action Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment, and Retaliation, in violation of California 21 Government Code § 12940(k). Against Defendants CCHCS and CDCR only. 22 Ninth Cause of Action Discrimination Based on Association, in violation 23 of California Government Code § 12940(h). Against Defendants CCHCS and CDCR only. 24 Tenth Cause of Action Harassment, in violation of California Government 25 Code § 12940(j). Against Defendants Snell, Rueter, and Murray only. 26 ECF No. 1, pgs. 19-33. 27 28 Plaintiff seeks money damages only. See id. at 33. 1 It bears noting that Plaintiff’s complaint was filed with the assistance of retained 2 counsel who has since withdrawn, leaving Plaintiff to proceed pro se. See ECF No. 26 (District 3 Judge’s December 14, 2020, granting counsel’s motion to withdraw). 4 5 II. DISCUSSION 6 In their unopposed motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue as follows: 7 (1) Plaintiff’s state law claims are barred; (2) Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the California 8 Government Claims Act bars his non-FEHA state law claims; (3) Plaintiff cannot establish 9 unlawful discrimination; (4) Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s 10 Tenth Cause of Action for harassment; (5) the same actor defense creates an inference of 11 lawfulness; and (6) Plaintiff’s state law and Americans with Disabilities Act claims are barred by 12 the Eleventh Amendment. See ECF No. 28. 13 As discussed below, the Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate because 14 Plaintiff’s First through Ninth Causes of Action against the state agency defendants and 15 Plaintiff’s Tenth Cause of Action against the individual defendants are all barred by the Eleventh 16 Amendment. 17 A. Defendants CCHCS and CDCR 18 Plaintiff’s First through Ninth Causes of action are asserted against Defendants 19 CCHCS and CDCR only. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s ADA claim is barred by the Eleventh 20 Amendment. See id. at 27. The Court agrees. 21 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought 22 against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states. See Brooks v. 23 Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). This prohibition 24 extends to suits against states themselves, and to suits against state agencies. See Lucas v. Dep’t 25 of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 26 Cir. 1989). A state’s agency responsible for incarceration and correction of prisoners is a state 27 agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 28 (1978) (per curiam); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 1 Plaintiff names CCHCS and CDCR as defendants, both of which are agencies of 2 the State of California. Under the Eleventh Amendment, this Court may not hear any of 3 Plaintiff’s claims against CCHCS and CDCR. The First through Ninth Causes of Action – all 4 asserted against Defendants CCHCS and CDCR only – should be dismissed with prejudice. 5 B. Defendants Snell, Rueter, and Murray 6 Plaintiff’s Tenth Cause of Action for harassment in violation of California 7 Government Code § 12940(j) is the only claim asserted against the three individual defendants, 8 Snell, Rueter, and Murray. These defendants are sued in their official capacities for money 9 damages only and are all alleged to be state officials. 10 The Eleventh Amendment also bars actions seeking damages from state officials 11 acting in their official capacities. See Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1995); Pena 12 v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The Eleventh Amendment does not, 13 however, bar suits against state officials acting in their personal capacities. See id. Under the 14 doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits for 15 prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities. See 16 Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997). 17 Here, Plaintiff does not seek prospective declaratory or injunctive relief and 18 Plaintiff does not name the individual defendants in their official capacities. Plaintiff’s Tenth 19 Cause of Action for money damages as against Defendants Snell, Rueter, and Murray, who are 20 sued in their official capacities as state officials, is also barred under the Eleventh Amendment. 21 / / / 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 I. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ unopposed 3 | motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 27, be granted. 4 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 5 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within 14 days 6 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections 7 | with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of objections. 8 | Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See Martinez v. 9 | Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 10 11 | Dated: March 1, 2022 Ssvcqo_ DENNIS M. COTA 13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28