(PS) Habibi v. Orange County, Social Services Agency

District Court, E.D. California·Decided June 9, 2025·No. 2:25-cv-01507·Unknown

Opinion

SAIDEH HABIBI, Case No. 2:25-cv-1507-DC-JDP (PS) Plaintiff, v. ORDER SERVICES AGENCY, Defendant. Plaintiff brings this action against Orange County, Social Services Agency. The complaint fails to state a claim, however.1 I will dismiss the complaint with leave to amend. I will also grant plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, which makes the

1 In addition to filing her complaint, motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and motion for electronic filing permission, plaintiff also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. In it, she asked that the court issue an order directing defendant to “cease any form of harassment or retaliation,” comply with a medical note concerning her need to work remotely, pay her the salary she would have received had she not taken medical leave, and “cancel the unjust extension of [her] 12-month probation period.” ECF No. 4 at 2. The court denied plaintiff’s motion, finding that her complaint does not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits and that the motion suffered from procedural defects. ECF No. 6. The undersigned finds that the complaint fails to state a claim for the reasons articulated in the that order. The court also referred plaintiff’s action to the undersigned for all further pretrial matters. Id. showing required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)(1) and (2), but deny plaintiff’s request for electronic filing privileges, ECF No. 3. Screening and Pleading Requirements A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). Additionally, a plaintiff’s complaint must set forth the basis for federal court jurisdiction. A federal court may adjudicate only those cases authorized by the Constitution and by Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The basic federal jurisdiction statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332, confer “federal question” and “diversity” jurisdiction, respectively. Federal question jurisdiction requires that the complaint (1) arise under a federal law or the U.S. Constitution, (2) allege a “case or controversy” within the meaning of Article III, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution, or (3) be authorized by a federal statute that both regulates a specific subject matter and confers federal jurisdiction. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962). A case presumably lies outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts unless demonstrated otherwise. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376-78. Analysis Plaintiff alleges that her employer, defendant Orange County, Social Services Agency, has engaged in employment discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”). ECF No. 1. Plaintiff is a Farsi speaking woman who is older than 40 years of age. Id. at 4, 7. She claims that at her place of employment, she has been harassed and discriminated against by four individuals. Id. at 7. For example, she alleges that her direct supervisor, Laura Lopez, asked plaintiff where she was born, what plaintiff’s husband does for a living, his income, whether plaintiff and her husband own a home, and how much equity she and her husband have in their home. Id. Plaintiff claims that Lopez favors employees who buy her gifts, which plaintiff is unable to do. Id. at 8. Plaintiff also alleges that since February 2024, she has been one of three new employees, but the other two, one of whom is white, have passed their probationary periods. Plaintiff claims that his pattern of discrimination is compounded by the fact that her supervisors are unnecessarily copied on emails about her work progress. Id. at 10. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). As the court previously determined, the complaint fails to allege facts to support a Title VII claim, which plaintiff claims is predicated on discrimination based on race, color, religion, and national origin. The complaint is devoid of factual allegations supporting her membership in any protected class. See McDonald v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., No. 4:07-cv-4249 PJH, 2007 WL 3144832, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2007) (dismissing Title VII claim of discrimination based on race and religion where the plaintiff did not state what race he was or religion he practiced). The plaintiff’s allegations that she speaks Farsi and was unable to purchase gifts for her supervisor do not demonstrate that she is a member of a protected class. The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with respect to

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(PS) Habibi v. Orange County, Social Services Agency, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
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Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska
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