(PS) Favis v. Mallari

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedJune 30, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-01772
StatusUnknown

This text of (PS) Favis v. Mallari ((PS) Favis v. Mallari) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PS) Favis v. Mallari, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEPHEN FAVIS, No. 2:25-cv-1772-TLN-CKD PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 DARYL MALLARI, et. al., 15 Defendants. 16

17 18 This action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21). See 28 19 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff filed an application in support of his request to proceed in forma 20 pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff’s application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 21 so the motion to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. Plaintiff’s pro se complaint filed on 22 June 25, 2025, is now before the court for screening. (ECF No. 1.) 23 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 24 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis 25 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a 26 claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 27 immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 28 (2000). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 1 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the 2 court accepts as true the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly 3 baseless or fanciful, and construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 4 See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 5 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 6 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to 7 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial 8 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 9 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 10 Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & fn. 7 11 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal). Prior to dismissal, the court is 12 to tell the plaintiff of deficiencies in the complaint and provide an opportunity to cure––if it 13 appears at all possible the defects can be corrected. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 14 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, if amendment would be futile, no leave to amend need be 15 given. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996). 16 The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and a federal court has an independent 17 duty to assess whether federal subject matter jurisdiction exists, whether or not the parties raise 18 the issue. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 19 2004). The court must sua sponte dismiss the case if, at any time, it determines that it lacks 20 subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A federal district court generally has 21 original jurisdiction over a civil action when: (1) a federal question is presented in an action 22 “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” or (2) there is complete 23 diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 24 1332(a). 25 II. THE COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED 26 A. Allegations 27 Plaintiff has filed a complaint alleging three causes of action: Deprivation of Procedural 28 Due Process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Retaliation for Protected Activity in violation of 42 1 U.S.C. § 1983; and Fraud on the Court “Equitable Action.” (ECF No. 1.) Although the 2 allegations are difficult to follow, it appears that plaintiff filed a noise complaint against 3 defendants in March 2025. (Id. at 2.) After an altercation between plaintiff and defendants on 4 March 6, during which plaintiff alleges he was injured, defendants filed a request for a restraining 5 order in the Sacramento Superior Court. (Id.) Plaintiff also requested a protective order and 6 requested smartphone video footage, presumably of the altercation. (Id.) Defendants refused to 7 provide the footage to plaintiff, but it was provided to a judge involved in the matter. (Id.) 8 Although it is not clear, it appears that a restraining order was issued against the plaintiff. Plaintiff 9 “is not seeking appellate view of the restraining order itself but seeks redress for independent 10 constitutional violations based on extrinsic fraud.” (Id. at 3.) 11 B. Legal Standards 12 To state a claim under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two 13 essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 14 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of 15 state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 16 substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 17 conferred.” Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). 18 “A section 1983 claim based upon procedural due process has three elements: (1) a 19 liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the 20 government; (3) lack of process.” Id. (citing Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 21 (9th Cir. 1993)). 22 To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “that (1) she 23 was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, (2) the defendant's actions would chill a 24 person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity and (3) 25 the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's conduct.” O'Brien 26 v. Welty, 818 F.3d 920, 932 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 27 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006)). To ultimately “prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must establish a 28 ‘causal connection’ between the government defendant's ‘retaliatory animus’ and the plaintiff's 1 ‘subsequent injury.’” Hartman v.

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(PS) Favis v. Mallari, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ps-favis-v-mallari-caed-2025.