1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SURESH ESWARAN, Case No. 2:25-cv-1003-TLN-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 GAVIN NEWSOM, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Suresh Eswaran (“plaintiff”) alleges that defendants violated his free speech and due 18 process rights after he was denied a state contract. ECF No. 7 at 2-4. After review of the 19 amended complaint, I find that plaintiff’s First Amendment censorship claim against defendant 20 Radcliffe is suitable to proceed past screening. All other claims, however, are non-cognizable 21 and should be dismissed without leave to amend. 22 Screening and Pleading Requirements 23 A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed 24 in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and 25 dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon 26 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 27 relief. Id. 28 1 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 3 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 4 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 5 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 6 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 7 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 8 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 9 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 10 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 11 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 12 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 13 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 14 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 15 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 16 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 17 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 18 Analysis 19 As in his initial complaint, plaintiff alleges that he designed a rehabilitation program for 20 prisoners and engaged in negotiations with leadership at the California Department of Corrections 21 and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) to implement it. ECF No. 7 at 3. He claims that a deal was nearly 22 finalized but, before it was signed, a change in leadership at the CDCR terminated the negotiation 23 process and the program was never adopted. Id. As I explained in my previous screening order, 24 plaintiff has no property right in a state contract that was never adopted. A claimant cannot seek 25 enforcement or damages from a party that he himself admits never agreed to terms. Nor is there 26 any law supporting the notion that, in nearly obtaining a state contract, a plaintiff establishes 27 some property right or federally entitled process. Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 28 871 (9th Cir. 1998) (“To establish a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must, as a threshold 1 matter, show a government deprivation of life, liberty, or property.”). The frivolity of this claim 2 is highlighted by the extraordinarily large amount of damages plaintiff seeks in recompense: 1.9 3 billion dollars. ECF No. 7 at 3. 4 Similarly, plaintiff’s retaliation claims are non-cognizable. As best I can tell, he alleges 5 that Governor Newsom retaliated against him because of his public criticism of California’s 6 correctional policies. Id. He claims that the California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) is a paramilitary 7 organization that sent officers to intimidate him and to convince his family that he needed 8 psychiatric care. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff does not allege how he knows that Governor Newsom 9 directed these actions, or how the governor became aware of his advocacy. Moreover, the details 10 of his encounters with the CHP are vague, offering almost nothing in the way of context. For 11 instance, he alleges that CHP officers visited his family’s home and attempted to dissuade him 12 from attending a California judicial council meeting.1 Id. Plaintiff does not specifically allege 13 what was said or done to dissuade him from attending the meeting. And his claim that Newsom 14 was behind the attempt at dissuasion is based on pure conjecture. He claims that only Newsom 15 had the “unique constitutional authority” to compel the CHP or CDCR to retaliate against him. 16 Id. at 5. Plaintiff also alleges that he knows that the governor was “consciously aware” of his 17 advocacy because he connected with him on a social media platform. Id. Federal pleading 18 standards are not demanding, but they demand more than conjecture, unsupported by any alleged 19 detail. See Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2014) (mere conjecture does not 20 satisfy Rule 8(a)). Given that plaintiff twice been permitted to amend his complaint, I find that 21 granting further opportunities to amend his deficient claims would be futile. See Schucker v. 22 Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (“Dismissal of a pro se 23 complaint without leave to amend is proper only if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of 24 the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) (internal quotation marks and citations 25 omitted); California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1472 (9th 26
27 1 In a separate instance of alleged “retaliation,” plaintiff alleges that a podcasting agreement with a corporate executive abruptly fell through. ECF No. 7 at 3. Governor 28 Newsom’s alleged involvement in this event is not even cursorily alleged. 1 Cir. 1988) (“Valid reasons for denying leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith, prejudice, 2 and futility.”). 3 By contrast, plaintiff’s First Amendment claim that defendant Radcliffe prevented him 4 from speaking at a public hearing for the California State Personnel Board is, for purposes of 5 screening, cognizable. Plaintiff alleges that Radcliffe interfered with his microphone and 6 prevented his comments from being entered into the record. These allegations, liberally 7 construed, are sufficient to state a First Amendment claim against this defendant.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SURESH ESWARAN, Case No. 2:25-cv-1003-TLN-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 GAVIN NEWSOM, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Suresh Eswaran (“plaintiff”) alleges that defendants violated his free speech and due 18 process rights after he was denied a state contract. ECF No. 7 at 2-4. After review of the 19 amended complaint, I find that plaintiff’s First Amendment censorship claim against defendant 20 Radcliffe is suitable to proceed past screening. All other claims, however, are non-cognizable 21 and should be dismissed without leave to amend. 22 Screening and Pleading Requirements 23 A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed 24 in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and 25 dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon 26 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 27 relief. Id. 28 1 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 3 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 4 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 5 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 6 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 7 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 8 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 9 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 10 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 11 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 12 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 13 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 14 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 15 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 16 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 17 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 18 Analysis 19 As in his initial complaint, plaintiff alleges that he designed a rehabilitation program for 20 prisoners and engaged in negotiations with leadership at the California Department of Corrections 21 and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) to implement it. ECF No. 7 at 3. He claims that a deal was nearly 22 finalized but, before it was signed, a change in leadership at the CDCR terminated the negotiation 23 process and the program was never adopted. Id. As I explained in my previous screening order, 24 plaintiff has no property right in a state contract that was never adopted. A claimant cannot seek 25 enforcement or damages from a party that he himself admits never agreed to terms. Nor is there 26 any law supporting the notion that, in nearly obtaining a state contract, a plaintiff establishes 27 some property right or federally entitled process. Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 28 871 (9th Cir. 1998) (“To establish a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must, as a threshold 1 matter, show a government deprivation of life, liberty, or property.”). The frivolity of this claim 2 is highlighted by the extraordinarily large amount of damages plaintiff seeks in recompense: 1.9 3 billion dollars. ECF No. 7 at 3. 4 Similarly, plaintiff’s retaliation claims are non-cognizable. As best I can tell, he alleges 5 that Governor Newsom retaliated against him because of his public criticism of California’s 6 correctional policies. Id. He claims that the California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) is a paramilitary 7 organization that sent officers to intimidate him and to convince his family that he needed 8 psychiatric care. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff does not allege how he knows that Governor Newsom 9 directed these actions, or how the governor became aware of his advocacy. Moreover, the details 10 of his encounters with the CHP are vague, offering almost nothing in the way of context. For 11 instance, he alleges that CHP officers visited his family’s home and attempted to dissuade him 12 from attending a California judicial council meeting.1 Id. Plaintiff does not specifically allege 13 what was said or done to dissuade him from attending the meeting. And his claim that Newsom 14 was behind the attempt at dissuasion is based on pure conjecture. He claims that only Newsom 15 had the “unique constitutional authority” to compel the CHP or CDCR to retaliate against him. 16 Id. at 5. Plaintiff also alleges that he knows that the governor was “consciously aware” of his 17 advocacy because he connected with him on a social media platform. Id. Federal pleading 18 standards are not demanding, but they demand more than conjecture, unsupported by any alleged 19 detail. See Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2014) (mere conjecture does not 20 satisfy Rule 8(a)). Given that plaintiff twice been permitted to amend his complaint, I find that 21 granting further opportunities to amend his deficient claims would be futile. See Schucker v. 22 Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (“Dismissal of a pro se 23 complaint without leave to amend is proper only if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of 24 the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) (internal quotation marks and citations 25 omitted); California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1472 (9th 26
27 1 In a separate instance of alleged “retaliation,” plaintiff alleges that a podcasting agreement with a corporate executive abruptly fell through. ECF No. 7 at 3. Governor 28 Newsom’s alleged involvement in this event is not even cursorily alleged. 1 Cir. 1988) (“Valid reasons for denying leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith, prejudice, 2 and futility.”). 3 By contrast, plaintiff’s First Amendment claim that defendant Radcliffe prevented him 4 from speaking at a public hearing for the California State Personnel Board is, for purposes of 5 screening, cognizable. Plaintiff alleges that Radcliffe interfered with his microphone and 6 prevented his comments from being entered into the record. These allegations, liberally 7 construed, are sufficient to state a First Amendment claim against this defendant. I note that 8 plaintiff also brings this claim against Westly but, other than being present at the meeting, he does 9 not allege that she had any involvement in his censorship. Accordingly, I find that this claim 10 should proceed only against defendant Radcliffe. 11 Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 12 1. Plaintiff be allowed to proceed with the second amended complaint’s First Amendment 13 censorship claim against defendant Fredrick Radcliffe. 14 2. Plaintiff’s remaining claims be dismissed without leave to amend. 15 3. If these recommendations are adopted, the matter be referred back to me so that service 16 my be initiated for defendant Radcliffe. 17 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 18 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days of 19 service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 20 court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to 21 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed 22 within fourteen days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 23 objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See 24 25 26 27 28 1 Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 2 | 1991). 3 4 IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: _ June 23, 2025 q-—— 6 JEREMY D. PETERSON 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28