1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SURESH ESWARAN, Case No. 2:25-cv-1003-TLN-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 GAVIN NEWSOM, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, proceeding without counsel, brings this action against defendants California 18 Governor Gavin Newsom, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and the 19 Secretary of CDCR.1 His complaint cannot proceed as articulated. I will dismiss the complaint 20 and give plaintiff a chance to amend his complaint before recommending dismissal of the case. I 21 will also grant plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, which makes the 22 showing required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)(1) and (2). 23 Screening and Pleading Requirements 24 A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed 25 in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and 26 dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon 27 1 Plaintiff has filed a request to communicate with the court via email. ECF No. 3. That 28 request is denied. 1 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 2 relief. Id. 3 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 5 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 6 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 7 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 8 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 9 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 10 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 11 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 12 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 13 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 14 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 15 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 16 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 17 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 18 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 19 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 20 Analysis 21 The complaint, while somewhat difficult to follow, due in part to its 240-page length, 22 discusses plaintiff’s “sole-source contract” with CDCR to create a specialized rehabilitation 23 program. ECF No. 1 at 1-2. Plaintiff claims that defendants Newsom, CDCR, and CDCR’s 24 Secretary terminated the contract without cause and in violation of his constitutional rights. Id. at 25 2. Plaintiff asserts that the termination has caused him financial and social harm and has 26 obstructed necessary reform within CDCR. Id. Plaintiff also alleges that CDCR experienced a 27 data system breach in 2022, which was proceeded by an increase in website activity from China. 28 Id. at 3. Additionally, he alleges that CDCR misappropriated billions of dollars from inmates’ 1 COVID relief payments. Id. 2 The complaint seeks declaratory relief affirming the unlawful termination of plaintiff’s 3 contract, an injunction to reinstate his contract, an investigation by U.S. Department of Homeland 4 Security into CDCR’s mismanagement and security failures, recognition of the Constitution and 5 public safety crisis in California’s correctional system, renaming CDCR to California Department 6 of Cognitive Rehabilitation, $1.9 billion dollars in compensatory damages, and formal 7 recognition of declaration of time. Id. at 3-6. 8 Plaintiff does not name proper defendants. To sustain a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, a 9 plaintiff must show that he suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created 10 by federal statute, and that the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of 11 state or federal law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 12 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). States and state agencies are not “persons” who can be sued under § 1983. 13 See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990). Likewise, state officials are not “persons” under 14 § 1983 when they are sued for monetary damages in their official capacities. See Will v. Mich. 15 Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). 16 Further, plaintiff’s contention that the Ex parte Young exception does not apply to his 17 claims is incorrect. Id. at 7. Under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), a suit challenging the 18 legality under federal law of a state official’s action in enforcing state law is not a suit against the 19 State, and thus is not subject to state sovereign immunity. Id. at 159-160. Ex parte Young relief 20 is limited to actions seeking prospective relief against state officials in their official capacities; 21 actions for retroactive relief against state officers sued in their official capacity are regarded as 22 actions against the State itself for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 23 651 (1974). 24 The complaint is dismissed for the reasons stated above. I will allow plaintiff a chance to 25 amend his complaint before recommending that this action be dismissed. Plaintiff should take 26 care to add specific factual allegations against each defendant and to better organize his 27 complaint. If plaintiff decides to file an amended complaint, the amended complaint will 28 supersede the current one. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) 1 | (enbanc). This means that the amended complaint will need to be complete on its face without 2 | reference to the prior pleading. See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 220. Once an amended complaint is 3 | filed, the current one no longer serves any function.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SURESH ESWARAN, Case No. 2:25-cv-1003-TLN-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 GAVIN NEWSOM, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, proceeding without counsel, brings this action against defendants California 18 Governor Gavin Newsom, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and the 19 Secretary of CDCR.1 His complaint cannot proceed as articulated. I will dismiss the complaint 20 and give plaintiff a chance to amend his complaint before recommending dismissal of the case. I 21 will also grant plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, which makes the 22 showing required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)(1) and (2). 23 Screening and Pleading Requirements 24 A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed 25 in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and 26 dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon 27 1 Plaintiff has filed a request to communicate with the court via email. ECF No. 3. That 28 request is denied. 1 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 2 relief. Id. 3 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 5 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 6 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 7 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 8 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 9 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 10 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 11 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 12 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 13 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 14 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 15 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 16 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 17 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 18 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 19 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 20 Analysis 21 The complaint, while somewhat difficult to follow, due in part to its 240-page length, 22 discusses plaintiff’s “sole-source contract” with CDCR to create a specialized rehabilitation 23 program. ECF No. 1 at 1-2. Plaintiff claims that defendants Newsom, CDCR, and CDCR’s 24 Secretary terminated the contract without cause and in violation of his constitutional rights. Id. at 25 2. Plaintiff asserts that the termination has caused him financial and social harm and has 26 obstructed necessary reform within CDCR. Id. Plaintiff also alleges that CDCR experienced a 27 data system breach in 2022, which was proceeded by an increase in website activity from China. 28 Id. at 3. Additionally, he alleges that CDCR misappropriated billions of dollars from inmates’ 1 COVID relief payments. Id. 2 The complaint seeks declaratory relief affirming the unlawful termination of plaintiff’s 3 contract, an injunction to reinstate his contract, an investigation by U.S. Department of Homeland 4 Security into CDCR’s mismanagement and security failures, recognition of the Constitution and 5 public safety crisis in California’s correctional system, renaming CDCR to California Department 6 of Cognitive Rehabilitation, $1.9 billion dollars in compensatory damages, and formal 7 recognition of declaration of time. Id. at 3-6. 8 Plaintiff does not name proper defendants. To sustain a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, a 9 plaintiff must show that he suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created 10 by federal statute, and that the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of 11 state or federal law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 12 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). States and state agencies are not “persons” who can be sued under § 1983. 13 See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990). Likewise, state officials are not “persons” under 14 § 1983 when they are sued for monetary damages in their official capacities. See Will v. Mich. 15 Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). 16 Further, plaintiff’s contention that the Ex parte Young exception does not apply to his 17 claims is incorrect. Id. at 7. Under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), a suit challenging the 18 legality under federal law of a state official’s action in enforcing state law is not a suit against the 19 State, and thus is not subject to state sovereign immunity. Id. at 159-160. Ex parte Young relief 20 is limited to actions seeking prospective relief against state officials in their official capacities; 21 actions for retroactive relief against state officers sued in their official capacity are regarded as 22 actions against the State itself for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 23 651 (1974). 24 The complaint is dismissed for the reasons stated above. I will allow plaintiff a chance to 25 amend his complaint before recommending that this action be dismissed. Plaintiff should take 26 care to add specific factual allegations against each defendant and to better organize his 27 complaint. If plaintiff decides to file an amended complaint, the amended complaint will 28 supersede the current one. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) 1 | (enbanc). This means that the amended complaint will need to be complete on its face without 2 | reference to the prior pleading. See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 220. Once an amended complaint is 3 | filed, the current one no longer serves any function. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in 4 | the original, plaintiff will need to assert each claim and allege each defendant’s involvement in 5 | sufficient detail. The amended complaint should be titled “First Amended Complaint” and refer 6 | to the appropriate case number. If plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, I will 7 | recommend that this action be dismissed. 8 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 9 1. Plaintiff's request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, is GRANTED. 10 2. Plaintiff's complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 11 3. Within thirty days from service of this order, plaintiff shall file either (1) an amended 12 | complaint or (2) notice of voluntary dismissal of this action without prejudice. 13 4. Failure to timely file either an amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal may 14 |} result in the imposition of sanctions, including a recommendation that this action be dismissed 15 || with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 16 5. The Clerk of Court shall send plaintiff a complaint form with this order. 17 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 ( q Sty — Dated: _ April 23, 2025 Q——— 20 JEREMY D. PETERSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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