WILLIAM JOSEPH BABBITT, 2: 24-cv-02396-CKD PS Plaintiff, v. ORDER DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
Plaintiff proceeds without counsel and seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to the undersigned by Local Rule 302. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff’s complaint and motion to proceed in forma pauperis are before the court. (ECF No. 1, 2.) I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis A plaintiff seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis must submit an affidavit demonstrating inability to pay the filing fee, which must include a statement of all the plaintiff’s assets and demonstrate the affiant’s poverty “with some particularity, definiteness, and certainty.” United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). While § 1915(a) does not require a litigant to demonstrate absolute destitution, Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948), the applicant must nonetheless show that he is “unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). If the court determines “the allegation of poverty is untrue,” the court “shall dismiss the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court has conducted the required review and will grant plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. II. Screening Requirement Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a short and plain statement of the claim that shows the pleader is entitled to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In order to state a cognizable claim, a complaint must contain more than “naked assertions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. The facts alleged must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the allegations of the complaint and construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id.; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). III. Allegations in the Complaint Plaintiff alleges that conditions of confinement at the Sacramento County Jail violated his Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when he was placed in a “suicide cell” that was “covered in feces” in October of 2023. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff also alleges that between January 13, 2024, and February 14, 2024, he was “deprived of hot food” and his “food was stolen.” (Id.) Plaintiff names the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department and “Vera Deputy Sheriff” as defendants. Plaintiff does not say whether he was a pretrial detainee or a sentenced prisoner at the time of the alleged incidents.1 IV. Discussion Plaintiff’s complaint fails to contain sufficient factual allegations to state a claim. First, plaintiff fails to state whether he was a pretrial detainee or a sentenced prisoner at the time of the allegations, necessary information for a complete legal analysis.2 Second, although he names the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department as a defendant, plaintiff does not allege any county policy, custom, or practice that caused his unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Third, although plaintiff names “Vera Deputy Sheriff” as a defendant, he does not include any details about if, and how, she was involved in either incident. Finally, plaintiff does not provide information regarding who was responsible for the condition of his food, nor who allegedly stole his food. V. Relevant Legal Authority The court provides the following to assist plaintiff in understanding the deficiencies of his complaint. a. Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department Municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 585 at 691, 694 (1978). “Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. Municipalities are considered “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore may be liable for causing a constitutional 1 A pretrial detainee’s rights arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause whereas a convicted prisoner’s rights arise under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.2006). To properly plead a Monell claim based on an unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy, plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) such policy amounts to deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). The municipal policy at issue must be the result of a “‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity.’” Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966
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WILLIAM JOSEPH BABBITT, 2: 24-cv-02396-CKD PS Plaintiff, v. ORDER DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
Plaintiff proceeds without counsel and seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to the undersigned by Local Rule 302. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff’s complaint and motion to proceed in forma pauperis are before the court. (ECF No. 1, 2.) I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis A plaintiff seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis must submit an affidavit demonstrating inability to pay the filing fee, which must include a statement of all the plaintiff’s assets and demonstrate the affiant’s poverty “with some particularity, definiteness, and certainty.” United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). While § 1915(a) does not require a litigant to demonstrate absolute destitution, Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948), the applicant must nonetheless show that he is “unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). If the court determines “the allegation of poverty is untrue,” the court “shall dismiss the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court has conducted the required review and will grant plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. II. Screening Requirement Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a short and plain statement of the claim that shows the pleader is entitled to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In order to state a cognizable claim, a complaint must contain more than “naked assertions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. The facts alleged must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the allegations of the complaint and construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id.; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). III. Allegations in the Complaint Plaintiff alleges that conditions of confinement at the Sacramento County Jail violated his Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when he was placed in a “suicide cell” that was “covered in feces” in October of 2023. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff also alleges that between January 13, 2024, and February 14, 2024, he was “deprived of hot food” and his “food was stolen.” (Id.) Plaintiff names the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department and “Vera Deputy Sheriff” as defendants. Plaintiff does not say whether he was a pretrial detainee or a sentenced prisoner at the time of the alleged incidents.1 IV. Discussion Plaintiff’s complaint fails to contain sufficient factual allegations to state a claim. First, plaintiff fails to state whether he was a pretrial detainee or a sentenced prisoner at the time of the allegations, necessary information for a complete legal analysis.2 Second, although he names the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department as a defendant, plaintiff does not allege any county policy, custom, or practice that caused his unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Third, although plaintiff names “Vera Deputy Sheriff” as a defendant, he does not include any details about if, and how, she was involved in either incident. Finally, plaintiff does not provide information regarding who was responsible for the condition of his food, nor who allegedly stole his food. V. Relevant Legal Authority The court provides the following to assist plaintiff in understanding the deficiencies of his complaint. a. Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department Municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 585 at 691, 694 (1978). “Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. Municipalities are considered “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore may be liable for causing a constitutional 1 A pretrial detainee’s rights arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause whereas a convicted prisoner’s rights arise under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.2006). To properly plead a Monell claim based on an unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy, plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) such policy amounts to deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). The municipal policy at issue must be the result of a “‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity.’” Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002)). b. Vera Deputy Sheriff There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). c. Conditions in the Cell Conditions of confinement claims raised by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir.1998). Nevertheless, comparable standards apply, with Fourteenth Amendment analysis borrowing from Eighth Amendment standards. Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. “Jail officials have a duty to ensure that detainees are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Shorter v. Baca, 895 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2018). d. Food The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment imposes a duty on prison officials to “provide humane conditions of confinement.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). “[P]rison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Id. To show a violation of the Eighth Amendment premised upon a denial of food, a prisoner must show (1) an act or omission of a prison official resulted in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,” id. at 834 (internal quotation omitted), and (2) the denial was the result of at least deliberate indifference to a substantial risk that the deprivation would occur. Id. at 847. Generally speaking, the Eighth Amendment requires that inmates receive “food that is adequate to maintain health.” LeMaire v. Mass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993). “[P]rison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Id. VI. Leave to Amend The court finds the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint so vague and conclusory that it is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. The complaint must be dismissed, but plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect… a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”). If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980). Furthermore, vague, and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). An amended complaint should be titled “First Amended Complaint” and bear the case number of this order. In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015) (“an ‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.’” (anternal citation omitted)). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. VII. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not intended as legal advice. Your complaint is being dismissed because it fails to state a claim regarding confinement in an unsanitary cell or the food you received. However, you are being given the chance to fix the problems identified in this order by filing an amended complaint. If you wish to file an amended complaint you must clearly identify the people involved, and the specific actions or inactions they undertook to support your allegations. VUI. Conclusion In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 1. Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 2. Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 3. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice; failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed. Dated: March 12, 2025 / ae I / dle ae CAROLYNK. DELANEY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE CKDBabbitt2396