Przybyla (David) v. State

• Court: Nevada Supreme Court
• Decided: June 11, 2014
• Docket: 64440
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

abuse of discretion." Ouanbengboune v. State, 125 Nev. 763, 774, 220 P.3d

1122, 1129 (2009). The district court denied Przybyla's disfigurement

instructions because it concluded that the instructions were a directed

verdict on an element of the crime and that it was within the province of

the jury to determine if there was substantial bodily harm. The district

court denied the instruction regarding prolonged physical pain because

the term needed no further definition. We conclude that the district court

did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Przybyla's proposed instructions.

See NRS 0.060; Collins v. State, 125 Nev. 60, 62, 203 P.3d 90, 91 (2009)

("[T]he phrase 'prolonged physical pain' has a well-settled and ordinarily

understood meaning."); Dawes v. State, 110 Nev. 1141, 1146, 881 P.2d 670,

673 (1994) ("Words used in an instruction in their ordinary sense and

which are commonly understood require no further defining

instructions."); Levi v. State, 95 Nev. 746, 748, 602 P.2d 189, 190 (1979)

(holding that it is within the jury's province to determine the seriousness

or duration of injury).

Second, Przybyla contends that the district court erred by

denying his special verdict form that separated substantial bodily harm

into the four theories alleged by the State in the charging document.

Przybyla argues that a verdict form indicating the basis of conviction was

necessary to assure juror unanimity "Although there is no per se

prohibition, `fals a rule, special verdicts in criminal trials are not favored."

United States v. Reed, 147 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 1998) (alteration in

original) (quoting United States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d 385, 392 (9th Cir.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) I947A 1976)). Whether a special verdict should be used depends on 'the

particular circumstances of [each] case," and the district court's decision is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting

O'Looney, 544 F.2d at 392). The district court denied the special verdict

form because it determined that there was no need for jury unanimity on

the theory of substantial bodily harm. We conclude that the district court

did not abuse its discretion by refusing the special verdict form. See

Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999) (concluding that unanimity in the theory supporting an element of a crime is not necessary,

as long as all jurors find that the element was proved beyond a reasonable

doubt); Anderson v. State, 121 Nev. 511, 515, 118 P.3d 184, 186 (2005)

(holding that the jury does not need to be unanimous on a particular

theory of culpability to sustain a conviction for a single offense).

Third, Przybyla contends that the district court erred by

denying his pretrial motion to dismiss based on an alleged statutory

speedy trial violation. Appellant invoked his speedy trial right at his

arraignment on April 22, 2013. Trial was scheduled as an alternative

setting for June 18, 2013, but was subsequently rescheduled to August 13,

2013, when the primary setting went to trial. Przybyla filed a motion to

dismiss, and the district court conducted a hearing. The district court

denied the motion, concluding that there was good cause for the delay and

that, considering the factors in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972),

the delay did not prejudice Przybyla.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A e A district court may dismiss a charging document if the

defendant is not brought to trial within 60 days after arraignment. NRS

178.556(1). "A dismissal is mandatory only if the State cannot show good

cause for the delay." Meegan v. State, 114 Nev. 1150, 1154, 968 P.2d 292,

294 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by Vanisi v. State, 117 Nev. 330, 22 P.3d 1164 (2001). We conclude that the district court did not err by

determining that there was good cause for the delay. See Shelton v. Lamb,

85 Nev. 618, 619, 460 P.2d 156, 157 (1969) (recognizing "the well-settled

law of this state that the condition of the calendar, the pendency of other

cases, the public expense, the health of the judge, and even the

convenience of the court are good causes for a continuance").

Fourth, Przybyla contends that there was insufficient evidence

to support a finding of substantial bodily harm. He argues that the victim,

a lay person, was the only one to testify about substantial bodily harm and

asks this court to adopt a rule that would require expert medical

testimony whenever substantial bodily harm cannot be discerned by

simply viewing the victim. Our review of the record reveals sufficient

evidence to establish substantial bodily harm beyond a reasonable doubt

as determined by a rational trier of fact. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979); Origel-Candido v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 381, 956 P.2d

1378, 1380 (1998). The victim testified that as a result of Przybyla biting

and hitting her, she suffered from pain and double vision in her eye, even

after corrective surgery, she was scarred and in pain for weeks, and she

continued to experience headaches. A rational juror could find beyond a

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 101 1947A e reasonable doubt that the victim suffered bodily injury that caused either

"protracted . . . impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ"

or "[p]rolonged physical pain" or both. NRS 0.060. It is for the jury to

determine the weight and credibility to give conflicting testimony, and the

jury's verdict will not be disturbed on appeal where, as here, substantial

evidence supports the verdict. See Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624

P.2d 20, 20 (1981); see also McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571,

573 (1992). Furthermore, there is no statutory provision that medical or

expert testimony is required to prove substantial bodily harm, and we

decline to create such a requirement.

Having determined that Przybyla is not entitled to relief, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 2

„, Piekg J. Pickering

Gt Aili (CC— , J. 'rre

Parr1 J. Saitta

2 Thefast track statement submitted by Przybyla does not comply with the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure because it does not include page numbers. See NRAP 32(a)(4). We caution counsel that future failure to comply with the rules of this court when filing briefs may result in the imposition of sanctions. See NRAP 3C(n).

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 5 0) 1947A e cc: Hon. Alvin R. Kacin, District Judge Elko County Public Defender Attorney General/Carson City Elko County District Attorney Elko County Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 6 (0) 1947A e