Pryor v. Doe

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 31, 2022
Docket7:22-cv-00162
StatusUnknown

This text of Pryor v. Doe (Pryor v. Doe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pryor v. Doe, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DAIVON PRYOR, Plaintiff, -against- 22-CV-162 (LTS) PHYSICIAN JOHN OR JANE DOE M.D., DOWNSTATE CORRECTIONAL ORDER TO AMEND FACILITY; SUPERINTENDENT ROBERT MORTON, JR., DOWNSTATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Bare Hill Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights during his custody at Downstate Correctional Facility. By order dated January 11, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action against Superintendent Robert Morton, Jr, of Downstate Correctional Facility, and “John Doe M.D.” He invokes federal-question jurisdiction and asserts violations of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

The complaint contains the following allegations: Plaintiff, who is Rastafarian, entered the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision in April 2018. Plaintiff was required at that time to undergo a health assessment and physical examination at Downstate Correctional Facility. A correction officer named Cude directed Plaintiff to a “cubicle type examination room” with a “curtain door,” and instructed him to remove his clothing down to his boxer shorts and socks. (ECF No. 1, at 5.) Although the curtains remained open and people were able to see into the examination room, Plaintiff was not provided a gown or drape. When the doctor arrived and questioned Plaintiff on his medical history and records, their conversation could be heard in the adjoining room and by people passing by. After reviewing Plaintiff’s medical history, the doctor examined Plaintiff’s eyes, ears, and throat, and listened to his heart, lungs, and chest. The doctor also had Plaintiff lie down on a table and examined his abdomen and placed his hands under his shorts to check his testicles. Once the examination was completed, Plaintiff was directed to get dressed.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his right to privacy and his religious belief that forbids him from being naked in front of anyone other than his wife. He claims that at no time was he ever informed of his right to refuse any part of or the full examination. He seeks monetary damages. DISCUSSION It appears that Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred. The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Section 1983 claims generally accrue when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the claim. Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff alleges that the medical examination giving rise to this complaint occurred in April 2018, and the claim accrued on that date. Plaintiff therefore had until April 2021, to file this action. Plaintiff’s complaint, which is dated January 3, 2022, was filed more than eight months beyond the limitations period. See Walker v. Jastremski, 430 F.3d 560, 562-64 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing prison mailbox rule, under which the date a prisoner signs a court submission qualifies as the filing date). The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court, “under compelling circumstances, [to] make narrow exceptions to the statute of limitations in order ‘to prevent inequity.’” In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 318 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The statute of limitations may be equitably tolled, for example, when a defendant fraudulently conceals from a plaintiff the fact that the plaintiff has a cause of action, or when the plaintiff is induced by the defendant to forego a lawsuit until the statute of limitations has expired. See Pearl, 296 F.3d at 82-83. In addition, New York law provides that where a person “is under a disability because of . . . insanity at the

time the cause of action accrues,” the applicable statute of limitations will be tolled. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208; Gardner v. Wansart, No. 05-CV-3351, 2006 WL 2742043, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2006) (although mental illness is on its own insufficient for equitable tolling purposes, tolling is appropriate if a plaintiff is insane at the time the cause of action accrues and is “unable to protect [his] legal rights because of an overall inability to function in society”).

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Owens v. Okure
488 U.S. 235 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Walters v. INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA
651 F.3d 280 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Hogan v. Fischer
738 F.3d 509 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Pearl v. City of Long Beach
296 F.3d 76 (Second Circuit, 2002)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
Pryor v. Doe, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pryor-v-doe-nysd-2022.