Pryor v. Bond

110 A.2d 539, 1955 D.C. App. LEXIS 155

• Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 5, 1955
• Docket: 1577
• Status: Published

Opinions

CAYTON, Chief Judge.

The administrator of the estate of Charles M. Hogeland sued Marion P. Bond, claiming that she had become indebted to Mr. Hogeland during his lifetime on a note, and also on a series of separate loans. Mrs. Bond defended on the ground that the note had been discharged in consideration of her promise to marry Mr. Hogeland and that the other items were gifts and not loans. The trial court sustained defendant’s position and the administrator has brought this appeal.

Mr. Hogeland, a widower, was a regular visitor at Mrs. Bond’s apartment. In December 1952 he lent her $1,200 for which she insisted on giving him a promissory note. The note bore no maturity date and the printed provisions for interest and place of payment were stricken out. In April 1953 they became engaged to marry and she testified that at that time when she “promised to become his wife,” “he told me that the note was cancelled as of now, also any future indebtedness of mine would be his.” This testimony was uncontradicted, and it was corroborated in a general way by two daughters of Mrs. Bond and also by a friend of the family. The testimony also was that Mr. Hogeland himself found it necessary to postpone the marriage because of business commitments and that he died in October of the same year.

The question is whether the testimony supports the finding that the note had been discharged. Our Code provides that one of the ways in which a negotiable instrument may be discharged is, “[b]y any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of money.” Code 1951, § 28-801; Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, § 119. We have held that a written contract may be modified, rescinded or discharged by subsequent oral agreement. Nickel v. Scott, D.C.Mun.App., 59 A.2d 206. Citing many cases, Williston has said that it is competent for the parties to a written contract to “waive, dissolve or annul,” it orally. Williston on Contracts, Rev.Ed., Vol. 2, § 591. And there is no logical reason why this principle should not apply to the verbal discharge of a negotiable instrument. It has been held, and we think correctly, that when a valuable consideration exists for the discharge of a note, such discharge need not be in writing, since it may be accomplished by any act which will discharge “a simple contract for the payment of money.” English v. Evans, Mo.App., 157 S.W.2d 793, 795. It seems clear that such a discharge was intended and accomplished by the parties in this case. The effect of what Mr. Hogeland told Mrs. Bond was that in consideration of her promise to marry him and the benefits he expected to derive therefrom, he was discharging the debt evidenced by the note. There can be no doubt that such was a good and valuable consideration. Many years ago the Supreme Court ruled that marriage is not only a valuable consideration to support a contract, “but is a consideration of the highest value, and from motives of the soundest policy is upheld with a steady resolution.” Prewit v. Wilson, 103 U.S. 22, 26 L.Ed. 360. In the eyes of the law there is no higher consideration to support a contract than a promise of marriage. See Miles v. Monroe, 96 Ark. 531, 132 S.W. 643; Guild v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 122 Me. 514, 121 A. 13; De Hierapolis v. Reilly, 44 App.Div. 22, 60 N.Y.S. 417; Anderson v. Goins, Tex.Civ.App., 187 S.W. 2d 415. See also, 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 85; Williston on Contracts, Rev.Ed., Vol. 1, § 110; id. Vol. 2, § 591; Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 1, § 134; id. Vol. 2, § 460.

Appellant urges that the note was-not discharged because it was not delivered’; up to the maker but remained in Mr. Hogeland’s possession. But we think such fact' would do no more than raise a presumption, that the note was unpaid. See Clyne v. Brock, 82 Cal.App.2d 958, 188 P.2d 263; Shannon v. Hoffman, 256 Wis. 593, 42 N.W.2d 268. That presumption would have been overcome by the evidence of payment, and we think it was just as effectively overcome by the uncontradicted evidence of cancellation and discharge. We have had no difficulty whatever in concluding that the ruling on this point was supported by. ample evidence and was legally correct.

We think there is even less basis for challenging the ruling that the other items in the administrator’s claim were gifts to Mrs. Bond. It is true that these items, some twelve in number, ranging-from $5.00 to $200.00 and totaling $1,577.-00, were listed as “loans” by Mr. Hogeland' on the back of the note we have discussed. (The testimony was that he kept no formal-business records and .entered his financial transactions on memos or slips of paper.)But the uncontradicted evidence was that these various amounts were in fact- not-loans but had been presented to defendant-for personal purchases; for example, for a television set, for a vacation trip, for binoculars, for eyeglasses, toward the cost of her trousseau, and as outright personal gifts. It was clearly within the province of the trial judge to accept that testimony as having a higher probative value than.the decedent’s informal notations.

Finally appellant asks us to rule that the trial judge should have stricken the testimony of the three witnesses produced by defendant. He relies on our surviving party statute, Code 1951, § 14-302. That section has no application here; it prohibits a judgment on uncorroborated testimony in actions against an administrator or other representative of a decedent or incompetent, and has no reference to suits commenced by an administrator. Even if it had any applicability to this action, we think it very plain that the testimony of the three witnesses would meet the statutory requirement. Mrs. Bond testified that at the time she made her promise of marriage Mr. Hogeland cancelled her financial obligations to him. One of her daughters said that he volunteered that when they married all her bills would be his and “it would be naturally ridiculous for her to owe him money when they were married.” Another daughter described some of the items as gifts. The third witness said that when in a discussion about the price of an engagement ring Mrs. Bond mentioned the money she had borrowed from Mr. Hogeland, he said: “Just forget about that, because what is yours is mine and what is mine is yours. * * * We are going to get married. We will just consider that null and void.” We can easily understand that such testimony would impress the trier of the facts as highly plausible and persuasive corroboration.

Affirmed.