Protect The Peninsula's Future v. Haaland

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT TACOMA PROTECT THE PENINSULA’S CASE NO. CV23-5737-BHS FUTURE; COALITION TO PROTECT PUGET SOUND HABITAT; and ORDER Plaintiff, v. DEB HAALAND, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR; UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE; UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE; HUGH MORRISON, REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE PACIFIC REGION; and JENNIFER BROWN SCOTT, Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on limited intervenor Jamestown’s motion for reconsideration, Dkt. 71, of this Court’s Order, Dkt. 65, denying Jamestown’s motion to dismiss. The Court concluded that because the claims here seek only prospective, injunctive relief requiring the Service to comply with Refuge Act procedures, and because Jamestown failed in its burden to show compliance would impede any legally

protected interest, Jamestown is not a required party. Dkt. 65. Even if it were, the Court concluded the public interest exception to traditional joinder rules would allow the case to go forward because the claims seek to vindicate a public right to administrative mandates to protect the Refuge. Id. at 2. Jamestown argues that the Court made three “key errors” in its order: (1) it

questioned whether Jamestown a necessary party; (2) it misapplied Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 by “ignoring evidence of impact and risk of inconsistent obligations;” and (3) it ignored a “threshold question” of whether the Refuge Act applies to Jamestown’s aquatic leasehold. Dkt. 71 at 2. Plaintiffs respond that Jamestown fails to raise any new arguments or arguments

which could not have been raised before with due diligence. Dkt. 75. They argue further that the declaration of Hansi Hals, Dkt. 72, contains numerous improper legal conclusions. The Service responds for the limited purpose of re-iterating that it enjoys dominant property rights over the disputed tidelands due to its public purpose easement from the State. Dkt. 76.

Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and will ordinarily be denied unless there is a showing of (a) manifest error in the ruling or (b) facts or legal authority that could not have been brought to the court’s attention earlier with reasonable diligence. See Local Rule 7(h)(1); see also Marlyn Natraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the

controlling law.”). The term “manifest error” is “an error that is plain and indisputable and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law or the credible evidence in the record.” Black’s Law Dictionary 622 (9th ed. 2009). Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop,

229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). A motion for reconsideration should not be used to ask a court to rethink what the court has already thought through, whether rightly or wrongly. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F.Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). Mere disagreement with a previous order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration, and reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been

presented at the time of the challenged decision. See Haw. Stevedores, Inc. v. HT & T Co., 363 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1269 (D. Haw. 2005). Whether or not to grant reconsideration is committed to the sound discretion of the Court. Navajo Nation v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003). Jamestown’s arguments are not new and they do not raise any factual or legal

errors that that warrant reconsideration. Contrary to its assertion, the Court’s Order did not merely “question” whether Jamestown was a necessary party under Rule 19. It decided definitively that “Jamestown is not a necessary party under Rule 19 because it lacks a protected interest for purely procedural and prospective claims.” Dkt. 65 at 15. No further clarification is needed on this point. Jamestown argues that the Court’s conclusion that the requested relief is purely

procedural “ignores” evidence that ordering a compatibility determination (CD) would “prohibit Jamestown from harvesting planted seeds or conducting essential monitoring, interfering with its lease rights.” Dkt. 71 at 3. These are points that Jamestown already thoroughly briefed and that the Court considered, but rejected. See, e.g., Dkt. 60 (Jamestown Reply to Plaintiffs’ response in support of its motion to dismiss) at 15

(“Performing a compatibility study alone will immediately halt existing operations and harm years of investment and production potential.”); see also Dkt. 63, Reply to Service Resp. at 7 (same). Jamestown argues that the Court applied a flawed standard by assessing whether the CD “destroys” Jamestown’s property rights and “improperly applied Makah Indian

Tribe v. Verity, despite evidence of impairment to Jamestown’s legal entitlements. 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990).” Dkt. 71 at 4. Although Jamestown disagrees with the Court’s assessment of the applicability of Makah to the evidence Jamestown presented of alleged impairment to its legal rights, it fails to identify any manifest legal error. Jamestown’s argument regarding the Court’s use of the word “destroy” conflates the

necessary party analysis in Makah with caselaw discussing the public rights exception. Caselaw discussing the public rights exception at times uses the term “destroy” to describe the acceptable burden on non-parties once a court determines a public right is vindicated. See, e.g., Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1459 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The [Supreme] Court felt that this burden on the contractual rights of nonparties was acceptable, however, because such adjudications do not destroy the legal entitlements of the absent parties”). When assessing whether Jamestown is a necessary party however,

the Court did not apply the “destroy” standard for the public interest exception but rather applied Makah and Dine1 to determine that the purely administrative relief would not impede any of Jamestown’s existing legal rights. Dkt. 65, Order, at 12 (“Jamestown has not shown that merely completing a compatibility determination or requiring a special use permit would impede its lease or treaty rights.”). Jamestown fails to establish

manifest legal error and its disagreement with how the Court applied caselaw to the facts it already presented is an insufficient basis for reconsideration. Haw. Stevedores, Inc., 363 F.Supp.2d at 1269. Jamestown asserts that the Court was incorrect in its assessment that Jamestown “appears to have planted seeds after it was aware that it was probable the Service would

conduct a compatibility determination.” Dkt. 71 at 5 (quoting Dkt. 65 at 15). It argues that this “flawed interpretation forms the basis of the Court’s conclusion that it was the Tribe’s own fault that it is harmed.” Id. Even crediting that Jamestown was not aware of the probability of a compatibility requirement before it planted the seeds, it does not change the Court’s analysis on the procedural nature of the relief or applicability of the

public rights exception. Jamestown’s request to modify the Court’s ruling to reflect that it was not aware that a CD for its proposed oyster farm was probable when it planted seeds 1 Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Env't v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 932 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 2019) is denied. The Order accepted as true the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint and drew all reasonable inferences in the record in plaintiffs’ favor for the limited purpose of ruling on Jamestown’s motion to dismiss. Diné, 932 F.3d at 851. It did not decide as a matter of

law Jamestown’s awareness or lack thereof of the compatibility determination requirements. Jamestown’s assertion that the Court misapplied Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 by failing to evaluate the required second prong of Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(ii) regarding the substantial risk of inconsistent obligations is similarly unavailing. Rule 19 addresses subjecting an

“existing party,” meaning the parties prior to any decision on joiner, to inconsistent obligations. Jamestown argues that the Service would be subject to inconsistent obligations because it purportedly lacks jurisdiction over “State-owned tidelands.” Jamestown already raised this point in its initial motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Dkt. 60, Reply at 12 (“There is no public purpose vindicated when a threshold issue is whether the

Refuge Act even applies to the Tribe’s lease and operations on the State-owned tidelands”). The Court carefully considered but rejected its arguments, and Jamestown fails to show any manifest legal error in its analysis. Jamestown’s argument that the Court ignored a “threshold question” of whether the Refuge Act applies to Jamestown’s aquatic leasehold also fails. It relied on its earlier

argument that the Service lacks authority to issue a CD because “evidence indicates the Refuge-area jurisdiction does not extend to the tidelands.” Dkt. 71 at 6; see Dkt. 61 at 16, Ex. A (Map of NWR boundary attached to Hals Decl. submitted in support of motion to dismiss). It argues that there “is no evidence that the State relinquished its fee simple rights to these tidelands” and that “the earlier Executive Order [EO] creating the Refuge could not have included the tidelands and the lands were continuously leased for aquaculture.” Dkt. 71 at 7. Jamestown previously raised and the Court already considered

that the State enjoys fee simple property rights over the tidelands and that the lands were continuously leased for aquaculture. See Dkt. 63, Reply to Service, at 1 (fee simple ownership) and 4 (continuous aquaculture leases). Jamestown fails to establish that it could not with due diligence have earlier raised its argument that the EO creating the refuge could not have included the tidelands. In any event, Jamestown fails to

acknowledge Washington property law which supports that uses by the fee simple owner of the tidelands, such as leasing it to others for aquaculture, may occur concurrently with the Service’s use under its easement as long as those uses do not “unreasonably interfere with the easement holder’s use.” Zonnebloem, LLC v. Blue Bay Holdings, 401 P.3d 468, 471–72 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017); Littlefair v. Schulze, 278 P.3d 218, 221–22 (Wash. Ct.

App. 2012). The Service argues persuasively that it has administered the tidelands as part of the Dungeness National Wildlife Refuge since 1943. Dkt. 76 at 2. Jamestown fails to raise any arguments that warrant reconsideration of the Court’s conclusion that the issue of whether the Service has authority to control Jamestown’s activity in the Refuge is not ripe for review. Nothing in plaintiffs’ claims seek a

predetermination of the outcome of a CD or special use permit decision. Jamestown has not raised any new facts or uncovered any manifest legal error that triggers reconsideration of the Court’s conclusion that the claims here do not implicate its treaty rights. The claims ask the Court to interpret the Service’s prospective administrative duties under the Refuge Act. Such relief does not necessitate interpretation of the scope of Jamestown’s treaty rights and settlements. Even if the Court requires a CD or special use permit determination, any treaty rights Jamestown has will remain fully

intact. As Jamestown recognized in its motion to dismiss, “Treaty rights and their scope must be adjudicated in U.S. v. Washington.” Dkt. 44 at 15 n.14. The Court here cannot and will not determine any treaty rights in Jamestown’s absence. For the reasons articulated in this Order, the remainder of Jamestown’s line- specific requests for modification are denied.

Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that Jamestown’s motion for reconsideration, Dkt.71, is DENIED. Dated this 14th day of July, 2025. A BENJAMIN H. SETTLE United S tates District Judge